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Acknowledgements

It is with great pleasure that I present the seventeenth volume of the *UCLA Historical Journal.* The material in this general issue presents a number of diverse and interesting articles that demonstrates some to the intriguing new research being done by graduate students today.

This has been an exciting and rewarding task, and I would like to thank all the people who have helped bring it to a successful conclusion. Jennifer Koslow and Doris Namala have their tireless dedication to this project. Also, the article reviewers represent a wide spectrum of graduate students in the history department here at UCLA who have selflessly donated their time and effort to make sure that the articles selected for publication are of the highest quality. Eric Altice, Chris Bates, Donna Binkiewicz, Connie Chen, Derek Denardo, Laura Emerson Talamante, Corey Hollis, Daniel Hurewitz, Jennifer kalish,m Matthias Klein, D'Art Phares, Anastasia Simmons, Michael Soller, Anna Suranyi, Greg Vanderbilt, and Steve Wardinski all thoughtfully and carefully reviewed essays and gave the necessary constructive feedback to help make selecting these articles from a group of high-quality submissions possible.

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The Roebuck Motion and the Issue of British Recognition of the Confederate States of America

Lindsay Frederick Braun

With the secession of the southern states from the Union and the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861, British policymakers and financiers had to contend with the novel diplomatic and economic difficulties of relations with two Americas locked in battle. Faced with an uncertain contest abroad and divided affinities at home, the government of Lord Palmerston chose to steer a middle course of neutrality. This did not, however, prevent advocates and detractors of both sides from organizing opinion and advancing agendas across the country and even into Parliament. Debate on the situation within the warring states and suggestions that Britain might do well to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the Confederate States of America as a sovereign nation, or to intervene in the conflict, appeared regularly in Parliament during the course of the war. The ill-fated Parliamentary motion towards recognition introduced in summer of 1863 by John Arthur Roebuck, Member of Parliament for Sheffield, was the last of the serious attempts to secure recognition. It was, perhaps, the most telling effort of the entire war period in terms of the European diplomatic landscape and Europe's relations to events in North America.

Between the inception of Roebuck's motion in May 1863 and its withdrawal on 13 July 1863, its sponsor engaged in amateur diplomacy with the French, serious breaches of protocol, and eventually witnessed not only the obloquy of pro-Union and anti-interventionist speakers but also the desertion of other pro-Confederate members of Parliament. His own rhetoric was primarily to blame, for Roebuck created a situation where the motion's failure would force the Palmerston government into closing the door on recognition of the Confederacy.

Howard Jones's 1992 *Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in*

the Civil War has generally been recognized as the latest authority on the subject of British recognition and intervention issues in the Civil War. However, Jones's work implies that the threat of foreign intervention had dissipated after November of 1862, even though Jones himself notes that the British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, still held out the prospect that the Confederacy might be recognized in 1863. Certainly the South still found sympathetic ears in powerful positions the secretary of state for foreign affairs, Lord John Russell, and the prime minister among them but they had been dissuaded from endorsing intervention. Such a conclusion, however, discards the possibility that Russell or Palmerston might have been brought around by Confederate victories or convincing agitation from textile makers reeling from cotton shortages in Lancashire and idle workers unable to make a living wage as a result. In 1863 such a possibility seemed very real, and the Roebuck motion reflects this reality just as surely as its failure reflects the inability to convince the ministers.[1]

The motion introduced by Roebuck in mid-summer of 1863 thus deserves a fresh look. Jones, for example, limits his mention of the motion to a few sentences and an extensive footnote; with respect to Britain, the motion itself has been touched upon only tangentially since D.P. Crook's 1974 *The North, The South, and the Powers* and Brian Jenkins's 1980 *Britain and the War for Union* (and even those spend a scant few pages upon it). Both limit their examinations to the motion as an episode, but make important points. Crook notes that Roebuck's motion held a great deal of promise for success before it became a fiasco, and Jenkins identifies the watershed nature of Roebuck's failure. After Roebuck's motion for recognition failed, it was apparent that recognition from the major European powers would not be forthcoming so long at the war's outcome was contested. It is in the confirmation of this fact that Roebuck's motion is important.[2]

I.

Queen Victoria, in 1861, declared Great Britain formally neutral in the Civil War, implying legally that a state of war existed between the United States and the Confederacy. The British Government further infuriated the Lincoln Administration by granting "belligerent rights" to the Confederacy, a course of action announced by the Queen on 13 May 1861, within the context of the aforementioned declaration of neutrality. The extension of belligerent rights, extended only when two organized sides are seen in a conflict,

was prompted by Lincoln's declaration of a blockade of Southern ports in accordance with international law in mid-1861. Therefore, Anglo-American relations were strained by this implication that the South was equal in status to the Union as a military force, rather than a rebellious faction. From that point, the Palmerston government kept a neutral stance, walking a fine line between the two sides.[3]

The Confederacy, for its part, sent several delegations to Europe with the intent of securing recognition of the Confederate States as a nation. Diplomatic recognition is in itself a symbolic act, but its repercussions are enormous. In granting diplomatic recognition to a government, a neutral state accepts and tacitly approves of its existence. The problem with Britain's granting this recognition to the Confederate States of America, however, centers upon British relations with the United States. The Lincoln administration's stated objective was the restoration of the Union a goal necessarily incompatible with the existence of the Confederacy as a sovereign nation. Recognition, therefore, portended war between Britain and the United States, much as French recognition of the United States during the Revolutionary War led to war between France and Britain.

The calculus of the recognition issue was not solely on the negative side. Recognition also had the potential to confront Lincoln with a fait accompli and end the war, and its supporters long considered this the strongest argument in favor. Likewise, recognition might lead to a British declaration of the Union blockade as ineffective, and the Royal Navy could then open southern ports by force; hitherto the blockade and closed ports had been respected as part of an internal matter of the United States. Finally, whether or not recognition led to war, the division of the United States was sometimes argued as desirable for maintaining the balance of power between European nations and the growing economic might of the United States. In all of those cases, the Confederacy could remain a source of cheap raw materials for the textile mills and factories of Europe. The Confederate commissioners and their sympathizers used all of these arguments, sometimes in combination, to plead their case. The issue of continued slavery in the South was conveniently omitted, a lacuna that would return to haunt Roebuck's motion in 1863. But to fully understand the situation and why slavery was not the pivotal issue it might appear, one must realize that until late 1863 recognition was considered by many not a matter of if but of when, and the independence of the Confederacy seemed assured in any case. Indeed, to English observers, slavery was not the issue in the war; it became a diplomatically more prominent

issue following Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, which provided Union supporters with "proof" of the North's superior moral cause.[4]

Superior as a moral cause might be, feats of arms dictated the actions of pro-Confederate members of Parliament. The amount of support for recognition varied heavily depending upon Confederate military fortunes; for example, As Robert E. Lee's Army of Virginia moved north and began a second invasion of Pennsylvania in mid-1863, friends of the Confederacy gathered support for a new consideration of recognition for the Confederate States of America.

John Arthur Roebuck was one such friend of the Confederate States. A member of Parliament representing Sheffield since 1849, Roebuck had begun his career in Commons as a Radical, representing Bath from 1833 to 1847. Roebuck held an aggressive stance in foreign policy, having authored many pamphlets and articles on colonial and diplomatic matters, and his attacks on British conduct in the Crimean War were largely responsible the resignation of Lord Aberdeen's Ministry in 1855. He was also a very caustic and often brutally frank fellow, and his "directness of attack and pungency of speech" landed him in more than one duel in his earlier parliamentary days.[5]

William Schaw Lindsay, a British shipbuilder, owner, and member of Parliament for Sunderland, was another agitator in favor of the Confederacy. In mercantile matters, he was well-regarded, and had received audiences with the French Emperor on multiple occasions on navigation issues. Lindsay took part in the birthing of Roebuck's motion when he invited James Mason, Confederate commissioner to Great Britain, and Roebuck to his estate in late May 1863. During the meeting, Roebuck and Lindsay decided the time was right to take action. Afterwards, Lindsay would be inextricably bound to the motion, using his capacities, both official and unofficial, to aid Roebuck and his cause.[6]

This motion was not the first action in Parliament to consider the question of recognition, nor was it the first time the Palmerston ministry had considered the subject. Many friends of the South precipitated discussion of the subject in Parliament at various times. These discussions had heretofore ended without tangible results. Correspondence from Prime Minister Palmerston to his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord John Russell, reflect the former's conviction that without the great powers of Europe, Britain could not possibly act on this issue of recognition without dire consequences. As a result, the Palmerston government followed a "wait-and-see" approach, requiring a major victory by the South before extending recogni-

tion.[7]

Roebuck felt that British opinion at this time was favorable to his motion. In addition to recent Confederate victories, including Chancellorsville in May, there was a perceived willingness of France to follow Great Britain's lead on matters concerning the American war. Roebuck thus needed only worry about opposition in Parliament standing in the way of recognition. Pro-Confederate groups, to this end, organized meetings designed to solicit sympathy from the industrial workers. At the same time, Roebuck himself organized meetings in Sheffield to garner support for his motion, the presentation of which was scheduled for 30 June.[8]

However, anti-recognition forces were also gearing up for Roebuck. From another member of Parliament, Roebuck heard of a rumor that may have originated from Palmerston himself. This rumor implied that Palmerston would, in the course of debate, oppose recognition as inexpedient. He would support his opposition with the statement that Napoleon III had reversed his earlier position and no longer supported the idea of meddling in American affairs, with or without Great Britain. Roebuck communicated this discovery in a letter to Lindsay, and they came to the realization that the only way to counter the possibility of Palmerston's undercutting them was to travel to Paris immediately and speak with the Emperor themselves.[9]

II

Roebuck and Lindsay met with Napoleon III on 22 June 1863, only eight days before the initial discussion of the motion before Parliament. There, Roebuck was notified by Napoleon that France was ready to support recognition if Britain should decide on that course. Napoleon, however, refused Roebuck's request for an official statement of his position, fearing that Lord Russell would forward any such communication to U.S. Secretary of State Seward in Washington. Napoleon III feared a war, which would jeopardize his position in Mexico and quite possibly destroy his fleet. Roebuck replied to Napoleon that the Union would not declare war, but even if they followed such a course, France would need not fear. The federal navy was weak, and the people fatigued; Roebuck believed that the people of both Union and Confederacy would hail Napoleon as a savior. Napoleon was also informed of the existence of "peace parties" in the North, and Roebuck's belief that their existence was an indicator of popular sentiment.[10]

Before leaving their audience with Napoleon, Roebuck brought up a question which would later cause much embarrassment to himself, Lindsay, and

the Palmerston government. Roebuck was denied any written statement of the Emperor's position, arising from Napoleon's fear of having such a communiqué forwarded by Russell to the United States Department of State, which the Emperor alleged happened before. Roebuck therefore asked if he could have the Emperor's permission to relay verbally, to Parliament, all that was communicated in the meeting. The Emperor tendered an affirmative answer. This information coming from Napoleon contradicted the position Palmerston was intending to present in Parliament, that France was not in communication with Great Britain on the subject of Confederate recognition, and therefore was not in favor of recognition at that time. According to Lindsay's written account of the meeting, Napoleon expressed surprise that "Lord Palmerston gave that answer, for you know, Mr. Lindsay, it was not correct."[11] Feeling secure in this knowledge, Roebuck was prepared to return to Parliament and present his motion before Commons.[12]

This first day of the debate ultimately consisted of five major groupings of arguments. The first grouping was one that contained only Roebuck, for this was Roebuck's own presentation, designed to justify his position. The second grouping, perhaps the most immediately damaging to Roebuck, was made up of friends of the Confederacy who were against recognition. The third segment, which was divided into several spots during this part of the debate, was the position of government ministers who partook. The fourth, and most virulently opposed, viewpoint comes from the pro-Union factions. They were also not sequential in the debate, but attacked Roebuck's motion at several different times. The last group, which included only Lord Robert Arthur Talbot Cecil, member for Stamford and a future Prime Minister himself, was the pro-recognition group providing support on the floor for Roebuck. Oddly enough, William Lindsay did not address Commons in the course of the debate on the 30th. Although he was addressed, and even rose from his seat on one occasion, he declined to comment.[13]

The debate drifted as well. It can be divided, therefore, into two major parts: one that was the intended subject, the motion itself; the second was the subject upon which debate turned at the end, the question of Roebuck's allegations concerning France. The first portion was the longest, as the speeches were of greater duration, but the second appears to be impromptu and is therefore shorter in the total length of transcribed material. The second subject was undoubtedly the cause of questions that were later brought up in Commons. At the beginning of the debate, however, Roebuck felt he had the Napoleonic trump card to play against the machinations of Palmerston.[14]

Roebuck was therefore confident in his intent to present his motion before Parliament; however, immediately prior to his presentation on 30 June a different but related question was placed before Commons. This was a question posed by William E. Forster to the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir Austen Henry Layard, concerning the position of France. Forster asked Layard if the government had received any communiqués from France concerning intervention or mediation in the Civil War. In his answer to the question, Layard took great care to clearly indicate that no such communiqué came from France dealing with any issue of that sort, including recognition. Forster's purpose of bringing this question to the floor at the time was clearly to acquaint the members with the 'official' position of the French, with a mind to discredit Roebuck's meeting with Napoleon before it was brought to Parliament's attention. Similar measures were carried out in the House of Lords on the 26th and 30th of June.[15]

Nevertheless, Roebuck brought his motion to the floor for debate shortly after Forster's question, preceding it with a short background speech. In this monologue, Roebuck stated that the decision of the American colonies to revolt against Britain in the eighteenth century and French recognition of those colonies as independent before Britain did so were the foundation of two points of international law. These precedents, said Roebuck, justified the actions of the Confederacy and merited recognition of their independence. The North, Roebuck continued, was responsible for exploitation and repression of the Southern states, forcing them into armed insurrection. Slavery, Roebuck asserted, constituted an economic device aimed at easing this repression, and when it failed, the South seceded. Slavery was not a question in the war, it was wholly caused by economic reasons. The apparent Northern inability to crush the rebellion was portrayed as proof of the righteousness of the Confederate cause.[16]

From this point, Roebuck ventured to appeal to national pride and public feeling. He showed a strong anti-American bias, saying flatly that he wished to see no reconstitution of the Union. Perhaps more important, however, was the portion of his speech which pertained to the position Napoleon III allegedly communicated to him in the meeting June 22. Napoleon, Roebuck carefully stated, had given him free rein to relate all of the details of the meeting to the House of Commons, which he cheerfully did, using strong language imploring Great Britain to take the initiative, lest France reap all the benefits of recognition. Great Britain need not concern itself with the threat of war with the Union, said Roebuck, for Great Britain could decimate any

opposing force the North could assemble.[17]

Before regaining his seat, Roebuck presented his motion, which requested:

> That a humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to enter into negotiations with the Great Powers of Europe, for the purpose of obtaining their co-operation in the recognition of the independence of the Confederate States of North America.[18]

The challenge had been issued; Roebuck had stated at the beginning of his speech that he expected to receive abuse for the cause he championed. The first to reply to Roebuck was, however, not a friend of the Union. Rather, this dissenter was a supporter of the Confederacy who disagreed with Roebuck's assertion that the time for recognition was nigh, Lord Robert Montagu.[19]

Montagu, a conservative who sat in Parliament for Huntingdonshire, was known as a powerful speaker and an active politician. His oratory on Roebuck's motion was important in its presentation of an opposing, yet still pro-Confederate, viewpoint. Montagu attacked virtually every point in Roebuck's background speech, while retaining a firm base in logic. He struck at Roebuck's personal attacks in a rather indignant tone, and then attacked Roebuck as a puppet of Napoleon III. Montagu maneuvered to systematically debunk Roebuck's precedents with quotations and precedents of his own. Montagu appealed to the honor of Great Britain, stressing the equation of acceptance of Roebuck's motion with a declaration of war against the Union. Montagu questioned the wisdom of interfering when the South was so close to victory, thus stealing the glory of winning from the Confederacy and angering them. Finally, he stated that to prorogue the war would only serve to increase tensions, and hostilities would break out once again as soon as both sides were rested. To that end, Montagu proposed an amendment to Roebuck's motion. Montagu's amendment asked that, instead of negotiating with Europe for recognition of the Confederacy, the government should continue to maintain an impartial neutrality in the Civil War.[20]

Further illustrating the split among friends of the Confederacy, Mr. Clifford echoed Montagu's sentiments immediately after the latter's speech. He, too, attacked the personal nature of the remarks Roebuck made. Clifford attacked Montagu's personal retorts as well, however, but supported the conclusions to which Montagu arrived concerning the implications of recognition. Clifford reiterated the pro-Confederate belief that the states possessed

the right to secede, and that the Union was acting unjustly in trying to coerce them, but that recognition was premature. Within the very ranks of the pro-Confederates, then, there existed a schism over the timing of recognition; this was the very issue that plagued the Palmerston ministry.[21]

During the debate of 30 June Prime Minister Palmerston was ill and consequently unable to attend Parliament. Roebuck referred to his absence, calling him the personification of the government, and perhaps Roebuck hoped to lock horns with Palmerston on the question of France's position on the matter of recognition. The only government ministers who tendered opinions at this stage of the debate were the Right Honourable William Ewart Gladstone, and Sir George Grey, Secretary of State for the Home Department.[22]

Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time of the debate and a future Prime Minister, made his view of recognition clear. He opposed Roebuck's enmity towards the United States, imploring caution when including British interests in the debate. While making no concrete remarks to indicate his preference, he hints at a desire to see the reunion of the warring parties. Gladstone backs this up by his own discussion of British interests in North America, and the potential fate of a divided United States that might target these interests. While Gladstone echoed the sentiments of Roebuck in desiring an end to the war, he also came down firmly against both recognition of the Confederacy and Montagu's amendment, addressing both pro-Union and pro-Confederate considerations in hopes of placing all of them firmly against recognition until the war has reached a terminus.[23]

Sir George Grey addressed the House of Commons immediately after the fiery speech of the Radical, John Bright, and shortly before the debate was adjourned. Grey's topic of speech consisted entirely of possible transgressions of foreign policy involved in the unsanctioned diplomacy of Lindsay and Roebuck. Grey chastised Roebuck for being the spokesman of a foreign sovereign. While communicating the views of Napoleon III on recognition might have been unproblematic, stated Grey, carrying a complaint to Parliament which instead should have been tendered through the offices of Lord Russell (the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) was clearly a violation of accepted etiquette. Furthermore, Grey added, Roebuck's assertions were not corroborated by the French consuls in London, and the correspondence that Napoleon felt was wrongfully forwarded to Union Secretary of State William H. Seward was not secret in the least. Ending his oratory, Grey repeats his assertion that Napoleon III had no grounds for complaint, and certainly Roebuck had no right to act as the agent of the French Emperor in relaying the complaint to Parliament. While these speeches from officials of the government may not have been meant to hurt Roebuck, they did not

come from his avowed opponents, and perhaps that made them more damaging to his position. The pro-Union members were similar in their condemnations of the Roebuck motion and its authors.[24]

Roebuck expected to receive opposition from pro-Union members during the course of the debates, an anticipation which was displayed in the opening remarks Roebuck made during his speech of introduction. Roebuck was surely not guilty of paranoia, for opposition arose in the form of William E. Forster and John Bright, both of whom lambasted Roebuck at this juncture of the debate. Forster, a 'conservative liberal' from Bradford and an extremely prominent member of Parliament, and Bright, a Radical Party member from Birmingham whose oratory skills were well-known and highly respected, were both strongly in favor of workers' interests and against slavery. In their speeches, they did not reiterate Montagu's unhappiness with Roebuck's personal comments. Instead, both men struck hard at Roebuck's anti-American overtones and his apparent defense of slavery in addition to his assertions of Union impotence and French cooperation.[25]

Forster made his oratory focus upon each of these in turn, stopping longest on the question of slavery. The first point which he endeavored to make concerned the threat of war with the Union, opposing specifically Roebuck's assertion that the Union Navy was of no consequence. From there he moved to another facet of a United States-Great Britain break: a potential food shortage added to the cotton shortages already extant. Forster was also quick to lash out at Roebuck regarding the visit to Napoleon, and made reference to the question he had posed to Layard immediately before the beginning of the debate. The Americans, said Forster, feared foreign intervention more than any other threat, and a xenophobic Union response to French attempts at mediation was indicative of this. The largest segment of Forster's speech, though, was his tirade on slavery and Great Britain's moral right to oppose slavery whenever and wherever possible, calling the Confederacy a "Slave Confederation", based upon "'Slavery, Subordination, and Government'".[26] Forster's impassioned anti-slavery plea was so animated that it inspired Lord Robert Cecil to label him a fanatic.[27]

Bright's rebuttal was causticóso much so that is has in itself been the subject of scholarly debate. He attacked Roebuck at each turn, especially regarding his anti-American sentiment and his amateur diplomacy. This first point became a position at which Bright also attacked Lindsay's part in the whole affair. Bright threw personal attacks against both Roebuck and Lindsay, deploring the idea that they should wish to break up a friendly nation, in the name of Roebuck's jealousy of America's prosperity. Bright stressed heavily upon the moral ramifications of supporting the Confederacy, providing figures and arguments designed to generate overt hostility to the Confederacy as

the defender of slavery. Bright did not speak much of fear of war against the Union, but he does make an occasional reference to it. Of France, Bright simply stated that "the Emperor runs the risk of being far too much represented in this House!"[28] After the attacks of Montagu, Clifford, and Forster, Roebuck may have worried about receiving any support at all for his motion. One opinion in favor of Roebuck's initiative was, however, extant on the 30th, from Lord Robert Cecil.[29]

Without Lindsay's corroboration, the only spokesman in behalf of Roebuck's motion was Cecil. Cecil's oratory fell immediately after Forster's, and immediately before Bright's. He spoke more pragmatically than Roebuck, and was less given to passion and judgment of his fellow members. Cecil believed that recognition of the Confederacy was not the tacit approval of slavery, but rather a means to achieving the end of slavery. Like the other pro-Confederates, Cecil believed that the United States was not destined to be restored. He echoed Roebuck's sentiment that, because of this, Great Britain must act to effect the speediest possible end to the conflict. Not only was recognition the honorable and humane course of action for Great Britain to take, Cecil asserted, but precedent once again favored recognition in the case of a successful rebellion against the mother country. Cecil contended that, since the United States government itself had set these precedents in dealing with Latin America, the same rules of conduct were therefore applicable to the situation within the United States itself. Concerning the fears of Gladstone, Cecil implored the government not to be given to hypothetical rhetoric designed to create chimerical fears.[30]

Concerning Roebuck's diplomacy, Cecil postulated that Napoleon's reasons for following this course were probably sound, or else the Emperor would not have consented to such an irregular procedure. Later, in rebuttal to Sir George Grey's attack upon Roebuck's trip to France and his denial of impropriety in forwarding communiqués to the United States, Cecil insinuated that if a breach of etiquette had occurred, the responsibility for it was Lord Russell's alone.[31]

There were several points at which individuals spoke with no long tirades on recognition, addressing instead the validity of Roebuck's diplomacy with France and the perceived feeling of the belligerents in North America. These remarks illustrate the drift of the debate, from the subject of recognition to the subject of diplomacy. Two speakers interjected on this day: Percy Wyndham, member for the western division of Cumberland, and Charles Newdigate Newdegate, a Conservative member from North Warwickshire. Wyndham's short address was a simple statement of opinion, his belief that any call for peace coming from the concert of Europe would be welcome in the United States. In his words, a faint pro-Confederate bias is detectable,

but it is not concrete, rather an observation. Newdegate, speaking after Sir George Grey, came down against recognition, he stated, on the basis of the unauthorized diplomacy of Roebuck. Newdegate said that he must vote against recognition, for the concrete facts in America were not offset by the hearsay of Roebuck on the subject of French cooperation. Shortly after Newdegate spoke, the debate was adjourned. The debate was to be resumed on 2 July.[32]

III

The period between the first and second debates was fraught with behind-the-scenes activity and repeated prorogation of the second debate. Within Parliament, pro-Union factions sought to further undercut Roebuck by calling questions to the floor concerning Roebuck's French adventure. Various individuals put resumption of the debate itself off on several occasions, for various reasons. Finally, this period was characterized by a flurry of correspondence from all corners, most of it hostile to Roebuck.

Activity related to the motion between 30 June and 10 July was restricted to the question of Roebuck's allegations of Louis Napoleon's position on recognition. Forster brought the question before Commons on 2 July 1863. The debate on the matter quickly became a verbal shooting match between the under-secretary for foreign affairs and Roebuck. Layard made an unusually long response to the question before him, despite Roebuck's protests that the matter was already before the House as a matter of debate and therefore should not be discussed. Layard, however, was determined to clear the government of any wrongdoing. Since Roebuck took the liberty of addressing the complaint of a foreign sovereign to Commons himself, Layard felt obliged to tell the government's side of the story concerning the forwarded communiqué. Layard's statements contradicted those which Roebuck had made, discrediting Roebuck's words still further.[33]

Questions about the continuance of the debate occurred thrice between 30 June and 10 July. These questions were raised on 2, 3, and 6 July. Roebuck, on two occasions, asked for a date on which the debate could be resumed. Sir George Grey, in an answer to the question posed on July 2, referred to a desire postpone the debate in order to receive Palmerston's feelings on the matter. Bright and his supporters, confident of victory, appear to have wished to press the motion to a vote before the next mail, but that request was denied. On 3 July, Grey answered Roebuck's same question with the belief that Palmerston would be in Parliament on 13 July. On 6 July, Palmerston himself answered the same question posed a third time by Roebuck, and expressed a desire to conclude the debates. The date for completion of debate was finally set for

13 July 1863.[34]

Correspondence between the debatory periods was voluminous. Palmerston wrote to Roebuck on July 9th, imploring him to omit mention of Napoleon in further discussion of the motion. Communication between Mason and Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin was extant as well. Mason wrote to Benjamin on July 3d, relating the activities of the previous day in Commons. He pointed out that Napoleon's complaint referred to correspondence on the blockade, not recognition, and therefore Layard's defensive status was dodging the allegation somewhat.[35]

Much later, on July 19, John Slidell, Confederate commissioner to France, sent a letter to Benjamin outlining his observations on the Roebuck-Napoleon controversy. Slidell contended that Roebuck's license to communicate the content of his meeting with Napoleon III was limited to the discussion on recognition; thus, by referring a confidential complaint, Roebuck had overstepped this boundary. Slidell also rebuked the contention that any written statement was forwarded to the Union, because the only written communication sent to Great Britain had been published by the French themselves. Although Slidell's communication occurred after the conclusion of debates, it reflects his beliefs concerning Roebuck's actions, and has therefore been included here. During this period, then, many concerns about Roebuck's openness with Napoleon's words, as well as the timing of his motion, had been aired; these concerns would play heavily into the next part of the debate on 10 July.[36]

July 10th marked the beginning of the end for Roebuck's motion, even though the debate was not scheduled to continue until the 13th. On this date, a question placed before Roebuck in Commons turned into an expression of reasons why the motion should or should not be withdrawn. The debate on this date, though it was not on the substance of the motion, clearly indicated the perceptions of those interested in its implications.[37]

Sir James Fergusson, Conservative member for Ayrshire, put that question to Roebuck before Commons, which turned into an expression of Fergusson's belief that recognition was a dead letter. Fergusson stated his conviction that pursuit of the motion would end up benefiting none of the parties in the conflict and implored Roebuck to withdraw his motion. One of Fergusson's points, notably, was that "several Members of the House, who agreed in principle with the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield [Roebuck], and concurred in his object, would yet not support him,"[38] specifically because the timing was perceived as wrong. Fergusson believed that the situation in the United States was too fluid at that time to allow Parliament to commit to a stance.[39]

Prime Minister Palmerston, having returned from his illness, was the first

to reply to the sentiments of Fergusson. Palmerston echoed the sentiments of Fergusson, adding that no continuance of the debate could be made without also discussing Roebuck and Lindsay's French adventure. Palmerston stated that while Roebuck and Lindsay may have been justified in visiting Napoleon III, they had no right to bring those statements before Parliament. Palmerston spoke at length on the French question alone, indicating by his tone the embarrassment of the situation. Later in the debate, in defense of his statements, he explicitly denied that he had agreed to state, on 13 July, a definite course the British government would take concerning the Confederacy. The actions of government would, however, speak for themselves.[40]

Immediately following Palmerston's statements, Lindsay finally rose to defend himself. Lindsay defended his position on the grounds that Palmerston had previously used Lindsay's knowledge of marine matters to negotiate navigation duties with Napoleon III. Lindsay defended Roebuck's statements as true, while conceding that he would not, in Roebuck's place, have revealed as many of the sensitive details. He echoed Roebuck's belief that France would fall in line if Great Britain recognized, and asked that the House of Commons wait until the 13th for Roebuck to make a decision on continuance of the debate. Lindsay did, however, display some lack of confidence in the success of the motion at that time. He specifically wanted Roebuck to wait until after the next mail from America which presumably would contain the news of Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania before making his decision.[41]

William Forster made a speech which clearly indicated his personal feelings on continuation. He wished to carry the motion to conclusion. Forster reinforced his opinion as a matter of principle, not as a matter of sympathy for Union or Confederacy. Forster believed it was apparent by that time that the motion would fail. Perhaps Forster also saw that the failure of Roebuck's motion would be a great moral victory for the Union. Forster wished that Roebuck would make a decision immediately whether he would continue the debate.[42]

Previously unheard-from individuals also added to the debate on continuance of the motion. Bernal Osborne, member for Liskeard, indicated that he wished the matter to be either immediately dropped or pushed to completion on the 13th. William H. Gregory, member from Galway and a long-time supporter of the Confederate cause, made a statement that if Roebuck's motion were defeated, it would indicate that the British government was against the independence of the Confederacy, even if the House of Commons was mostly pro-Confederate. Therefore, Gregory believed that the motion should be withdrawn.[43]

The most important observation of the day, however, was rendered by Lord Robert Cecil, and was clearly a product of his support of the Confederacy in combination with the astute political mind he possessed. Cecil made the observation that most members who were friends of the Confederacy were in favor of withdrawing the motion, a sentiment which even whispered into Lindsay's statements. He also observed, having spoken shortly after Forster, that only the friends of the Union were in favor of continuing the motion. Cecil, however, asked Roebuck to hold off making a decision until the 13th, when news of great Confederate victories was expected to arrive.[44]

Roebuck's actions as messenger of Napoleon III was another topic in the debate of 10 July. Alexander W. Kinglake, representing Bridgwater, also made an observation that the question of Roebuck and Napoleon should not be omitted from the debate as it had already been introduced to the House. Charles Newdigate Newdegate, speaking after Forster, placed his emphasis on the question of international protocol, and Roebuck's statements on behalf of Napoleon. Newdegate saw Roebuck's statements as a great breach of etiquette, and highly improper. Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Layard also made a statement concerning the truth of Roebuck's allegations about mishandling of French communiqués. On several occasions, Layard hints that Roebuck had not relayed the words of Napoleon III exactly, a tactful way of intimating that Roebuck was a liar. The dispatch Layard said Napoleon must have referenced was either one which simultaneously appeared in the Moniteur, the French official paper, or else it did not exist. Layard also strongly believed that Roebuck far overstepped his bounds in bringing forth Napoleon III's complaints.[45]

Roebuck eventually decided to withhold his decision on continuance until 13 July, attributing his decision to the sentiments of Lord Cecil who spoke immediately before him. On the 13th, Roebuck would make a decision regarding the pursuit of his motion. In the meantime, James Mason actually felt greater confidence stemming from the debate of the 10th, as reflected in his communication to Secretary of State Benjamin in Richmond on the 11th. This confidence was not to bear fruit, for on 13 July their position would be converted to one of retreat in Commons.[46]

IV

On the 13th, Roebuck made a decision. He decided that, because of government's apparent position combined with the lack of great Confederate victories during the course of the debate, he would withdraw the motion from consideration in Parliament. Roebuck and Lindsay spoke extensively in

defense of their actions in meeting with Napoleon. However, the fiasco had done its damage, and Palmerston further attacked the base of credibility upon which their defense was based. On this date, pro-Union activists were nearly silent, and the matter was closed. However, this final group of statements, from Roebuck, Lindsay, and Palmerston, clearly outline the change in perceptions that occurred between 20 June and 13 July 1863. Roebuck stated that he was opposed to removing his motion, and in actuality was probably pressured into doing so by the pro-Confederate lobby in Parliament.[47]

The effects of Roebuck's treatment by government, pro-Union, and even pro-Confederate members were momentous. After the failure of Roebuck's motion, the tone between Great Britain and the Confederacy changed for the worse. On 4 August 1863, the Confederate secretary of state, Judah P. Benjamin, wrote James Mason, Confederate envoy in London, stating that "The perusal of the recent debates in the British Parliament satisfies the President that the Government of Her Majesty has determined to decline the overtures made through you for establishing by treaty friendly relations between the two Governments, and entertains no intentions of receiving you as the accredited Minister of this Government near the British Court."[48] Mason's mission to Britain was officially withdrawn upon his receipt of Benjamin's above dispatch on 14 September 1863. It was terminated largely because of the hostile government position indicated during the debates, and the heightened tensions helped contribute to the expulsion of British consular agents from the Confederacy later in 1863.[49]

Recognition was never extended to the Confederacy by France or Great Britain. Eventually, only the Vatican would ever extend recognition to the Confederate States of America. The Roebuck motion was only prevented from becoming a complete failure by its withdrawal, and it slammed shut the last door to Confederate hopes of recognition in Great Britain.[50]

V

The Roebuck motion for recognition of the Confederacy failed to achieve its objective, not because of any lack of sympathy for the Confederate cause but rather other concerns that stemmed from the effects endemic to recognition. A fear of war, concerns over Napoleon III's veracity, and the moral issue of slavery all served to create an atmosphere in which Roebuck's initiative could not possibly have succeeded. These issues all combined in one way or another to create the opposing viewpoints Roebuck faced. The schism within pro-Confederate ranks, the issue of Roebuck's diplomacy, and the revelation of government policy were all of the highest magnitude in beating down the motion.

The most important event was the division of pro-Confederates on the recognition issue, which was underlaid by a fear of war. Without a united front, Roebuck was left with few supporters of his efforts on behalf of the Confederacy. Even Lindsay did not back him fully in the end, and this lack of strong support forced Roebuck to withdraw his motion rather than suffer a defeat at the hands of pro-Unionists.

Roebuck and Lindsay traveled to France looking for support, but instead found a controversy which raised questions about Roebuck's sincerity and his motives in bringing the motion before Parliament. Both he and Lindsay were heavily attacked for this action, and the truthfulness of Napoleon III's statements were called into question. In the end, this amateur statesmanship proved to be a powerful weapon against Roebuck, Lindsay, and the motion.

Another telling event was the position of government. Palmerston was following an approach that emphasized neutrality, but Roebuck's actions forced the government to make some sort of statement confirming that policy. Roebuck's lack of any support in government for his motion contributed to its defeat. Later, the views expressed by Palmerston and Layard would prompt the Confederacy to end Mason's mission to Great Britain. The British government saw the question as one of self-preservation, and recognition was a step they could ill afford to take.

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Dangerous Minds: A Perspective on Women's Education in Tudor/Stuart England.

Morgan Lofting

Why should women be educated? Why should they not? This article looks at several early modern English writers who argue either for or against the education of women. They are Richard Hyrde, Juan Luis Vives, Thomas Elyot, Richard Mulcaster, Roger Ascham, Edward Gosynhill, Edward Hake and Mrs. Dorothy Leigh. Several strongly suggested educating women; others were vehemently opposed. Several approached the subject from a humanistic perspective and several from a religious. All tended to operate from a received opinion of womankind so inculcated in the society it had become opaque. Their arguments became entangled in this meaning of "woman" — a meaning at all times under deliberation and construction in relation to woman's in both the ideological and practical world. The drive to stabilize the meaning of "woman" pervaded these texts, yet the marking of her mind as potentially dangerous facilitated both the arguments for and the arguments against her education. I will argue that her dangerous mind was implicitly tied to the control of her dangerous womb, and that her mind/womb became not only an emblem for the period's religious, educational, and political anxiety but a focus for maintaining familial and authority-dependent relations as the bedrock of Order. Chastity was a key concept here and the selections reveal a constant struggle to define chastity, gender relations and the female mind in such a way as to obviate any threat to the social order and the newly emergent self coded as male.

Of the selected writings one is a translation, the others vernacular originals; all were written between the years 1524-1618 in England. Greater stress is placed on Richard Hyrde and his translation of Juan Luis Vives to provide a base line from which to discuss change and alternative viewpoints which

emerged over time. Hyrde was not only an optimistic educator of women, he found women themselves to be a joy. Do the other writers echo Hyrde's sentiments, or, if not, why do they not? Change is both contextualized within the dramatically altering political and religious climate, and change is localized according to each writer's own particular ethos. Hyrde (? -1528) was a secular optimist and mentor. Vives (1492-1540), was an eminent humanist cleric and son of conversos. Mothers were a vexed question for him; his mother in particular is discussed. Elyot (1499?-1546), a contemporary of Hyrde and Vives who also wrote prior to the Henrican Reformation, was a rhetorician and political writer. Ascham (1515-1568), was an instructor to the young Elizabeth and also Latin secretary to Queen Mary. Mulcaster (c. 1530-1611), bridged the Elizabethan period as a schoolmaster and as the most prominently published educational writer of his time. Hake (fl. 1574), most assuredly a pessimist and possibly a lawyer, had a negative effect on women's education in the early days of the English Renaissance as did Gosyhill (fl. 1560), a satirist. Mrs. Leigh (fl. 1616) a dying woman and widowed mother of four sons wrote during the reign of James. She was not emblematic of all women writers of her day, but a success story of sorts as she exemplified a politicized education for women far removed from Hyrde's optimism of ninety years before. It is the hows and whys of the commodifications to women's education which this piece follows.

The subject of education for both male and female in the early modern period was never divorced from a notion of the public good. The humanists' agenda for male education in the Renaissance turned on the problem of virtue for this very good. Was it possible to teach virtue, they asked, or if virtue could not be taught, was it possible to teach an eloquence which begat virtue? These questions complicated the subject of women's education because of the underlying assumption that women had no need of a public eloquence. Eloquence, education, the importance of the human will as a creative resource, and the superiority of the will to intellect were the keynotes of humanist educational theory, and all belonged to the male purview. This educational program was thoroughly implicated in England's religious reformation struggles and her political agenda. [1] The interactive recipe of education, religion and politics was the key to why some suggested teaching women and why others scoffed at her receiving any education at all.

Certain concerns were paramount: How best could a woman be controlled? Was there any good to be gained from educating her? Could her education serve to strengthen the family or would it destroy the family? In an age which conceived of society as a hierarchy of groups, women had no corporate identity other than the family, and yet the family was alternately

perceived as both a threat to and a constituent part of both the social order and the self.[2] That women had an anomalous power and an anomalous selfhood helped to explain certain themes which contended in both the pro- and anti- educational texts: (1) the construction of an alternative public good for woman through her literacy and education; (2) the overcoming of her inherent "lack" by privileging a guiding authority; (3) the addressing of all educational suggestions to the man in charge of her virtue and not the woman reader herself; (4) the salubrious effect of certain classical and religious readings in educating her to chastity as her crowning virtue; and (5) education's potentially hazardous effect in making her more capable of deception. The notions of woman's anomalous powers and its necessary containment were at the heart of the power/knowledge dilemma. To paraphrase Foucault: power and knowledge were mutually conditioning. Power deployed discourses on and over bodies, establishing the truth of bodies, their desires and their lack. Knowledge was extracted from the body and, in turn, helped to form bodies. The body was object and target, knowledge the major instrument and technique. Foucault never directly addressed the female body but it would appear that power/knowledge had not only produced what "woman" was, but constantly worked to secure that knowledge. One method of woman' containment was the family which in the mid-sixteenth century became not just the agent of social control but the object of control. Wiesner has proposed the family as the key to social organizations of power, seeing relations in all social and political organizations as linked ideologically and politically to those within the family.[3] The family existed as both the containment point and the ideological locus of woman's anomaly. One could say that the anxiety over women's potency enjoined various propagandas where proprietary power and woman's body and mind were always tacitly connected. Educating her to the "proper" knowledge of herself might be a boon or it might backfire. Dangerous minds, dangerous wombs.

By the early sixteenth-century, not only women's education but the whole of education for either sex was tending towards a very authority driven model. Originally, the reemergence of an eloquence based in classical letters had absorbed both the Greek-trained Cicero's of the bonae artae for persuasion in a public, civic context, as well as Quintilian's precept that the bonae artae trained the moral faculties. That a "self-evident" connection existed between eloquence, a mature moral integrity and the virtuous state, pervaded Renaissance humanist thought, but there was a conflict. The Renaissance patron's practical needs, the humanists' educational agenda, and the existing clerical scholarship conflicted and congealed into a more rigid, less optimistic model of education constricted by both society and polity. Renaissance England was neither a democratic Athens nor a republican Rome and

English education was devolving into a conformity not openly receptive to freedom of thought or any vaunted republic's "new men."[4]

Nevertheless, the fact that an ideology of "civic use" still inhered to the curriculum exacerbated the problem of women's education. As Leonardo Bruni had written to the accomplished Batista Malatesta in the fifteenth century: "why exhaust a woman with...the thousand difficulties of rhetorical art, when she will never see the forum?"[5] And if she would not what was a possible moral agenda for women's education? Erasmus, the premier Christian humanist who had united the classical ideal of humanitas (virtuous eloquence) and Christian pietas (duty to God, state and family), spoke not to woman's learning but to her occupation. He proposed that "the distaff and the spindle are in truth the true tools of women and suitable for avoiding idleness."[6] Idleness in the female was not arbitrary; it was dangerous. Idleness equated with the female's uncontrolled imagination which needed to be channeled by some authority, and as the locus of the imagination was the body and not the mind in this period, imagination in a woman posed a threat to her womb fruit. With conception the natural state of the married women, the moral goal of womankind became a perfected state of enclosure, or matrimony, and pro-eduationists came to see a potential if other civic use in her education. Matrimony "matured." Women would become functionally educated for their own betterment and for their children's. The "good mother" was being created: a woman educated to the value of her chastity who, thereby, enhanced the family as a locus of moral and social order.[7]

There should be a drum roll here as traditional ideology displayed its circular logic and woman's dangerous mind and wandering womb were conjoined in a tentative but contentious educational project. Knowledge would make her more moral and therefore of maternal civic use. Or knowledge might encourage her "natural" tendencies toward sin like her foremother Eve. Or she was highly educable and a joy because she had surmounted her bodily obstacles. Or because she was highly suggestible, some authority should be in charge of her education. In the political and religious dislocations of Reformation Europe a humanist optimism in regard to the mind and a religious pessimism in regard to the sinful body were often in odd conjunction, but even the pro-educationists could not get around the fact that certain "normative" constraints on women's sex had to explicitly circumscribe her education. And if she was to be educated at all, then the purpose of her education was not to be and, indeed, could not be the same as a man's.[8]

I.

The first English work on female education was a deportment guide orig-

inally written in French in 1371 with William Caxton setting the English version in 1484. [9] Just prior to the Henrican Reformation and the break with the Roman Church, the first original English comment on women's education appeared. Penned by Richard Hyrde, an educational radical in his own times, it was the introduction to Margaret More Roper's translation of Erasmus' "*Paternoster*," a Latin text first published in Basle in 1523. Roper's English version appeared the following year bearing Hyrde's dedication to the seven year old Frances Brandon, later the mother of Lady Jane Grey.[10] Addressing Frances directly, and not anyone in charge of her education, Hyrde encouraged the young girl to pay no attention to the majority who railed against learning. Rather, Frances should heed Plato and learned doctors of the Church who recommended it to both men and women. Indeed, learning would last longer and be more steadfast than the body's beauty for "though ye had none otheer," he reminded Francis, learning "shall get you both greater love, more faithful and longer to continue of all good folks than shall the beauty of the body, be it never so excellent, whose love decayeth together with it that was the cause of it...."[11]

Although Hyrde quite directly addressed the young Frances one can only ask if he would have concerned himself with the vagaries of earthly beauty if he had been addressing a young man. Indeed, we do not know if Hyrde ever had boy pupils. Little known of him: he lived with the Thomas Mores as Margaret's tutor; he may have taken an Oxford degree in 1519; he died on Lady Day in 1528.[12] Certainly he was present in a household that enthusiastically espoused learning for women albeit a learning not quite divorced from idea of womankind as the progenitors. In admonishing Frances to follow in the footsteps of her own dear mother who was even then taking up that learning that she had missed as a child, Hyrde wrote: "It would be great shame...born of such a mother and also nourished up with her own teat, for [you] to degenerate and go out of kind."[13] Hyrde was rather an optimistic pro-educationist within certain constraints — women were not to be men. But he did not propose that women were by nature immoral as did some of his contemporaries. Rather he stressed that those men were mainly unlearned who said Latin and Greek would inflame women the more towards their natural inclination to vice.

Those men were in error, he wrote, for "women be not onely of no less constancy and discretion than men, but also more steadfast and sure to trust unto than they." Indeed, he continued, if all human vices were open and shown, a man would have much more to be ashamed of than a woman, and yet, men rail at her about her slighter faults. She was more often ashamed of her fault while he did not even acknowledge his own. Therefore, if reading were a cause of any faults, it would work much worse effect in the man than

in the woman.[14] And like any dedicated mentor, Hyrde stressed the teacher's importance in guiding the female mind away from that idleness which had also concerned Erasmus.

> Reading and studying so occupieth the mind, that it can have no leisure to muse or delight in other fantasies, where in all handiworks that men say be more meet for a woman, the body may be busy in one place, and the mind walking in another: and while they sit sewing and spinning with their fingers, may cast and compass many peevish fancies in their minds, which must needs be occupied either with good or bad, so long as they are waking.[15]

Hyrde did not elaborate on what women should be taught but presumably he approved the classics as he would have had no occasion to write the introduction if Margaret were not highly competent in Latin. Moreover, he sang the praises of the humanist ideology: learning "sheweth the image and ways of good living, even right as a mirror sheweth the similtude and proportion of the body."[16] About Margaret his pupil he wrote: "This gentlewoman, which translated this little book...undoubted it is to the increase of her virtue, [that] she hath taken and taketh no little occasion of her learning."[17] A skeptic could say that he sang his pupil's praises as her scholarship redounded to him, but the paramount impression one takes from Hyrde's essay was encouragement for women to learn and praise for their ability to achieve high standards. Perhaps, because he lived and worked among the elite, his concept of woman had a more salubrious caste — a humanist education drawing its value in moral profit. Yet integral to his understanding of woman was not that she was a "lacking" male. Rather she was of a different "kind."

The polarization of male/female into "kinds" was not a new idea but an unclearly enunciated one. Of what gender was an educated woman? Angelo Poliziano in writing to the distinguished humanist Cassandra Fedele, a learned latinist in 1580s Venice, remarked that as a learned woman she was "not-woman." Although Poliziano praised Fedele as "his laudatio of female scholarly accomplishment," and acknowledged her learning as a "manly" virtue in a female body, he made it clear that she was also not a man which squarely removed her from any notion of active political involvement. Equating her with classical figures, he shifted in his letters from addressing her as Camilla, the warrior or manly-maid, to calling her virgin Muse and herald of the poetic cult. In these letters, at least, Fedele was effectively metamorphosed from a talented and learned individual into a genus representing female worth.[18] Because of her learning Fedele had become a paradigm; because of her female body her personal virginity was problematic. By

remaining unmarried, she had refused the traditionally privileged role of woman. Implicit in the notion of two "kinds" was the notion that scholarship was in itself de-flowering ñ the learned woman might never bear her fruit, a child. And this was a problem which writers on Queen Elizabeth's reign would later take up.

Woman's proper fruit was central to Juan Luis Vives' text on women's education; he was a man not quite as sanguine about women as his translator, Richard Hyrde. In the vanguard of the humanist educational movement, Vives (1492-1540) was a Valencian whose parents were suspect conversos amid the rumblings of Inquisition and Reformation. On the continent, Luther's writings would suggest a non-medieval answer to Church reform and divide Christendom.[19] In England, despite the Roman Church's opposition, some were urging a vernacular bible . Vives wrote, as they say, in interesting times. And it is the time disparity between the appearance of the Latin and English texts which may say a good deal about England's engagement with the times and its heightened interest in women's education. Vives' "*De Institutione Foeminae Christiane*" ("*Instruction of a Christian Woman*") was published in 1523 while he was a resident at Corpus Christi, Oxford and in the king's good favor.[20] Hyrde's translation had to be completed before 1528, the year of his death. Between 1528 and the publication of the English translation in 1541, severe political and religious changes occurred in England. Between 1531-34, Henry VIII legitimated his divorce from Catherine of Aragon and established himself as head of the Church of England. In 1532 Cromwell used Parliament to amend the statutes regarding Church and conformity. Henceforth, to call the king a heretic was treason. In 1535, Hyrde's benefactor, the humanist Thomas More was beheaded. In 1536 Henry proclaimed his religious writ throughout the realm, and in opposition, Cardinal Pole wrote the "*Defense of the Unity of the Church.*" In 1538, the pope excommunicated Henry; in 1540 the king abolished the monasteries and convents; and also executed Cromwell. Vives himself, having opposed Henry's divorce, was jailed for six weeks, then left for the Netherlands to die in Bruges in 1540.

One could argue that in more settled times Hyrde's own work would have had a positive effect on the preceding formlessness of women's education while Vives even in '23 had a more programmatic agenda; one could also argue that with the loss of the convents in '40, women lost a more personal space for learning. Home was the only educational venue open for them when, following the break with the Roman Church and amid the Henrican Reformation of the polity, moral regulation became co-extensive with State formation.[21] Was there a political purpose at work as control of women's education shifted firmly to father, then to husband? Was the reorganization of

patriarchal control a reason for the translation of Vives to appear in 1541? The point is not to definitively answer these questions but to contextualize women's education by noting the lag time in Vives' English publication. The dates are important. As Hyrde died in '28, the translation sat on the shelf for at least thirteen years until its publication in '41, one year after Vives' death, and well on into the Henrican Reformation.

That the translation of Vives was published at all, as well as going through four editions until 1592, suggests a possible for it to appear in English.[22] Of what use could Vives' text be? Was women's education being used as a strategy for reconstituting the family as a stable counterweight to the political and religious upheavals? Margaret Spufford has equated any attempts to control the more private aspects of people's behavior with such a spontaneous "higher status" reaction to demographic and economic stress. Muchembled has also cited the sixteenth century's acculturation of thoughts and behaviors as an elite agenda. Law was not only one of power's mechanisms for repressing popular culture, it also spoke for a unifying, centralizing authority which set out to discredit women and their magical mentality. Law and the state as Providential institutions of Order stepped over the family threshold to write a new ritual of social conformity. Such power agendas were not new but an intensification according to Martin Ingram. With the Marriage Act of 1563, the English Church tightened safeguards against clandestine marriage, yet unwilling to countenance any changes regarding the freedom to marry, the Church maintained the apprenticeship system as an unofficial means restricting the poor from marriage. As ambivalence surrounded both prenuptial sex and bastard bearers, the Marriage Act became a new tool in the campaign for moral discipline and Christianization by naming spousals (prenuptial contracts) invalid and requiring that valid marriages be performed in public. However, Ingram has stressed that Law and Church/State made no sustained effort to reform personal conduct other than sexual behavior.[23]

Anthony Fletcher has named male fear of sexual impotency, the prime sexual issue confronting the period. Visible genital difference only located one's place on a one-sex continuum. There was always the danger of overlap and reversal. Positioning women at the lower end of the continuum were God's direction regarding Eve's sin and women's natural physical inferiority, but metamorphosis was a dreaded possibility. With sexual potency was a male marker, impotence highlighted the difficulties in forever stabilizing the male as male and his initiative, control and dominance. Could men alleviate this fear and securely determine the truth of two "kinds" by drawing sharper lines between the sexes? The first "scientific" confirmation, according to Fletcher, was Fallopio's discovery of the clitoris in 1561. This knowledge allowed the Galenic notion of uterus as inverted penis to gradually be

replaced by a clitoris/penis analogy. Now one could admire the uterus for its reproductive functions, without de-stabilizing penile power. Other stabilizing factors of two "kinds" included: the gentry's prescriptive honor code which grounded social roles in the physical body with dress and bearing proclaiming for class and gender rule; the gentry's desire for absolute property in women which encouraged marriage as the lynchpin of social order; the gentry's view of class as implicitly gendered which included an elaborate scheme of gender construction marking gentry from the masses through a proscriptive literature aimed at gentry women; and Thomas Willis' sensational psychology of the 1660's whose combination of biological, psychological and social attitudes created a powerful ideology of gender difference. Phyllis Rankin has confounded the Renaissance body image of visible sexual difference by insisting that the body served as a map, not of gender difference but of social and political hierarchy. The head not the penis justified male dominance.[24] Whether head or penis, however, each was intrinsically coded male.

Even prior to the Henrican Reformation in '23 Vives had a rhetorical agenda of two "kinds" which took no joy in women as had Hyrde in his Introduction to Roper' "*Erasmus*." He addressed not the woman reader herself but the male reader in charge of her virtue: the purpose was for "thynformation & brynyng up of a christian woman: a matter never yet entreated of any man...." He preached the of her learning with chapter headings covering the three virtuous stages of womankind: virgin, wife and widow while citing Aristotle, Plato, Ambrose, Xenephon, Cyprian, Augustine who had exhorted women to goodness but not taught them the "lower things."[25] The only textual change in the '41 publication was in the dedication. The Latin "Instruction" of '23 had been dedicated to his pupil, the same Queen Katherine who was divorced by the time of Hyrde's translation; the translation was re-dedicated to her daughter, the future Queen Mary. The following overview may speak for itself, and Vives' difficulties with his own mother will help make his positions clear. With elite and gentry controls stressing Order and Privilege through ideology and culture, the appearance of the English Vives and its continued republication was another tool used to construct a normative ritual for women.

II.

Vives wrote in his preface a maid should read all the books pertaining to her honesty and chastity. While men were at home and abroad, these were her charges of which she must be informed. Honesty and chastity were women's jewels and those were the more cursed and detestable, who "go aboute to perysshe that one treasure of women: as though a man had but one

eye, and an owalde go about to put it out." Writing to his young student, the princess Mary, daughter of dedicatee, Queen Katherine, he promised the queen "you shall see the resemblaunce of your mynde and goodnes" much as the portrait displays the bodily similitude.[26] Vives did not concern himself with the mind's essence but with its actions — how the mind was put to use. "What soul is, is of no concern for us to know," he wrote. "What its manifestations are, is of great importance."[27] Although mothers were a vexed question for Vives, in this instance he promoted the ideal of mothers and nurses, often called mothers. Mothers should be with the girl to "reckon her daughter her owne" for the daughter is of the same blood, borne in her womb and takes her milk. The mother had kissed the first laughs, heard joyfully the early stammering, held her to her breast, and all these things generate love. And because she loved, "she shall be far more loved and sette by of her daughter." As he held the contemporary belief that a child could get its dispositions from the teat, Vives recommended using the best nurses, and the wisest also because the first speech a child heard was so important. Despite Quintilian's disagreement he urged diligence in comportment in choosing a boy's nurse too.[28] But girls needed special attendance from both mother and father "lest any spot of vyce or unclenlynes shulde stycke to her." Indeed, he asked, how much more diligence ought to be given in a Christian virgin than in the boy child who had naught to lose?[29]

In his "*Book of Maids*," Vives drew on classical scholarship to sing the praises of Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi, who had taught her children herself; of Portia wife of Brutus, who took her father's wisdom; and of Cleobula so given to learning she "dispised al pleasure of the body." Other women and prophets cited were all virgins with Zenobia, Queen of Palmyra, and Tecla, a mete scholar for her noble master Paul among them. That learning kept a girl chaste was the essential Vives: "for the study of learning is such a thing, that it occupieth ones mind holly, and lifteth it up unto the knowledge of most goodly matters, and plucketh it from the remembrance of such thinges as foul." Women should study wisdom as woman learned on good books never turned to villainy. A public eloquence, however, they did not need as it "is no shame for a woman to holde her peace, but it is a shame for her and abomynable to lack discretion, and to lyve yl."[30] Specifically separating the duties of each sex, he accepted the traditionally privileged norm — a norm apparent in the foundational logic of the two primary rhetoricians of this period, Agricola and Erasmus. Moreover, Vives' humanist ideology included women as integral to civic integrity, but only in their maternal capacity:

> And in lernynge, as I poynte on one ende to the manne, no more I doo to the woman: saving it is mete that the man have knowledge of many

> and divers thinges, that may both profit hym selfe and the common welthe, bothe with the use and increasinge of lernyng. But I wold the woman shuld ve al to gether in that parte of philosophy, that takethe upon it to enfourme, and teche, and amen the conditions. Finally let her lerne for her slefe alone and her yonge children, or her systers in our lorde. For it neyther becometh a woman to rule a schole, nor to lyve amonge men, or soeke abrode, and shake of her demurenes and honesty, eyhter all together or els a great parte: which if she be good, it were better to be at whome within and unknowne to other folkes.[31]

In fact, as it was better for a woman to go blind that to use her learning to read books of war and romance, Vives could not understand why fathers and husbands would allow their charges to become infected with such poison; the law should take heed of the filthiness in some songs, he wrote. There were dangers inherent in the act of unsupervised reading which Vives' addressed reader, the male authority, should not "allow." Rather he should pay close attention to Vives' "suggested" reading list which focused on Latin as a medium of both conversation and active writing. It not only included grammar and pronunciation, but set a high moral standard stressing content as well as style and form for the maid or future wife.[32] In imitating Latin lines, the maid's purpose was to exercise her memory in holding opinions of only those good things which were true. He did not mention Greek; perhaps it was considered either too difficult or not a fit subject for young ladies.[33]

Believing that from proper memory and religion together, a foreknowledge could almost be obtained, Vives recommended Cato, Publius Syrius, and Erasmus' Seven Wise Men. For cultivating right language and right living, he suggested Cicero, Seneca, the Latinized Plutarch, certain passages on government in Plato, the epistles of Jerome, certain works of Augustine and Ambrose, and especially More's "*Utopia*," Erasmus' "*Institutiones Principis*," "*Enchiridon*," and "*Paraphrasis*." Such heathen poets as Lucan, Seneca the dramatist and Horace might be added when she had mastered an extensive Latin vocabulary. He also recommended that Princess Mary, only eight years of age, read the New Testament morning and evening. The idea being that as with her classics, Mary would question herself each morning about the previous day's reading.[34] Mary herself went on from these studies to translate Erasmus' "*Paraphrase for St. John's Gospel*" which was published in a whole work by Nicholas Udall in 1547, and the fact that both Mary and Margaret Roper translated works of a religious bent may be a telling point as to what "individuality" could be permitted.[35] Both women translated neither the classical nor the patristic writers directly but a mediator, Erasmus. Certainly Mary, praised for her learning in relation to moral integrity, was denied access

to certain "ill-conceived" writers who had no wit or ingenium — no innate moral integrity. Proscribed works had but "a fewe wordes of wanton lust whiche be spoken to move her mynde...And I miselfe some time have red in them, but I never found in them one step either of goodnes or wit." People read them because they saw themselves as in a glass. I want no pleasure, Vives wrote, infected with poison nor any woman "quickened unto vyce."[36]

Vives offered the maid a select reading list which would not tax her as some women, as well as men, were inept at learning. He further believed that while the precepts for men might be innumerable, women might be informed with just a few words.[37] To counter any suspicions that learned women could use their learning for deceit, he stressed educating her correctly through both eye and ear, and educated correctly she would know the value of her own treasure, and the mischief she could do. Without guidance, she would not know "what a font of ungratiousness she letteth in, what tyme she shutteth forthe chastytte." Proper learning would her from dwelling on bodily pleasure "beacuse a woman is a frayle thing, and of weake discretion, and...may lightly be disceyved, which thing our fyrste mother Eve sheweth, whome the dyvell caught with a lyght argument." Further Vives cited Paul and Timothy as to woman's proper place within the home: "Let youre women holde thier tonges in congregations, nor they be allowed to speake but to be subjecte as the lawe biddeth. If they wolde lerne any thing, lette them aske their husbandes at home."[38]

"Be not proude mayde," Vives wrote, "that thou arte hole of body, if thou be broken in mynde: nor bicause no man hath touched thy body, if many men have persed [pierced] thy mynde. What avayleth it thy body to be clene whan thou beareste thy mynde and thought infected with a foule and an horrible blotte?" The sin of pride in learning or a swelled mind equated with a belly swelled not by man's seed but by devils.[39] To embellish this idea that a future husband would not approve of ideas, or seed, inimical to his own, Vives turned to St. Augustine: "The holy virgin our lady conceyved fyrst in her mynde our lorde Christe, and after in her body." As the whole question of women's education was problematic even in its "usefulness," it was constantly constricted by citing some authority. By stressing the mental conception, Vives could not only guilelessly salvage the problem of the Immaculate Conception but he could also adhere to the Aristotelian version of male or mental essence and female materiality. In allowing woman a mind at all, control could be kept by analogizing that mind into womb or fertile field. The monopoly or authority over the mind by the male thinker was also salvaged; it was "a more honorable noble, and excellent thing to conceive in mynde than in body, wherfore thou art the partener of the more excellent conception."[40] The idea that learning could penetrate woman's mind and create a chaste or

unchaste condition was a commonplace.[41]

While not questioning women's abilities to learn, Vives did question their native wit or ingenium. The whole subject of a learner's abilities, whether man or woman, was much discussed in the Renaissance. Some said ability was natural; others that it could be learned. In women, however, the penetration of the mind, lent itself immediately to an analogy with the penetration of the vagina — the spark igniting knowledge and the sperm igniting conception became co-terminus. In one sense, this analogy of mind and womb was a metaphor, a figure of speech for rhetorical use. However, it was also a figure of thought, a logic which supported a "normative" foundation for women's education.[42] What women seemed to lack in this schema where she acted as receptacle was discernment. Therefore, just as her conceptual ability would be properly enclosed in marriage, her mental conditioning would be overseen by an authority. The goal of her education became irredeemably tied to her chastity.

Essentially, women were more in thrall to their bodies than men as our "fyrst mother for meate was cast out of paradise." So while women's minds received a diet of proper reading in their maidenhood, Vives cited Galen in suggesting that until marriage they should also fast. A diet of cold food, of mean meat and water, would bridle the body; meat induced heat and young men and women were already naturally hot. Further, as "some thynges that be in the mynde come of the reason and complection of the body" a maid growing from the child's state should be kept from men's company as her body would be full of lust.[43] Virginal conditioning prepared the way for Vives' second book and his discourse on wedlock — a state ordained not so much for generation as for certain company of life and continual fellowship. God led the woman to the man, Vives wrote, not only for procreation but because "god hym selfe was chiefe author and maker of wedlocke." Indeed, the name of "husband" did not signify bodily pleasure but unity and affinity. "Where it is sayde in one fleshe (Gen. 2), it is to be understanden one fleshe, and fleshe after the propriety of the Hebrewe spech sygnifieth mankynde both man and woman." With these ideas Vives completed the circular figure of thought on woman's purpose.[44]

In the book of wedlock, Vives built on the value of chastity in promoting the state's good. While at first claiming he would not dispute the old questions concerning marriage, he proceeded to demonstrate how the state of a nation rested on womankind. Citing the cases of the Manicheans and various other heretics and pagans, he reminded his reader that the Carthaginians were known for false promise, the Cilicians as robbers, the Romans for their covetousness, and the Greeks as inconstant and variable because a minority of common evil women gave the name to the whole nation. Indeed, "honeste

wyves ought to hate and blame the noughty sylves: as a shame and slander unto al the kynd." A woman who fulfilled her two virtues of chastity and love for her husband cemented the virtuous state. Through study, she came to understand the law that "reckoneth her selfe and her husbande all one person" in service to that state.[45]

Vives' psychology of women was centered around her being a non-self. She had a mind but it required an enclosure in order to function properly. In a similar manner, should her body and womb be enclosed by chastity. Chastity was like a veil without which the woman was naked; it was the maintenance of her integrity through submission to authority; and it was a condition that she could carry throughout her life. Chastity was not virginity but her entity first enclosed by her father, and then by her husband. As she moved from her father's house to her husband's, she was never exposed, never naked, never without proper enclosure. In becoming one in her husband's flesh, she was in a sense never penetrated because her flesh was not hers. Enclosed in the husband's flesh she remained forever chaste as if the husband were penetrating himself. That this ideology tended to breakdown on the practical front, was very apparent in Vives' own difficulties regarding the nature of motherhood.

"No mother loved her childe better than myne did me," he wrote. "Neither any childe did ever lesse percyve hym selfe loved of his mother than I." As a child I fled from her but when I reached manhood I loved to see her. I now have her memory in reverence. "I embrace her within my mynde and thoughte, whan I can nat with my bodye."[46] Vives' tortuous relation to his own mother followed a trail which seemed to replicate the period's history. As he examined the potential relationships between women, language and culture, the figure of the mother became polarized as the uneducated speaker of the "mother" tongue. How could he transform her into an ideal in this time of rampant female illiteracy — a time in which mothers almost disappeared in literary depictions? As responsible adult women became invisible, "comic" mothers actively rejected their children in picaresque novels. As print and humanism actively separated real women from social and political roles, the ideal woman had become exiled to a chastity defined by its absence of autonomous activity. It was in this space that authority determined women needed education.[47]

Vives own life was a microcosm of these contradictory messages. As he was working on the Latin "*Instruction*," his father was on trial in Spain for heresy and his mother had reconverted to Judaism. He seemed not to have believed in his father's defection but was seriously concerned about his mother's. How could this child of conversos save his mother's soul and salvage her as a still devout Christian woman? And how could he love her now when he

did not as a child? His writings suggest that the best mother may be a dead one like a blank tablet awaiting inscription, for on the one hand Vives' remembered his mother as cold and unfeeling. On the other hand he considered himself blessed for having escaped her influence in his formative stages, for not having imbibed the mother tongue along with her milk. Emilie Bergman suggests that: "Paradoxically, it is the renunciation of speech and of any demonstration of maternal feeling that give Blanca Vives her authority as an exemplary mother." The absence of her presence gave Vives the scope to become the distinguished humanist who could apotheosize her as exemplary Christian woman and as an "ideal" mother while burying the contradictory images. Blanca's exemplarity, Bergman suggests, "is created by the humanist as an autobiographical basis for his authority on the topic of motherhood."[48]

In essence I would agree, but Bergman's thesis does not quite answer why Vives wished to be an authority on motherhood. Vives' stress on woman's submission to her husband throughout his "Instruction" may be a crucial key. Focusing on the woman's union in the "one flesh" of her husband, was a strategy to save his mother from damnation. If his mother had reembraced Judaism, she was dead to the Church and, consequently dead to both herself and him. But if his father's authority prevailed, his mother's choices were immaterial. To accomplish this maneuver, Vives had to assume that his father was not a heretic despite any consequent judgment. His mother, simply rudderless without the father's authority, had made choices which did not count. If we accept womankind as incapable of any determinate judgment, three of Vives' choices become clearer . First, Vives' renounced the alternative concept of matrimony proposed by Fray Luis de Leön and seconded by Erasmus. This more positive idea of women not only allowed them free will in choosing matrimony but saw marriage as reciprocal economically. While a hierarchical framework still prevailed, such a conjoint union would have acknowledged woman's contribution of duties and favors in exchange for her husband's economic security. Second, by utilizing St. Paul's teachings that a woman's body must be subject to her husband, Vives firmly anchored her moral development under her husband's authority and moved her freedom of will into his care. It followed, then, that Blanca could not "choose" to leave the church if her husband was still a member.

And third, and perhaps most important to his psychology of women and a goal towards which his whole treatise was driving, Vives recovered the "good" mother by premising that if she had been educated correctly, she would have known her worth. She would have understood not only her moral responsibilities but how to demonstrate her love. "Let her embrace and kiss [her child]," he wrote, "when it does good things. "Let [mothers] love their

children well...for who wolde either adnull or dispreise the lawe of nature. Oh what a crueltie is it, nat to love them that thou hast borne." And "when she embraceth her chylde and kysseth it" let her pray that Christ give the child grace to be good and continent, despising the world's riches. Let her be virtuous and follow in the footsteps of St. Paul, who was more just than Cato, more holy than Socrates and Seneca, more cunning than Plato and Aristotle, and more eloquent than Demosthenes or Tullius. But such was Vives' plea for a mother's love that he could not resist castigating a mother's "natural" inclinations to not discourage vices in the child. Such children would stop loving their mother, he added, once they perceived they were unloved by others because of this indulgent mother love. "O mothers, what an occasion be you unto your children, to make them whether you wyll, good or badde."[49] As Vives must consider himself good, it naturally followed it must be due to Blanca. So Blanca always loved him, she just did not know it. That her "faults" were to due to an erring, unsupervising husband, also created a foundation for male authority. Hyrde's delight in women's learning has been replaced by Vives' angst. It was an angst that saw five reprints between 1541 and 1592.

III.

Among the modern comments on the period of Henrican Reform, Geoffrey Elton has argued that an educational program for men and women succeeded but with a twist. It was essentially concerned with man as sinful and with maintaining the hierarchical status quo. Faith in education's ability to instill proper duty survived but the politically practical, optimistic vita activa of a Thomas Starkey failed because it ran counter to Henry's monarchical aims.[50] Seminal Tudor figures, contemporaries of Hyrde, Vives and Elyot such as John Colet, John Fisher and Thomas More, had felt a complex sense of religious urgency in the face of continental Reformation, yet concern with law and education for government ultimately prevailed over religious concerns. By the later Queen Elizabeth's time patronage and service to the government would play the major role in the growth and direction of English education, with Christian Humanism absorbed to the state's agenda in the education of the Tudor aristocracy. Young men's training was no longer for the church or clerkships; they were to be trained as governors of society while upper class women were to study the classics to acquire a delight in learning. Absorbing their duty as good wives and mothers along with their books, they would consequently serve their families for the good of the state. Ironically, with more education more women began to write, not it must be noted to challenge the values of chastity, but their status as subordinate beings. Well-

versed in the classics, certain women developed a facility with rhetoric which by the time of King James would be marked as an impediment to the husband's control. Literacy and education spawned a freedom of thought beyond the educators' intention. This was a problem which would never cease to bedevil the status quo as the educational agenda contained an implicit tension between the behavioral and civic indoctrination to duty, and the literate, thinking individual who crossed gender and class lines. Literacy transformed the imagination.[51]

Edward VII's protestant conversion, and then Mary's return to Catholicism, followed the dissolution of the Roman Church and Henry's assumption of both secular and religious mantles. Protestantism with its unmediated God created a vacuum which the husband in the family stepped in to fill. A combination of salvation as predestination, education, and political routinization served patriarchy further by cutting upper class women off from their family and kin in the interests of state. Thomas Elyot, the watershed educational figure spanning this Henrican-Marian period, had the markings of a pro-educationist but with qualifications. Primarily a rhetorician and political writer he recuperated "woman" in her idealized, passive form in "*The Defense of Good Women*." Written in English, it first appeared in 1534 with a reprint in '45, and was not so much an educational tract as a paean to the virtuous woman as embodied in Queen Zenobia, the same virginal queen of Palmyra that Vives had cited.

Elyot (1499?-1546) had had a classical if not a university background, and had translated not only Isocrates' "*The Doctrine of Princes*" and Eucolpius' "*The Image of Gouvernance*", but also various Platonic dialogues, Plutarch, and several patristic writers. He also popularized the classics in England and his "*Dictionarie*" in Latin and English was the first book so-called in the kingdom. A friend of Thomas More, he attracted the attention of both Wolsey and Cromwell who appointed him to various offices. Dismissed in 1530, he turned full time to writing and he and his wife lived off the Woodstock estate which he had inherited in 1522. Familiarity with the assize circuit from accompanying his father, a justice, no doubt played a part in the genesis of his most noteworthy book, "*The Boke named the Governour*." Published in '31, it espoused the importance of learning especially for the sons of the nobility, and was a marriage of education and politics which revealed a classical influence as well as illustrating the evolution of English prose.[52] But in his "*Defense of Good Women*" he exuded the full force of Renaissance humanist ideology incorporating Quintilian's primary precept that the bonae artae train the moral faculties. However, as the civic goal for the vir bonum still remained problematic for women, notice Elyot's construction of the good woman as one made and not born.

Did the "*Defense*" even promote women's education? Was the preface an add on to a rhetorical exercise? Foster Watson's gloss on the "*Defense*" stressed Zenobia's education in view of matrimony. A woman was to study moral philosophy, Watson wrote, between the ages of sixteen and twenty in preparation for marriage, and to demonstrate the use of her studies both in her marriage and as a widow in choosing tutors and bringing up children. [53] Have I been reading a different book, or was Watson, writing in the early twentieth century, reading in his own time's received opinion? The gist of the essay was the dialogue between two male protagonists discussing Zenobia; Elyot referred often to Zenobia's virtue but not specifically to marriage. It was only in the preface that he suggested women reading Queen Zenobia would "be provoked to imbrae vertue more gladly, and to be circumspecte in the bryngynge up of theyr children." Also in the preface, he recalled how men rebuked women even though they never received displeasure. In fact some men praised women for serving their wanton appetites. Honest men, he wrote, should rather reverence the virtue and gentle strength of women. The preface was an instruction on women should read the essay. This was the only point in which not marriage, but motherhood was mentioned.

Keeping in mind that Elyot's addressed reader in the essay might not be female, there are two points which should be stressed in reading. First, the dismissed Elyot dedicated his work to the virtuous Queen Anne Boleyn (now chaste in marriage) while praising the virginal Zenobia. This was a very politic move perhaps meant to sing Henry's praises more than good women's. Second, form as an explanatory and shaping significance was a primary feature of humanist rhetoric. In the copiousness of words, verbal play interconnected on many levels. There was an enfolding of reason and irony most prominent in the open-ended dialogue of the homo ludens ; it was a dialogic device which both Erasmus in "*Praise of Folly*" and Thomas More in "*Utopia*" had used.[54] Viewed in this light, the dialogue of the "*Defense*," may not be pro-educationist at all, but rather a rhetorical exercise using a "historical" Zenobia metamorphosed into the "genus" of the ideal woman. She was not a woman but a topos, a figure of thought, a trope, a metaphor. To paraphrase Aristotle, poetry or verisimilitude was of higher value than any strict attendance to history. Elyot's Queen Anne was more a device; she was not Hyrde's exuberantly addressed Frances Brandon. Living women were in the main confined to the dedication; imaginary women were better to think with.[55]

Was "*The Defense*" pro-educationist or a rhetorical/political exercise? Elyot's previous attitude to women may shed some light as here lies the gender/class problem. All Elyot's other educational/political works addressed the necessity of proper education for the nobility's sons in serving the commonweal. One could argue that a woman would also be born into her class, but

for Elyot, gender carried more weight. His distrust of women had been apparent three years earlier in his "*Boke called the Governour*" in which he stressed that at "seven years of age, the [boy] child should be taken from 'the company of women.'"[56] But if Elyot had such an inherent mistrust of womankind, who was he addressing in his "*Defense*" but the fathers and husbands as the chosen overseers of women's influence on their children. These men would select his text as appropriate for their daughters and wives while reveling in its ironic tone themselves. The question of two "kinds" was resolved in Elyot's recommendation for raising women to virtue. Educated women would not only participate with men in reason but in fidelity and constancy be equal unto them. The education/chastity paradigm was operating as women's mental acumen was not in question, but her discernment. But was Elyot a man-at-play making good use of the Ciceronian in utramque partem, or was he serious?

The "*Defense*" itself was a very amusing battle of the citations between Caninius, a cur who was always barking after women, and Candidus, a benign and gentle man who used Zenobia's life to prove his argument for women's education. When Caninius offered Helen as an example of the false woman, Candidus countered with the more apt and wifely Penelope. Whenever Plato, Plutarch, Plotinus or Xenophon had written about false women and made them inferior to men, Candidus noted, they only wrote about some women and not most women. Caninius countered this with Aristotle but to no avail. Aristotle, Candidus insisted, reproached women in treating of matters weighty and serious but he himself was a crank. In fact, he reproached everyone in his works. In women's favor, Candidus cited Aristotle's more disciplined work, the "*Oeconomice*:" "The company moste accordynge to nature, is that whiche is ordeyned of man and woman." This companionship was not only for propagation of the species but for love and mutual assistance. Further Aristotole had written: "This company is not because that eche of them hath in every thynge and the same al their vertues lyke profitable," but because their virtues seemed to be contrary one to another and "yet in conclusion they agree to one purpose."[57]

Zenobia herself did not join Elyot's dialogue until close to the end. She was more than ready to continue carrying on this defense of good women herself but Caninius, the skeptic, assured her that he was already satisfied. "He is wise that with reason is shortely contented," declaimed Caninius. "And where Reason serveth not, silence is praysed." And Zenobia agreed: "a good mynde in sylence, is ever well occupied."[58] There would be no detrimental "imaginings" in the good woman's mind as Zenobia spun her wool. Women's proper education, and proper must be stressed, focused on her understanding the value of her chastity — her voice was not required. In fact, a proper edu-

cation would teach her the value of her silence. And any woman "reader" would see that Zenobia, the virginal queen, also concurred.

Grafton and Jardine suggest that this silencing method for celebrating women's learned virtue was "essentially an evasion of the humanist tactic of identifying the virtue of humanism with morality in the marketplace," or the male place.[59] But not only women were excluded from political participation. Politics was the realm of the propertied. The organization of appropriate texts devolved on the teacher who also supplied a disciplined method for their interpretation. Neither boys or girls could be set loose on readings of their own choice if the ultimate moral value of the bonae artae was to be achieved.[60] Consequently, while discernment was not an attribute connected naturally with student's young minds, there was always a special connection made regarding women's minds. Woman's mind could not escape analogy with her womb. It was a place of voluntary motion outside of the woman's control as was her mind, and proper education would either teach her the value of her chastity or make her more capable of deception. Elyot's "*Defense*" fell in that middle space between eloquence and regimentation. It recuperated Politan's distrust of the learned woman while recovering her as an emblem; it effectively silenced the real woman. It employed Vives' strategies for motherhood; it ignored Hyrde's delight in the female mind.

IV.

By the mid-Elizabethan period academic distinction offered real access to positions of power in the queen's court. Previously subservient to religion by the 1550's humanism as an identifiable movement had become the more secular "humanities" curriculum with its own methods of its teaching.[61] It was also in this period of the royal-female court that more women came to their own defense through writing and that two differing views on womankind emerged in the literature.[62] The anti-educationists, the pessimists, and the writers of scurrilous literature stressed woman as a creature "lacking" maleness. The pro-educationists promoted woman as not "lacking" but of another "kind" assimilating Fallopio's discovery of the clitoris to their argument. Two notable points: it was a period of increased attendance at university for the sons of the elite and middle-classes, as well as a time of vocational school growth in England; it was a period of queenship.[63] The constant redefinition of education for both sexes, and of humanism itself cannot escape the social and political contingencies — although one could argue that "language" itself perpetuated these contingencies as its grammar and syntax is always self-referential. This inherently gendered nature of language was put to the test as Mary and then Elizabeth ascended the throne. Did women have a

Renaissance as Joan Kelly so cogently asked? Perhaps, only if they were queen. Ambiguities abounded in regard to the one-sex body which allowed the "lacking" peeress to transmit inheritance through her blood but not to wield power over her inheritance. Old arguments were resurrected: would power render a woman barren, would her power set a subversive model? Was a queen God's will or Nature's mistake?[64]

For the subjects of both Mary and Elizabeth the problems of succession and of "the authority of a married queen regnant" were particularly urgent. In "*The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women*," Knox using history proposed that if God chose one woman as the vessel of queenship, He in no way intended all women for power. However, Knox using Scripture said that when God reproved a woman, he reproved all women. Elizabeth must be cut form the herd. John Aylmer, further determined that it was God's will that Elizabeth have no male heirs as her virile capacities had enfeebled her as a woman. It was fortunate, he continued, that Parliament was the final authority and not the monarch. John Leslie drew attention to the fact that although language repressed the feminine, ex fratribus comprehended women. If any woman were excluded, it must necessarily follow that she had been excluded from salvation.[65] The difficulty was in acknowledging the queen as authority and female while maintaining order in the realm but not liberating all females. It was a tortuous path to maneuver which no doubt exacerbated the Jamesian backlash. Elizabeth herself stepped into the breach when she exhorted her troops at Tilbury Camp. Employing her rhetorical training she appeared on the battlefield as king. Claiming a king's heart in her weak woman's body she deployed discourse over her body to strategize woman as genus and king as species.[66]

Amid the brouhaha the most prominently published writer on education was Richard Mulcaster, an attendee of both Eton and King's College, Cambridge, and a graduate of Christ Church, Oxford. His "*Positions*" first appearing in 1561 with probable reprints in '81, '87, and '91, had a profound effect on English education. A schoolmaster and later headmaster at Merchant Taylor's School and St. Paul's, Mulcaster had an insider's view of the essentials necessary for a good education, and while he addressed his "*Positions*" of 1561 primarily to educators of boys, he did include one chapter in favor of women's education. Moreover, he dedicated the work to Queen Elizabeth as the centerpiece of the constellation of learned women. Even if no state allowed women's education, he wrote, the queen commended women's education to our reason.[67] That education for women must be "reasonable" accorded with the humanists' self-fashioning notions of inculcating manners and values with control as the epitome of reason. Such reasonableness was the foundation for Mulcaster's four points in promoting the training

of women. The first point was the manner and custom of the country which allowed them to learn — a custom it would be loathe to contradict. The second was the duty which owe unto them — a duty that has charged us not to leave them lame in carrying out their own particular duty. The third was their own ability to learn. God by nature would never have given them this ability if he wished them to remain idle or to small purpose. The fourth point was the excellent effects in that sex which were fostered by a good bringing up. All this "commendeth the cause of such excellency, and wisheth us to cherish that tree, whose fruit is both so pleasant in taste and so profitable in trial." What more can be said, Mulcaster asked. "Our country doth allow it, our duty doth enforce it, their aptness calls for it, their excellency commands it." And do we dare some private conceit, he wrote, when such excellent points and such "rare circumstances do so earnestly commend" her education?[68]

Although women themselves were not addressed here, Mulcaster echoed Hyrde's joy in the educated woman. Yet his arguments also called up visions of a state in the midst of social and economic upheaval which, nevertheless, understood society as a static reality. His final thrust yielded to the "custom of the country."

> I set not young maidens to public grammar schools, a thing not used in my country, I send them not to the Universities, having no precedent thereof in my country. I allow them learning with distinction in degrees, with difference of their calling, with respect to their ends, wherefore they learn, wherein my country commendeth my opinion.[69]

In the queen's case, however, Mulcaster had overridden the custom of the country — a custom which was his main foundation for structuring women's education in a private milieu according to her and . Mulcaster set the tone which Ascham would follow in '70. In specifically addressing the problem of a monarch who was not-male but held the highest authority, he noted that God did not deny women the right to rule in those governments devised by men. And aware that many other women would also need learning according to the degree of their need or use in the commonwealth, he also proposed their education for a trade. The use value of education for the majority, however, could not be divorced from the good woman who aspired to be a good housewife.[70] In promoting learning for young maids as future wives, Mulcaster called them not only "the seminary of our succession" but "the naturall frye, from which we are to chuse our naturall, next, and most necessarie friends." Women were the very selfe same creatures, he continued, which were made for our comfort. They were the "only good to garnish our aloneness; our nearest companions in weale or woe and the peculiar and priviest partak-

ers in all our fortunes. They are borne for us to life and bound to us till death."[71] They were not only our warm companions but the mothers of our progeny. Drawing on the macrocosmic/microcosmic analogy, he promoted the education of both sexes in a communion of their "kind" of natural body: "For the bodie of a common weale in proportion is like unto a natural bodie...and in a bodie politike if the like proportion be not kept in all partes, the like disturbance will crepe thorough out all partes."[72] Citing the degeneration of the Roman Empire under foreign men in service, he wished England to train her own men, and made connections between the well-educated and the commonweal's good.[73] Essentially, Mulcaster was appealing to those in authority to do their duty in advancing an education for both girls and boys in which each should learn as much as should be needful in their proper positions.

Women especially, Mulcaster wrote, were committed and commended to us, as pupils to tutors, as bodies to heads, and moreover as bodies to souls. If we did not tender their education dutifully, or "if at any time wither by their owne right, or by our default, they winne the upper roome and make us stand bare head, or be bolder with us to," they may fault us for it. We would do well then to see that "by natural men, and Philosophicall reasons, ...young maidens deserve the traine: because they have that treasure, which belongeth unto it, bestowed on them by nature, to be bettered in them by nurture. " It was the Lord of Nature who had given men the duty to continue the education of all creatures to the limits of their own particular duty and for their utmost good. Because of the goal which the Lord had assigned them and the ways that he had willed them "we have it in commandement not onely to traine up our owne sex, but also our female, seeing he hath to require an account for naturall talentes of both parties, us for directing them: them for perfourmaunce of our direction."[74]

Specifically for a young gentlewoman Mulcaster suggested she be able to read plainly and distinctly, write fair and swiftly, sing clear and sweetly, play well and finely, understand and speak the learned languages, and also learn those tongues "which time embraceth, with some logical help to chop, and some rhetoric to brave." Logic and rhetoric gave seats to words just as bodies furnished a ground for apparel. A well-furnished maid should further be able to "draw clean in good proportion, and with good symmetry."[75] Mulcaster was aware, however, that the end of their education was different: for women "are to be the principall pillers in the upholding of households."[76] While he added that men's education was without restraint in its employment, women's was "within limit, and so must their traine be.." If she was to be trained "in respect to marriage, obedience to her head, & qualities which look that way, must neede be her best way."[77]

While Mulcaster wished women joy in learning, he feared they had no innate wit to assimilate geometry or the other sciences. He denied them ability in math but encouraged math's sister, music. As they would not plead at the bar, he wrote, they would not need to learn the law. And although countless stories commended their skill in herbals, they need not concern themselves with physics. As they had no use for public speech in the pulpit or as leaders, what good speech they learned was for honest performing and virtuous living. Philosophy, if they were able, was not prohibited as it would furnish their general discourse and allow them some tongues which, as Pliny had recommended: would help them beautify their needle work with good examples of their own kind. For all this learning, Mulsacter continued, they were best taught either at home or in elementary schools by their own sex although "ours frame them best, & with good regard to some circumstances will bring them up exceedingly well."[78]

The essential values in Mulcaster, were in certain instances a recapitulation of Vives. Woman's discernment was still in question while her education to virtue was promoted. The communion of education and politics was essential to Mulcaster. Virtue was the ground for all English women and men — "by whether so ever name ye call it, wisedom in pollicie, valiance in execution, iustice in deciding, modestie in demeanor."[79] However, the quintessential question as to whether virtue could be taught directly or whether teaching eloquence could lead to virtue was as problematic as always. The incorporation of Ramus' and Taleus' methods for teaching the classics in the universities had promoted the humanities as a way to learning, but certainly not to a public or democratic eloquence. The problem which bedeviled Cicero in grafting an Athenian discourse and educational goal on to a different political structure still surfaced around the notion of rhetoric in the Elizabethan period. Learning for men, however, did lead to a career in law, writing or court politics while the humanities had a basic education appeal to the mercantile class not so much for moral improvement as for information and skill.[80] Chastity and good mothering remained the primary goals of women's education but, ironically, the learning Mulcaster espoused for women as a purely private function would encourage lettered women to begin to write. And although these women would write in opposition to the male notion of their inherent "lack," they acknowledged their "place" as a different "kind."[81]

Mulcaster's opinion that maids were commonly more weak by nature recapitulated the idea of woman as a more material substance and the imagination as a bodily stratum. Women were "of a moonish influence," he wrote, "and all our kinde is weake of the mother side, which when the first was made, even then weakened the mans side." The biblical stories of woman created from man supported woman's intrinsic "nature." "Though the girles seeme

commonly to have a quicker ripening in witte, then boyes have, for all that seeming, yet it is not so. Their naturall weaknesse," he continues, "which cannot holde long, delivers very soone, and yet there be as prating boys, as there be pratling wenches." Besides their brains were not so much charged, with weight or with multitude of matters as boys heads were, "and therefore like empty caskes they make the greater noise."[82]

V.

With a debt to Mulcaster Roger Ascham's masterwork, "*The Scholemaster*," appeared early in Elizabeth's reign in 1570; it dealt, but only in passing, with the new phenomenon of female scholarship. A graduate of Cambridge, a Greek reader there, and public orator at the University after Cheke, Ascham went on to instruct the Princess Elizabeth in '48. His hatred of Rome demanded he maintain a self-imposed silence when he was appointed Latin secretary to Queen Mary in 1553, but with Elizabeth's ascension to the throne in '58, he himself played a role of "educational" power at the court. "*The Scholemaster*," sent to the publisher by his widow two years after his death, addressed the male teachers of youth and focused on the means for generating good leaders and the method for teaching Latin. All were in aid of a better commonwealth. In fact, Ascham blamed nobles for not educating their children correctly so that "meaner men's children come to be the wisest counsellors and greatest doers, in the weighty affairs of this realm."[83] But Ascham's approach to education also blended the religious with the humanist. "But now, master Cicero," Ascham wrote, "blessed be God and his Son Jesus Christ, whom you never knew, except it were as it pleased Him to enlighten you by some shadow, as covertly in one place you confess." Like your master Plato before you, you have said: "*Veritatis tantum umbram consectamur.*" (Nevertheless, we pursue the shadow of truth.)"[84]

Ascham's text focused on men's education and on their public role. he underscored both as essentially male prerogatives by suggesting that wise men send their sons to Italy "under the keep and guard" of example and authority.[85] For the male student he lauded the rule of three discrete persons: the schoolmaster who taught with gentleness, the governor who corrected manners with sharpness, and the father who maintained a stern watch on the child's whole obedience.[86] Despite being faced with the first formidable rumblings of the learned woman, Ascham enthusiastically promoted a "Quintilian" approach to education for men, and mentioned women only twice in passing. He praised Elizabeth obliquely by noting that "It is to your shame (I speak to you all, young gentlemen of England) that one maid should go beyond you all, in excellency of learning, and knowledge of divers

tongues."[87] He also lauded the executed Lady Jane Grey's accomplishments but said nothing further about a need for women's education or its possible use.[88] His love for education in and of itself seemed to be intrinsically bound up with the public role of men although certainly he would agree with Erasmus that "Studies, if they have begun to please, spur the mind to wilder enthusiasm than any other of the arts."[89]

Notably in his essay on matrimony, Erasmus had stressed the teaching duties of the husband in educating the woman's eye and ear lest amorous fables cause violent passions in young maids.[90] While Ascham made no mention of such specifics, nor of the education/chastity analogy, he did after all have that problem discussed above: unmarried and female monarch which bedeviled the Elizabethan period. As Ascham was, however, for a short time in charge of Elizabeth's education, we might infer that her syllabus included only those classical and religious readings which educated both men and women to their proper virtue. The question of a gentle authority in education itself and a concomitant attack on the license shown to impressionable young men at court was the essential Ascham. While offering Elizabeth and Lady Jane as examples for the court to follow, he was perhaps turning Elyot upside down by suggesting that royal blood surmounted the inherent complications of womankind.

Some might have considered anything more specific on Elizabethan womankind as a subject too hot to handle. Such thinking did not, however, deter Edward Hake in his "*Touchstone*" of 1574 as he took the educational authorities to task. A translator of one dialogue from Erasmus' "*Colloquia*" and of Thomas a Kempis' "*Imitation of Christ*," Hake may have been a lawyer, would serve as a bailiff in '76, a court recorder in '78, and as a member of Parliament in '88-'89.[91] He claimed to write to counteract the evils of poor education and despaired of the grievous injuries done the country by ill-educated men, yet so little is known of him there are no personal clues to his unmitigated pessimism in the "*Touchstone*." The essential Hake believed all children "by nature are evyll and being evyll, they are by the example of parents made worse." They had no love for God, nor any honor or fear of their Parents. On the subject of the "educated" women he despaired again over parents' who wanted learning for their daughters just "to make them companions of carpet knights, and giglots for amorous lovers."[92] He could only cite pagans, heathens and disbelieving people who had any women and virgins who were so well-learned and virtuous that even the worst of them could govern a whole country in their prudence. Of the majority of contemporary women he wrote: "I cannot tell whether through sorrow I should cry out and bewail them, or for shame commit them to silence: so immoderate in apparel, so lascivious in talk, so bold in behaviour, and so unseemly in gesture is the

universal state, almost as well of wives as of damosels." Provident care of parents over their daughters was so neglected that in their young and tender years they straightaway learned "the high path to whoredom, and the principles of vanity and lewdness." The daughter was either kept from exercises of good learning and a knowledge of good letters, or "else she is so nouseled in amorous books, vain stories and fond trifling fantasies, that she smelleth of naughtiness even all her life after."[93]

Another book, appended and bound with the "*Touchstone*," offered further enlightenment on Hake's attitude toward women and to girls' education. While these were poems and of a gentler, kinder nature, the gist was to counteract a mother's negative influence on her son's learning while stressing education solely for boys. In the prologue Hake incidentally made his attitude to women clear. There, he mentioned that his wife was about the house somewhere, and that he was going crazy without "accustomed conference." Having just reread a handy "*De Pueris Statim ac Liberaliter Instituendis*," by Quintillian to keep his mind occupied he decided to write on education handled wisely. The "missing" wife, the poems' dialogic debate as to whether young minds can learn anything, and their stress on the shortness of earthly time would seem to suggest a preoccupation with the corruptibility of humanity and the condemnation of women to a more sinful, and inept material kind. [94] Some small number of women, he wrote, "who have any knowledge at all, do so greatly abuse it, that much better were it that they should unlearn..."[95] Because of the rarity of texts on girls' education, aside from Vives' who had stressed the education/chastity analogy and Mulcaster's one chapter, Hake's negative influence became difficult to undo.[96]

In popular print, there were also scurrilous attacks on the literate female. The idea, that any education at all might make a woman more capable of deception by augmenting her "natural" talents, had been Edward Gosynhill's theme in his 1541 "*Scholehouse of Women*." A poem in seven line stanzas it attacked women satirically mocking their pretensions to be "on top." Such unruly women embodied ambiguity. They were mundus inversus , the world turned upside down — both shameful and outrageous, vigorous and in command, and emblematic of the analogy: dangerous minds, dangerous wombs. It was a multivalent image encompassing the female grotesque, the female limiting male tyranny, and Folly.[97] Nevertheless, several writers came to women's defense in print, and Gosynhill was believed to have recanted his lack of chivalry and published "*The Mulierum Pean*." The little "*Scholehouse*," however, still went through three subsequent printings — the last in '72, and by its popularity may have confirmed the beliefs of many. Using mockery, Gosyhill warded off the alien "female" by positioning her agonistically to the male. Then he absorbed and displaced her through the use of language struc-

tured as a male prerogative, the polar opposite of women's unlearned and unlettered mother tongue. Women were gossips, liars and talkers who used language any way they could.[98]

Although Gosynhill assured the reader that women themselves would acknowledge his sayings as true, it was the knowing men who were addressed in these poems. In gist: Women had no shame. Whatever men said or reasoned, women would always have the last word for after they had used their wiles to get you to sleep with them, they would then say you had made a promise to them just in case their belly swelled. If it did not, they were well pleased but if you were going to continue using them you would have to dress them and if their belly did rise, then they would swear it was yours. "Make sure," Gosynhill cautioned his reader, "that the childe looks like you." Woman's preposterous behavior was God's mistake: the rib he had taken to make her got chewed by a dog, and God had taken one of the dog's bones instead. So here she was, our woman, made of a bone which chattered and clattered around the empty hollow of her womb like bones in a bag.[99]

Gosynhill's female psychology drew a connection between women's two orifices: both her "lips" were loose. The labial analogy fitted a womb/brain analogy. With the womb an organ outside of the woman's will, her education was specious as it naturally followed, if the womb had a will of its own, so too did woman's brain. Both were two empty kettles which beset the poor man. He was condemned to a life of this immortal truth: "That whosoever weddeth a wyfe, Is sure of sorowe/ all his lyfe."[100] Interestingly, Gosynhill did not lambaste the male for his interest in "kettles." Instead he encouraged man's natural wit to get the best of female nature. Language was the device for surmounting woman's empty speech. And language, in this guise, created a reality. Both "natural" wit and learning became male prerogatives by demonstrating the transparency or emptiness of the woman's mother tongue. Both wit and learning were set aside as "commonplaces" which created a persona, a self-hood for the male by privileging him with the true language. The psychology of the period was not ours; the self was not an internal structure. The self was a created constellation of things, goods, and properties given communal credence which had a mask-like quality of exteriority. Agency, or the action of a self, equated with the proper and property. Gosynhill's denial of "language" to women was not just a problem of her educational lack. Language was an extrinsic component of self-hood, and its denial to women further substantiated her as property, as lacking agency and as requiring a guiding authority to promote the public good. Which ever orifice was referenced, mouth or labia, both needed supervision. In this sense Gosynhill's poems reinforced a pessimism like Hake's. Both the scurrilous and the pessimistic literature on education stressed woman as a creature "lacking" male-

ness.[101]

Mulcaster's "custom of the country," Hake's social pessimism, religious proscriptions, male domination in language and education, and Gosynhill's mockery created an odd stew. Together they made the propriety of women's writing directly for the public sphere, other than as a translator, rather difficult. Perhaps, agency was a strong factor here. The translators, such as Margaret Roper or the Princess Mary were not creating original works; they were merely performing a copying of sorts. Agency and authority were naturally synonymous with the "proper" of which propriety was a derivative term: what was suitable to one. Dying was one tactic a woman could employ to write; dying allowed her to maintain a woman's proper virtue while writing yet at the same time cope with the problem of proprietary or male selfhood. Dorothy Leigh (fl. 1616), writing on her deathbed, fit this category. Certainly other women were writing both in manuscript and in print but Mrs. Leigh might be considered a success story of sorts. She fit the paradigm towards which the educationalist's agenda had been driving. Mrs. Leigh was emblematic of a potentially dangerous mind converted to the public good through her devotion to her family. She had overcome her inherent "lack" by properly producing children. She accepted herself also as a different "kind": a good mother with great affection for her children. Citing religious and not classical readings as having had a salubrious effect upon her chastity, she was strongly aware that her writings might be discredited as she was only a woman. Bereft without her husband's authority to write, she turned to Lady Elizabeth daughter of King James and to her Church for approval. Yet yearnings for those vocations which only a man could attain surface in her book. Limited to weapons of the weak, she fulfilled a promise made to her dead husband, and wrote on her deathbed. She conformed even as she rebelled.[102]

In her "*Mother's Blessing*" of 1618, which was reputedly in its fourteenth edition by 1629, Mrs. Leigh entreated her four sons to educate all their children that they might learn virtue through reading and thus serve God, King and country. Marrying the notion of godliness with learning, she charged her sons "that al your children be they males or females may in their youth learn to read the Bible in their own mother-tongue, for I know it is a great help to true godliness."[103] The reading of religious texts was foremost in her mind; such an ability was a means to reach God who "sent his own Son to wash this filthy creature man."[104] Apologizing for writing in such a bold manner to her very young sons, she offered seven reasons why she must, and foremost was a mother's affection. The well-learned lessons of womankind permeated her text as she pleaded: it was because her children were boys that she must write for "the great mercy of God toward you, in making you men, and placing you

amongst the wise.[105] Hoping her women readers would not blush too much at her boldness, and giving men the first and chief place, she wrote, "yet let us labour to come in the second." Because we women must confess, "that sin entered by us into our posterity, and how fearefull we are that our sinne should sinke any of them to the lowest part of the earth..." do not be ashamed to show your infirmities.[106]

Parents, give your children names they can strive to emulate, she wrote, leaving names for her children's children: Philip, Elizabeth, James, Anna, John and the chaste Susanna. Mary she said she could not include because Mary was the savior's mother, the mother and comforter for all women, and "because many hae made a God of the Virgin Mary, the Scripture warrenting no such thing, and have prayed to her." Yet it was Mary, she reminded her readers, who "hath taken away the reproach which of right belonged to us, and it is further by her seed that we are all saved."[107] For Mrs. Leigh woman was rightfully less than man because of the original sin, and a woman had to be wary of this essential materiality. Chastity was key to woman's overcoming this natural state. Learning to read gave her access to this higher state of virtue. Indeed, Mrs. Leigh found a certain justice in women's subservience: for as Eve once beguiled Adam now we women may say "that men lye in waite every where to deceive us, as the elders did to deceive Susanna. Wherefore let us be, as she was, chast, watchful, and wary." Addressing the more numerous women readers of the early 1600s, she asked them to be on guard as "an unchaste woman destroyeth both the body and the soule of him shee seemeth most to love."[108]

Why should women be educated? Why should they not? Was there an alternative public good to be gained from educating women? Could her education serve to strengthen the family or would it destroy the family? In an age which conceived of society as a hierarchy of groups and women were deprived of any corporate identity outside the family, the family was alternately perceived as both a threat to and a constituent part of both the social order and the self. Hyrde, Vives, Elyot, Mulcaster, Ascham, Hake, Gosynhill, Mrs. Leigh. All their arguments became entangled in the meaning of "woman." Her dangerous mind was implicitly and explicitly tied to her sexualized body and the control of her womb. The anomalous nature of her power and selfhood help to explain certain themes which contended in both the pro- and anti- educational texts. "Woman" was a meaning at all times under deliberation and construction in relation to woman's in the world. Her mind/womb was not only an emblem but a focus for religious, educational and political anxiety.

We have come full circle. From Dorothy Leigh back to Blanca Vives.

Mother was love; woman was virtue; learning begat chastity; ignorance and lewdness went together. The conscious and unconscious commonplaces of these writers inscribed the learned women with a civic use while denying her a public voice. Hyrde's enthusiasm became lost in an educational agenda which prescribed male authority and authenticated male proprietary rights and selfhood. In reading these treatises on education today, however, they seemed to do something else, perhaps unintentionally. They structured a hierarchy of learning which in conjunction with the emerging capitalist system, drove a further wedge into the feudal structure of hierarchy and blood supremacy. Learning for both women and men promoted a new class structure based on mental acumen, albeit one that could not quite erase its debt to first principles. Aristotle's "causes" still emerged as women's lack of discernment. The equation of her womb with mental capacity always entailed some guiding authority whether pastor, tutor, husband or father. The unruly, unmarried or unseemly woman remained a prime suspect. The arguments became entangled in the meaning of "woman" but it was a meaning which the writing women would begin to undermine and challenge simply by writing. Their challenge might have altered not only the foundations of learning but the very meaning of "woman" herself if science had not recuperated chastity's essentiality in a language whose grammar and syntax remained self-referential. Chastity continued as the hobgoblin and Hyrde's joyfulness was redirected. Why should women be educated? Why should they not? Dangerous minds, dangerous wombs.

NOTES

1 The humanist argument for an education of practical use was in contrast to the scholastic which recuperated knowledge through an abstraction of the mind, a formally valid logic. Ronald Witt, "The Humanist Movement," in Thomas A. Brady, Heiko A. Oberman, and James D. Tracy, eds. *Handbook of European History, 1400-1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation* (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994).

2 For the deconstructed family as a constituent part of, as well as a threat to, both social order and the self see Jean Bethke Elshtain, ed., *The Family in Political Thought* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982).

3 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: TheBirth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). For a cogent overview of Foucault see Elizabeth Grosz, ed., *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana Unversity Press, 1994), esp. pp. 145-148. See also Ralp Houlbrooke, *The English Family*, 1450-1700 (New York: Longman, 1984);

Merry Wiesner, "Family, Household and Community," in Brady et al., *European History*.

4 Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), chapters 1 and 2. For an explication of the ongoing commodifications within humanism itself and between humanism and religion, there is no better source than the three volumes of essay in Albert Rabil Jr. ed., *Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms and Legacy* (Philadelphia: University of pennsylvannia Press, 1989). For a.discussion of numanists in opposition to king Henry's monarchical agenda see A.G. Dickens and dorothy Carr, eds., *The Reformation in England; to the Accession of Elizabeth I* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968); and Thomas F. Mayer, *Thomas Starkey and the Commonweal: Humanist Politics and Religion in the Reign of Henry VIII* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

5 *Leordano Bruni Aretino Humanistisch-Philosophische schriften mit einer chronologie seiner werke und briefe*, ed. by H. Baron (Leipzig, 1928), pp. 11-12, as quoted in Grafton/Jardine, p. 33 n11. For arguments for and against Baron's dissection of Bruni's civic humanism see Albert Rabil Jr., "Significance of Renaissance Humanism in the Interpretation of the Italian Renaissance," ; and "AHR Forum," (Feb. 1996): 107-144.

6 *Christiani matrimonii institutio* (Basle, 1526), chapter 17, unpaginated as cited in Grafton/Jardine, p. 32 n 10. For Erasmus' optimistic humanist agenda see Albert Rabil Jr., "Desiderius Erasmus,"

7 There is extensive literature in anthroplogy, philosophy and history on the contradictions in the female body which are often read as "pre-existing signs." For a particular instance of how society's creation of the "good mother" occludes its complicity in manipulating woman and her wealth while reinforcing her image as insensitive and dangerous when not under male control see Chrisiane Klapisch-Zuber, *Women, Family, and Ritual in Renaissance Italy*, trans. Lydia Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

8 In the period education (or even the ability to read) was implicitly tied to notions of hierarchy and to discovering the best obedience to Authority. What Authority was was highly contentious. That society did consist and was maintained by religion and law which were both structured on the Great Chain of Being is discussed in Conrad Russel, . For the period's notion that a settled doctrine of sovereignty implemented by an extrinsic, pragmatic potency of centralization would lead to peace see Denis Hay, (London and New York: Longman, 1966, 1989); in Hay women are hidden behind the pervasive notion of family. For a discussion of how the age not only conquered the world by force but laid foundations for political, economic and social changes essential to the evolution of the modern age (women again are hidden) see H.G. Koenignsberger, George L. Mosse, and G.Q. Bowler, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century* (London and New York: Longman,

1989). For an understanding of how the Reformation created unprecedented opportunities for secular power and how "man as sinful" fed elites' moral and educational agenda see Gerald Strauss, *Pre-Reformation Germany*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1993. For confessional orthodoxy's attempt to resolve the crisis of Authority see both Francis Oakley, *The Western Church in the Later Middle Ages*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979: and Jaroslav Pelikan, *Reformation of Church and Dogma*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). For moral regulation as co-extensive with state formation and the manner in which state formations animate, legitimize and routinize a particular moral ethos of citizenship and subjectivity in which difference equates with moral fault see Philip Corrigan *and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1985). For the interactions of state formation and self-mastery through manners which implicitly conveyed a gendered component in regard to power, and located the body as a site of cultural production see both Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process* (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1994); and Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

9 Cited in Suzanne W. Hull, *Chaste, Silent, and Obedient: English Books for Women, 1475-1640* (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1982), p. 181.

10 Richard Hyrde, Introduction to "A devout treatise upon the Paternoster made fyrst in latyn by the moost famous doctour mayster Erasmus..." 1524, as reproduced in, Foster Watson, ed., *Vives and the Renascence Education of Women* (London: Edward Arnold, 1912), p. 160.

11 Ibid., p. 169.

12 Ibid., p. 159.

13 Ibid., p. 172.

14 Cited and quoted, ibid., p. 163.

15 Ibid., p. 167.

16 Ibid., p. 168. He also reminded Frances of Erasmus' tale of "The Abbot and the Learned Woman" which took an oblique shot more at priestly incompetance than womanly scholarship. When Erasmus' abbot remarked that women were more secure from priests if they did not know Latin, his Magdalia replied: "Nay, there is the least danger from that quarter...because you [monks] take all the pains you can not to know anything of Latin." Ibid., p.166n1.

17 Ibid., p. 167.

18 Cited in Grafton and Jardine, *Humanism*, pp. 45-53.

19 For the Reformation from a political perspective see Euan Camer*on, The European Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); and De Lamar Jensen, *Reformation European: Age of Reform and Revolution* (Lexington, MA: D.G. Heath and Co., 1981). For the Reformation from a religious perspective see Francis Oakley, *Western Church* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979); and Jarislav Pelikan, *Reformation* 1300-1700, Vol. IV (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1984).

20 Richard Hyrde, "A very fruitful and pleasant boke called the Instruction of a Christian woman, made fyrst in Latyne by the right famous clerke maister Lewes Vives... Thome Berthelet, 1541, "Privelegio ad imorimendum solum," preface. STC: 24856 HUNT: 60706. (The reprint dates for the Hyrde/Vives text are 1547, 1557, 1585 and 1592. 1531 is listed as a questionable date in Pollard and Redgrave; 1540 is listed as well.) The reference HUNT throughout the footnotes refers to the book's call number at the Huntington Library, San Marino, Ca. Notes on Vives' background are cited from (Chicago, etc.: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1969), pp. 91-92.

21 Corrigan and Sayer, *Great Arch.*

22 George Buchanan published a Latin edition of Vives' treatise at Lyons in 1536 which was intended to follow Thomas Linacre's "Rudimenta Grammatica." Buchanan included the following admonition to the reader: "for he who looks in all things for a reason, as if for a goal, knows moreover what things are of most value, and which things have been furnished him to no use or purpose." He added further that in this text of Vives "you have the judgment of a most learned man [eruditissimi viri]."

23 Margaret Spufford, "Puritanism and Social Control," in ; Robert Muchembled, P*opular Cultural and Elite Cultural in France, 1400-1750*, trans. Lydia Cochrane (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1985). Spufford noted that women's regimentation was not specifically a Puritan response as similar controls on sexuality had surfaced in the thirteenth century. Martin Ingram, "Sex and Marriage," *Popular Cultural in Seventeenth-Century Englan*d, Barry Reay, ed. *Popular Cultural in Seventeenth-Century England* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).

24 Anthony Fletcher, *Gender, Sex, and Subordination in England, 1500-1800* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995). For discussions of the one-sex body see Phyllis Rankin, "Historical Difference, Sexual Difference," Jean Brink, ed., *Privileging Gender in Early Modern England* (Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1993); and Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1990).

25 Vives/Hyrde preface.

26 Idem.

27 *Encyclopedia Britannica*, op. cit.

28 Vives to the contrary, Quintilian believed a nurse's morals were important for boys as well. Moreover, Quintilian stressed early language for both boys and girls. Cited in Quintilian, *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, ed. by James J. Murphy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), pp. 11-12.

29 Cited and quoted in Vives/Hyrde, pp. 1-2.

30 Ibid., pp. 5r-9r.
31 Ibid., p. 9.
32 Cited in ibid., p. 9r.
33 Ibid., chapter 5, passim.
34 Idem. There is no specific mention that Plato also would have been in Latin.
35 Watson, , p. 148.
36 Vives/Hyrde, p. 11.
37 Ibid., cited in the Preface.
38 Cited and quoted in ibid., pp. 5r-10.
39 Ibid., p. 13.
40 Ibid., p. 14.
41 For the skopophilic gaze and the analogy between testicles and the male eye which penetrate the secrets of nature see Steve Brown, "The Boyhood of Shakespeare's Heroines: Notes on Gender Ambiguity in the Sixteenth Century," *Studies in English Literature*, 30, 2 (Spring 1990): 243-263; Paula Findlen, "Humanism, Politics and Pornography in Renaissance Italy," *The Invention of Pornography*, ed. Lynn Hunt (New York: Zone Books, 1996); David O. Frantz, *Festum Voluptatis* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1989).
42 For a discussion of the differences between figures of speech and figures of thought and Agrippa's influence on English rhetoric see Thomas M. Conley, *Rhetoric in the European Tradition* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990), esp. chapter 5.
43 Vives/Hyrde, pp. 18-18r.
44 Ibid., p. 63.
45 Ibid., pp. 61-64r.
46 Ibid., p. 116.
47 The basis for these ideas appear in Emilie Bergman, "The Exclusion of the Feminine in the Cultural Discourse of the Golden Age: Juan Luis Vives and Fray Luis de León," *Sex and Love in Golden Age Spain*, ed. by Alain Saint-Saens (Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edward Mellon Press, 1991), passim.
48 Cited and quoted, Ibid., pp. 129-133.
49 Vives/Hyrde, pp. 113r-115r.
50 Geoffrey Elton, "Humanism in England," *The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe*, eds. Anthony Goodman and Angus MacKay (London and New York: Longman, 1989).
51 Richard J. Schoek, "Humanism in England," ; Retha M. Warnike, Women and Humanism in England," ; Gerald Strauss, "State of Pedagogical Theory c. 1530: What Protestant Reformers Knew about Education," various articles in *The Rise of Puritanism*; William Haller, (New York: Harper & Row, 1957, orig. pub. 1938).
52 All cited in *English Writers on Education, 1480-1603*, compiled by Foster Watson (Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1967, original printing in four

parts between 1902-06), pp. 14-15, and *The Oxford Companion to English Literature*, compiled and edited by Sir Paul Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 268.

53 Cited in Watson, p. 18.

54 Cited and quoted in Thomas Elyot, (London: 1534, reprinted 1545), p. 4. STC: 7657.5; HUNT: 88302. The page references are to the Huntington's photo reproduction: R212242. References to the homo ludens may be found in Richard Schoek."

55 Zenobia may indeed have lived during the reign of Aurelian in 273 C.E.

56 Cited in Watson, pp. 15-19.

57 Cited and quoted in Elyot, p. 20.

58 Ibid., p. 35.

59 Grafton/Jardine, p. 35.

60 Cited in Ibid., pp. 147-49.

61 Today, historians debate whether humanism had by this time merely devolved into rote drills stifling creativity; whether it had only ever been just a broad cultural and literary movement with a strong belief in both recuperating the classics and valuing man; whether the movement came to a grinding halt amid the Reformation and Counter-Reformation; whether Puritan propaganda through the public and the press built on the humanistic model to transform the English imagination; or whether, indeed, humanism was a revolutionary cognitive turn. (That is a meaning-making taking place through dialogic encounters which refashioned reality through the use of words in a particular way, creating a new vision of the world in which the humanists' educational program helped shape state-building by promoting self-mastery and control as the epitome of reason.) This is a short list for pursuing these various arguments: Grafton and Jardine, ; James Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaissance* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991); Dermot Fenlon, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Elizabeth Gleason, "Catholic Reformation, Counterreformation and Papal Reformation in the Sixteenth Century," ; Haller, ; Jerome Bruner, *The Culture of Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization* (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1994). For an excellent overview and further bibliography on the subject see *American Historical Review* (Feb. '98) especially, Kenneth Gouwens "Perceiving the Past: Renaissance Humanism after the 'Cognitive Turn.'"

62 For an overview on literacy and learning among women, and a secondary source bibliography see Merry E. Wiesner, *Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993), pp. 117-145. For the primary texts themselves see , eds. Catherine Usher Henderson and Barbara F. McManus, *Half Humankind* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); and for a facsimile library of essential works, (10 volumes when completed), gen. eds.

Betty S. Travitsky and Patrick Cullen, *The Early Modern Englishwoman* (Brookfield, VT: The Scholar Press).

63 Lawrence Stone, "The Educational Revolution in England, 1560-1640," , no. 28 (July '64): 41-80.

64 Joan Kelly, "Did Women Have a Renaissance," *Women, History, and Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Judith Richards, "To promote a woman to beare rule: Talking of Queens in Mid-Tudor England," *Sixteenth Century Journal* (Spring '97): 101-122.

65 John Knox in (Edinburgh, 1895), p. 373; John Aylmer, "Harborowe for Faithful and Trewe Subjects" (1559); John Leslie, "A Defense of the Honor of Marie Quene of Scotlande" (London, 1569). All cited in Constance Jordan, "Woman's Rule in Sixteenth-Century British Political Thought," (Aug. '87): 421-451; Jordan quoted.

66 Janet Green, " 'I My Self': Queen Elizabeth I's Oration at Tilbury Camp," *Sixteenth Century Journal* (Summer '97): 421-446.

67 Richard Mulcaster, "Positions: Wherein those primitive circumstances be examined, which are necessarie for the training of children, either for skill in their booke, or health in their bodie" (Thomas Vautollier at London, 1561), p. 167. Probable reprints, 1581, 1587, 1591. STC: 18250; HUNT: 62700. Biographical material cited in Watson, , p. 99.

68 Mulcaster, p. 167.

69 Idem.

70 Cited in Ibid., p. 174, 180.

71 Cited and quoted in Ibid., p. 168.

72 Ibid., pp. 133-34.

73 Cited in Ibid., p. 159.

74 Cited and quoted in Ibid., p. 168.

75 Ibid., p. 180.

76 Ibid., p. 177.

77 Ibid., p. 174.

78 Cited and quoted in Ibid., pp. 181-83. Mulcaster cites the Pliny reference on needlework from Pliny, book 35, cap ii.

79 Ibid., p. 200.

80 Cited in Grafton/Jardine, Chapter 7 and Conclusion, passim.

81 See fn. 62.

82 Cited and quoted in Mulcaster, p. 177.

83 Roger Ascham, "The Scholemaster Or plaine and perfeite way of teachyng children, to onderstand, write, and speake, the Latin tong, but specially purposed for the private bryngyng up of youth in gentlemen and Noble mens houses..." B.L.J. Daye, London, 1570 in , collected and revised by Rev. Dr. Gilles (London: John Russel Smith, 1864), p. 123. Background on Ascham cited from Watson, , p. 43 and , p. 44.

84 Ibid., p. 256.
85 Ibid., p. 151.
86 Cited Ibid., pp. 119-120.
87 Quoted in Ibid., p. 142.
88 Cited Ibid., p. 118.
89 Erasmus, "Christiani matrimonii institutio" (Basle, 1526), no page citations, as quoted in Dorothy Gardiner, (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), p. 167.
90 Ibid., as cited in Gardiner, p. 164.
91 Cited in Watson, , p. 78.
92 Edward Hake, "A Touchstone for this time present, expressly declaring such ruines, enormities and abuses as trouble the Churche of God and our Christian commonwealth at this daye. Whereunto is annexed a perfect rule to be observed of all Parents and Scholemasters in the traying of their scholars and children in Learning." (Newly set forth by E. H. Imprinted at London by Thomas Hacket..., 1574), p. 26. STC: 12609; HUNT: 59531.
93 Cited and quoted in ibid., pp. 22-24.
94 E. H. in his Epistle to "A Compendius fourme of education to be diligently observed of all Parentes and Scholemaisters in trayning up of their children and schollers in learning." Gathered into Englishe meeter, by Edward Hake — and bound with the "Touchstone."
95 Hake, "A Touchstone," p. 22.
96 Watson, , p. 78. While there were numerous books on the method and value of a boy's education in this period, the only text specifically for girls was the reprinted Hyrde translation of Vives.
97 Natalie Zemon Davis, *Society and Cultural in Early Modern France* "Women on Top," (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975).
98 Edward Gosynhill, "Here begynneth a lytle boke named the Scholehouse of women: wherein every man may rede a goodly prayse of the condicyons of women." Tomas Petyt, 1561. (Pollard and Redgrave notes a possible error in date) Published 1541, 1560, 1572. STC: 12104.5 HUNT: repro of 16965. Biographical information on Gosynhill is cited from *Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. by Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee (London: Oxford University Press, 1949-50), pp. 266-7.
99 Ibid., pp. 1r-4.
100 Ibid., p. 3v.
101 I am indebted to both Stephen Greenblatt and Francis Dolan for my thoughts in this passage. Stephen Greenblatt, *Learning to Curse* (New York and London: Routledge, 1990); Frances E. Dolan, Dangerous Familiars: Representations of Domestic Crime in England, 1550-1700 (Ithaca and London:, Cornell University Press, 1994).
102 Further ideas on "the weak" may be found in James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

103 Mrs. Dorothy Leigh, "The Mother's Blessing: Or The godly Counsaile of a Gentle-woman, not long since deceased, left behind her for her Children..." (John Budge, 1618), Preface. (Reprinted in nineteen editions through1718 and dedicated to the Lady Elizabeth, daughter to the high and mighty king of Great Britain. STC: 154039, HUNT: 20955. The manuscript was sent to the Princess Elizabeth after Leigh's death on her instructions. In her dedication, she asks the Princess "to preserve this for my children who are now too young, while I am too old." The Huntington copy contains an inscription on the flyleaf to another Elizabeth. It reads: "to Elisa. Frances Park, October 9, 1811 from her father." Leigh's ideas were still very much of the moment.

The few particulars on Mrs. Leigh are cited in , eds. Anne Crawford et al. (Detroit MI: Gale Research Co., 1983). There are no birth or death dates given.

104 Ibid., p. 251.

105 Ibid. , p. 14.

106 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

107 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

108 Ibid., pp. 32-34.

Ruptured Spaces and Effective Histories: The Unveiling of the Babi Poet Qurrat al-`Ayn- Tahirih in the Gardens of Badasht.

NEGAR MOTTAHEDEH

But if Goethe was right to assert that when we cultivate our virtues, we at the same time cultivate our faults, and if, as everyone knows, a hypertrophied virtue—such as the historical sense of our age appears to be—can ruin a nation just as effectively as a hypetrophied vice: then there can be no harm in indulging me for this once.
-Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Uses and the Disadvantages of History for Life, foreword.*

The French Revolution viewed itself as Rome reincarnate. It evoked ancient Rome the way fashion evokes costumes of the past.
-Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," XIV.

The Babi conference in Badasht was held in the summer of 1848. Although the conference is significant in history as a moment that designates the messianic movement's complete break with Islam, it has received little focused attention in contemporary Iranian historiography. This is perhaps due to the lack of consistent information on the specifics of the gathering.

One can relate this paucity of detail in the early renditions of the Badasht conference to the way in which some of the particulars of the proceedings were perceived by the conference participants. Significantly, to be sure, the occasion of Qurrat al-`Ayn Tahirih's unveiled appearance recorded in Nabil's Narrative as recollected by Shaykh Abu Turab. Female unveiling in the public sphere before the turn of the century in Iran was rare, and if it occurred, it took place during Shrine protests to demonstrate that the proper order of things needed to be restored. "Thus," as Jackson Armstrong-Ingram argues,

"propriety is flouted to draw attention to the importance of maintaining it and the duty of the 'authorities' to do so." (correspondence) While Shrine protests were considered restorative, for a Shi`ite populace such as that assembled in Badasht, Qurrat al-`Ayn gesture was understood as a gesture of relentless revolt, for it associated itself with a break from the Shari`ah- religious law. For that reason alone, perhaps, the act was perceived as unseemly for a comely woman who was venerated as an emblem of purity and infallibility among the followers of Sayyid `Ali Muhammad, the Bab.

My general attempt here is to unpack the function of revolutions as forces that introduce discontinuity in history, problematizing thereby the writing of a comprehensive and continuous history. More specifically, however, I will address the ways in which the Babi revolt in Badasht articulated a rupture in Islamic history. Pried open by the unveiled appearance of Qurrat al-`Ayn in the public and male domain of the Badasht gardens, the historical discourses on Islamic space were reconfigured and disarticulated, affecting the way Islamic notions of selfhood and identity were conceived. By positioning the reading of this moment of unveiling on the problematic figure of Shaykh Abu Turab in Nabil's Narrative, I will discuss how the necessary configuration of human agency in an effective history reintroduces continuity into the historicity of revolt. In doing so, I argue, human agency problematizes the relation between the discontinuous character of revolutions and the "patient and continuous" development of historical consciousness.

Foucault, Genealogy and Effective History.

The central problematic of this paper arises out of a debate around the function of revolutions in historiography. Michel Foucault, whose concept "effective history" informs the title of this paper was accused at one point for introducing discontinuity into the history of the mind, thereby undercutting all basis for progressive political intervention.[1] In 1966, the existentialist Jean Paul Sartre discredited Foucault's *The Order of Things* as the work of a structuralist enemy of history. Sartre argued that Foucault's archeological labor was unable to explain how people move from one thought to another. In order to explain that phenomenon, Foucault would have to allow "praxis and thus history to intervene, and that's precisely what he refuses to do."[2] Foucault rejected the label, claiming contra Sartre that his aim "is to substitute different types of transformation for the abstract, general, monotonous form of 'change' which so easily serves as a means for conceptualizing succession." [3] He argued that he was instead "substituting for the theme of becoming an analysis of transformations in their specificity."[4]

Writing in 1971, Foucault elaborated his position on traditional historio-

graphic practices in an homage to his mentor Jean Hyppolite in an essay called "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History". In formulating his thoughts about the direction of his own historiographic practice, Foucault refers to Nietzsche's conception of genealogy as an "effective history". Drawing on Nietzsche's uses of the notion of origin, Foucault maintains that the foundation of any event depends not on a single originary gesture, but on a discontinuous multitude of events and attitudes for its emergence. History writing therefore must take a second look at the bedrock for its claims. For if events are not formed on the basis of continuous progress and development, historiography can in no way support its current practice which purports to be a dry affirmation of facts and figures, that merely recognize specific originary moments and mirror them so to enable mankind's rediscovery of a lost and uniform self. Foucault writes that:

> The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled. Necessarily, we must dismiss those tendencies that encourage the consoling play of recognitions.[5]

Under the banner of history, our knowledge cannot depend on the "rediscovery," of ourselves.

Indeed, Foucault argues, history must deprive us of a sense of stability in life.

> History becomes "effective" to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being— as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself. Effective history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.[6]

The writing of history, according to Foucault, must take on new forms. Forms that question in their very conception notions of the unitary subject, that interrogate the affirmations of stability at the base of nature and culture, and that disrupt practices preoccupied with the tracing of uninterrupted progress in human history. An effective history must therefore question the unity of authorship and authority behind the formulation of cultural life, because it recognizes chance as the originator of intent. Effective history

thereby cuts any notion of continuity at the heart of tradition. True historical sense as Foucault understands it, "confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or point of reference."[7]

Shaykh Abu Turab and Effective History

The recollecter of Qurrat al-`Ayn's unveiling in Badasht, Shaykh Abu Turab, came out of the Shaykhi school, much like most of the early adherents of the Babi movement in Iran in the middle of the nineteenth century. The school was situated in Karbala (Iraq), a place which was a major center for Shi`ite religious training. The Shaykhi school, associated with Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i, was known for its progressive teachings and reformist attitudes.

A significant number of the early adherents of the Bab had received six to nine years of formal religious training at the school. Indeed, much of their thinking about the day of Resurrection, the advent of the Imam Mahdi and the theory of prophetic cycles came from their contact with the instructor and later leader, Sayyid Kazim.[8] After the death of Sayyid Kazim, many of them found the fulfillment of their teacher's promises of the return of the Imam Mahdi (as the abrogator of the Islamic dispensation, the Qur 'an and the Shari`ah) in the teachings and the personage of the Bab. Typically the Shaykhi-Babis opposed the corruption of Shi`ite doctrine within Shi`ite orthodoxy and had a strong awareness of the way in which it accommodated for the needs of the Qajar rule.

From the perspective of effective history, Shaykh Abu Turab's recollections of the unveiled Babi poet Qurrat al-`Ayn's appearance in a garden in Badasht emerge as significant when measured in the balance of this historical force field. For in their very formulation, these recollections formulate a rupture into the conception of traditional historical Islamic discourses on space. — Spatial discourses which purport to be the very foundation for Islamic notions of selfhood and identity.

It is precisely on the basis of Abu Turab's recollections that I argue that the Babi revolt at the Badasht conclave constituted an event which in Foucault's own formulations was neither "a decision," "a treaty," "a reign," or "a battle," but "the reversal of forces," "the usurpation of power," "the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who once used it" and ironically, "the entry of a masked 'other'," into the realm of traditional history.[9]

The Babi Revolt in Badasht.

The Babi Conference in Badasht was held for three weeks between June and July of 1848. Mulla Muhammad `Ali Barfurushi (Quddus), one of the first people to join the Babi movement and his companions (who were among the Conference's participants) had intended on raising the Black Standard in Mashhad. [10] They were, however, forced out of the city of Mashhad due to heightened anti-Babi fervor and were wandering on horseback in the North Eastern corner of Iran. Qurrat al-`Ayn and her companions, traveling from Tehran, were on their way to the region of Khurasan to join Quddus' forces and to ride under the Black Standard. They met the group of wandering Babis en route on the Mazandaran-Khurasan road and from all accounts decided to change their destination. Despite the turn of events the two groups joined and decided to rent three gardens in which they could contemplate their fate and review a range of questions regarding the identity of the movement and its future strategy.

The group's charismatic leader Sayyid `Ali Muhammad—surnamed the Bab— had claimed (in 1844) to be "the Gate" to the Qa'im who would usher forth a new era in religious history. Due to his claim, which traditionally would imply the imminent relinquishment of power by both the Shi`ite clergy and the Qajar dynast, the Bab was imprisoned by the authorities in a remote castle-prison in Azarbaijan. The prime agenda of this group of eighty-one Babis, therefore, was the plight of the Bab. They were anxious to find a way to rescue him. Any effort in this direction, however, was contingent on a plan of future action. "Moderation and prudence in the face of mounting hostility, radical Babis argued, could lead only to further suffering. Yet the final Insurrection against the forces of oppression would materialize only if the Qa'im made his advent unequivocally apparent."[11] This raised the question of the Bab's precise claim and the nature of his mission. Who was the Bab? Was he, the Qa'im—the Messiah who they had been expecting for hundreds of years? Was his message a rejuvenation of the Islamic truth? Or did he intend to establish a new and independent religion? These pressing questions, unrelated to the question of loyalty to the Founder, were meant to establish the status of the movement and the identity of its participants.

Of the three gardens, one was assigned to the famous poet and Babi leader Qurrat al-`Ayn —surnamed Tahirih (The Pure One) at the Conference. The second was assigned to Quddus. The third garden Mirza Husayn `Ali, later known by the title Bah-', and who had rented the properties, reserved for himself.[12] The rest of the participants camped on the grounds surrounding these Babi leaders.

The narratives and histories of the events differ slightly in the manner in

which the events took place. Most agree on the following points: 1) that the poet/leader Qurrat al-`Ayn appeared unveiled before the conference participants; 2) that she argued for a definite break with the Shi`ite Shari`ah and the traditions of Islam; 3) that confusion and contention followed, leading to the denial of Faith on the part of several of the participants; and 4) that the gathering effected the further development of the movement and affected a radical change in the rituals and actions undertaken by its participants.

Qurrat al-`Ayn, the poet, took on the leading role at the conference, arguing for a definitive break with the Shari`ah and the old traditions. Some sources maintain that Quddus rejected her as a radical and "the author of heresy".[13] She, on the other hand, questioned Quddus' claims to leadership, having failed to raise the banner of Babi revolt in Mashhad.[14] This radical split between the two leaders is claimed by most parties to have determined the dynamics of the Badasht Conference.

Shaykh Abu Turab recollects: Qurrat al-`Ayn's unveiling.

Shaykh Abu-Turab, who the Babi historian Nabil introduces as the "best-informed as to the nature of the developments in Badasht,"[15] is reported to have related the following incidents:

> Illness, one day confined Bah·'u'llah to His bed. Quddus, as soon as he heard of His indisposition, hastened to visit Him... The rest of the companions were gradually admitted to His presence and grouped themselves around Him. No sooner had they assembled than...the messenger of Tahirih...suddenly came in and conveyed to Quddus a pressing invitation from Tahirih to visit her in her own garden. 'I have severed myself entirely from her,' he boldly and decisively replied. I refuse to meet her.'[16]

Unwilling to take no for an answer, Qurrat al-`Ayn herself is reported to have emerged from her garden to address the problem in person. Abu Turab describes what followed.

> Suddenly the figure of Tahirih, adorned and unveiled appeared before the eyes of the assembled companions. Consternation immediately seized the entire gathering. All stood aghast before this sudden and most unexpected apparition. To behold her face unveiled was to them inconceivable. Even to gaze at her shadow was a thing which they deemed improper, inasmuch as they regarded her as the incarnation of F·timih, the noblest emblem of chastity in their eyes...That sudden revelation seemed to have stunned their faculties. [One of the participants] was so

> gravely shaken that he cut his throat with his own hands. Covered with blood and shrieking with excitement, he fled away from the face of Tahirih. A few, following his example, abandoned their companions and forsook their Faith...[17]

Historians fascinated by the cite/sight of Qurrat al-`Ayn's unveiled appearance have either applauded this gesture as the originary moment of women's liberation in Iran or in absolute disgust for this act of heresy claimed this gesture to be the foundation for, as well as the fundamental proof of, the deserved ill repute and false motives of the Babi movement. Seldom have they stayed in the garden to witness what Shaykh Abu Turab claims to have followed. Nabil's informant goes on to report that Qurrat al-`Ayn who had seated herself next to Quddus:

> ...rose from her seat and, undeterred by the tumult that she had raised in the hearts of her companions began to address the remnant of the assembly. Without the least premeditation, and in language that bore striking resemblance to that of the Qu'ran, she delivered her appeal with matchless eloquence and profound fervor. She concluded her address with this verse from the Qu'ran: 'Verily, amid gardens and rivers shall the pious dwell in the seat of truth, in the presence of the potent King.' ... Immediately after, she declared: 'I am the Word which the Q-'im is to utter, the Word which shall put to flight the chiefs and nobles of the earth.'[18]

The Shaykh's detailed recollection of the moment of Qurrat al-`Ayn's usurpation of power is unequaled in the annals of early Babi historiography.[19] Yet, before I go on to discuss the specific ways in which I think this recollection of the events at Badasht "cuts" (to cite Foucault) our knowledge of Islamic history and disarms its notion of a unified subjectivity as well as its sense of historical continuity, I would like to briefly discuss the Islamic discourses on space and their effects on the historiography of the Islamic garden. For it is against these practices that Qurrat al-`Ayn's radical critique is aimed.

Islam and Spatiality.

It is said that in the early days of the religion of Islam the Prophet Muhammad used space and orientation as a way to establish the fundamental nature of Islam. He did this first to distinguish his new born revelation from paganism by aligning the new religion with other extant monotheistic religions. Every day he would turn in prayer towards Jerusalem — the Qibla

of Judaism and Christianity. For the followers of the new religion this corporal gesture became a sign of difference from the surrounding religious practices, affiliating the religion of Islam through the orientation of the body in space with the other two monotheistic religions. Then one day, it is said, his followers realized that he no longer was turning in that direction, but that he now was turning towards Mecca, changing the direction of his prayer in order to establish the unique and independent nature of Islam within the context of monotheism.[20] Spatiality thus gained relevance for the identity of the pious Muslim through these doctrinal and ritual practices of the body.

Spatial practices in most Islamic countries today function similarly to constitute a national and a personal identity. They are enforced as doctrines or laws to distinguish the realm of the public from the private. Spatial discourses directly superimpose the differential place of women and men upon this private/public split. These practices are significantly and hermeneutically linked to the verse 53 of sura 33 of the Qur'an on the issue of the hijab which in Arabic literally means to hide something from sight, to separate or establish a threshold or to forbid.[21] Thus linked, the verse of the hijab is construed as a prohibition that concerns space, and is more commonly associated with the practice of veiling.

Verse 53 of sura 33 of the Qur'an reads as follows:

> O ye who believe! Enter not the dwelling of the Prophet for a meal without waiting for the proper time, unless permission be granted you. But if ye are invited, enter, and, when your meal is ended, then disperse. Linger not for conversation. Lo! that would cause annoyance to the Prophet, and he would be shy of (asking) you (to go); but Allah is not shy of the truth. And when ye ask of them (the wives of the Prophet) anything, ask it of them from behind a curtain. This is purer for your hearts and for their hearts.[22]

Traditionally, when the question of the relevance of a certain verse arises, Islamic scholars turn towards memory or recollection.[23] The Hadith have constituted this memory for posterity through the (re)collection of the various stories told by the associates and the family of the Prophet. Among the thousands of these Hadith there is one significant story which relates to the Qur'anic verse on the question of veiling and which, according to the Moroccan feminist scholar Fatima Mernissi, gets lost in the shuffle. This misplacement, which should more relevantly be called "dissimulation" (because of the word's close association with the act of veiling), has institut-

ed a rather skewed impression of the context of the verse, and suggested that the Prophet ordered the separation of the sexes with it.[24] The political and cultural context for the descent of the verse on the hijab as constituted by al-Bukhari's version of Anas' recollections of this incident would prove such a view far from the mark.

The Prophet's Wedding Night: the institution of the veil.

In his collection of Hadith, the historian al-Bukhari writes that on the night when he celebrated his marriage to Zaynab, the Prophet Muhammad became frustrated with his guests. The whole city of Medina had been invited to the celebrations and despite the show of impatience on the part of the Prophet, the guests would not leave. Finally, standing on the threshold of the wedding chamber he recited the verse of the hijab (quoted above), while drawing a curtain between himself and his companion, Anas.[25] In effect this act of drawing the curtain not only separated the space between the sublime and the profane (the space between the Prophet and his disciples), but also the space between two men. This act and the verse of the hijab, situated above all the identity of the two men as separate and established a hierarchical division of power between the two through a spatial division.

In the period that followed, the verse revealed on the Prophet's wedding night became a handy tool for a confused community in civil war in Medina. The wedding of Zaynab and the Prophet took place during a period of instability in which the Prophet attempted to gain a foothold in Medina. The Muslims were constantly under attack by the surrounding community and it was obvious that one of the most powerful ways to weaken an already unsettled community was through attacking the Muslim women. The verse of the hijab gave the Muslim community a solution to a whole network of problems.[26] The act of veiling was introduced into the Muslim community as a way to distinguish between the wives of the Prophet (to whom the Medinese were forced to show respect) and the female slaves.[27] Veiling, then, derived from the act of drawing the curtain between two men, was introduced into the Muslim community in Medina as a sign of hierarchical differentiation, between men and women and among women. In the midst of civil war, the wives of the Prophet adopted the veil to protect themselves from molestation and the community from vigilant attacks.

During this war, the streets of Medina, i.e. public space, became male space and if women of higher status wanted to enter into this space, they were to do this on the condition that they pull a piece of clothing over their heads and bodies.[28]

Mernissi argues that the institution of this act in the Medinese period

marked the beginning of women's repression in Islam— a religion which from its inception was an egalitarian community.[29] Be that as it may, in order to support this position, one would have to disregard the more recent history of Muslim women, who in the struggle for independence in the Algerian War of Independence (1954-62) and in the struggle against imperialism in Iran during the Islamic Revolution (1978-79) chose to don the veil as a gesture of difference from the West. In other words they chose to veil as a gesture that would position them against the perceived "repression" of colonial and imperialist power.[30]

So, rather than argue that the veil is essentially repressive on the one hand or essentially liberating on other, I would suggest that the verse of the hijab invoked on the Prophet's wedding night thereby entered into an apparatus of power and knowledge. It did so as a question of the nature of communal identity at a restless moment in Islamic history. The female body was subsequently construed as the focal-point of this identity. As such it was given the task to protect the Muslim communal identity, by protecting its own. Islamic identity was thus constituted on a problematic rupture divided on this body's gendered split between nature and culture ñ and again on its historically hierarchical social divide – a body culturally constituted as vulnerable and perceived as naturally harmful.[31] Having entered into the apparatus of power and knowledge at this level, the verse of the hijab marked a fatal ambiguity within Islamic discourses on space. Its fluctuations within the contending recollections/knowledge that surrounded it and the political discourses that activated it, further problematized the production of a unified and continuous Islamic identity despite all efforts to construe it as such. The veil as a representation of this fragmented identity came to function both positively and negatively within the dynamics of power. As a focal point of identity it became an arena of constant struggle and domination for the future Muslim communities. It functioned therefore as a screen behind which the mysterious, the feared and the stereotypical and sexually potent Muslim female figure could lay dormant, always ready to erupt into the uncertain domain of the public.

Space and its gendered partitioning, as we have already observed, is fundamental in several ways to both the doctrine and the practice of Islam. Before we return to the discussion of its disarticulation in the gardens of Badasht, I would like to move our attention to a consideration of a particularly potent public space which has for centuries fired the imagination of indigenous Muslim poets and geographers alike. This is the space of the garden.

The Islamic Garden.

In the context of the geographical conditions of the area "conquered" by Islamic thought, the garden is to be seen as a way to ameliorate the often life-denying, arid and monotonous conditions of the land. People of high and low economic status incorporated a life-sustaining oasis, into their own properties, carefully sheltered away with a wall in order to shut out the hustle and bustle as well as the odors of the city. One finds clear evidence of this even if one only casts a passing glance on the various collections of images that have been handed down through Mogol arts, and ancient Persian miniatures and carpets. It would also seem, from a consideration of the vegetal imagery introduced into the carpet tradition during the Abbasid period in Iran, that the garden was so greatly valued that it was important to construct a never-fading image of it onto a transportable medium such as the carpet. The floral carpet would thus introduce the garden's verdant quality to interior spaces.

A brief study the life style and practices of the Iranian nobility, as depicted especially by the grand narratives of royal history and Iranian (mystical) poetry, may allow us to reach similar conclusions. We learn that gardens were always incorporated into the structures of dynastic residences for the pleasure and traditional rituals of the ruling class. These tales situate the royal garden as a site of romance and hedonistic pleasure, and as spaces where the king would hold court and celebrate his weddings. In allegories of the garden, the space of the garden represents and activates the dynast's dreams, desires and nightmares. The garden not only enables his daily and ritual activities, it is an integral part of his physical and phantasmagoric realities.[32]

Traditional historiographic practice claims the garden's main function to be the spatial reflection of the Paradise of the Qur'an. Its structure in the form of the Persian Chahar Bagh, for example, is said to directly represent the Garden of Paradise described by the Prophet Muhammad himself in this following verse:

> And besides these shall be two gardens,
> green green pastures,
> therein two fountains of gushing water
> therein fruits, and palm-trees and pomegranates
> therein maidens good and comely...
> houris, cloistered in cool pavilions...[33]

This description of Paradise is regularly interrupted by the refrain:

> O which of your Lord's bounties will you and you deny?

there by giving room for detailed attempts to figure out a geography of Paradise in the form of two times two gardens, a quadrangular layout of many royal Persian gardens called the Chahar Bagh — "Four Gardens." (Notably the interdiction against depicting human form in Islam is in this spatial interpretation focused directly on "the comely maidens").

Echoing theocratic narratives, historians of the garden return to similar Qur'anic verses about Paradise as a source that unquestionably situates the origin and the homogenous nature of the Islamic garden for all time. Historians of the Islamic garden place the garden in the grand narrative of Muslim life and attribute its very structure and continuity to the authority of the Prophet.

What is sorely missing from these historical accounts is a sense of discontinuity and change that leaves open to further research the construal of a variety of other influences in the making of the material paradise on earth: considerations for irrigation and traditional horticultural practices are examples of these. Other considerations, for instance for the ease of hunting, for aesthetics and architecture may also be the reasons behind the garden's present form. What is denied in the traditional historical analyses of the Islamic garden, then, is an analytics of the social and historical contexts which may signal various sources of authorship and historical influence, not to mention deeply embedded pre-Islamic associations with the garden and its beauties, as external conditions for the emergence of such a discourse.[34]

The Prophet's Wedding Chamber and the Gardens of Badasht.

It is precisely against this kind of historiography that I have launched Shaykh Abu Turab's memory of the revolt in Badasht. The event, or rather, the critical practice I attribute to it, presupposes four methodological principles identified by Michel Foucault in his 1970 inaugural lecture at the College de France "The Order of Discourse" : the principle of reversal, wherein the origin, tradition and authority of the Islamic discourse on space is put into question; the principle of discontinuity, which recognizes the discontinuity of discursive practices regarding space, their crossing, juxtaposition and exclusion; the principle of specificity which recognizes the violence of discourse done on things — here Islamic space; and finally the principle of exteriority which identifies the external conditions of possibility for such a discourse.

In my reading, Shaykh Abu Turab's recollections of the proceedings of the Badasht Conference are noteworthy, because they situate, for the first time in close to twelve centuries, a single female unveiled in Islamic public space in an act of public revolt. Beyond this, they are remarkable, because of the place

that they claim that the unveiling took place. They are striking, too, for the rhetoric that they associate with Qurrat al-`Ayn Tahirih's provocative gesture in a garden.

Although twelve centuries apart, (al-Bukhari's version of) Anas' recollections of the events that took place on the threshold of the Prophet's wedding chamber and Shaykh Abu Turab's recollections of the moment of Qurrat al-`Ayn's unveiling in the gardens of Badasht have similar although inverse effects in their appropriation by traditional historical practice. Whereas in the case of the Prophet Muhammad the rhetoric, that is the Qur'anic verse, is preserved in historical memory over and above the act of drawing a curtain between two men; in the case of Badasht, the act of a female's unveiled appearance, rather than Qurrat al-`Ayn's powerful address, is remembered.

In the case of one, the preservation of the word enabled the opportunity for men to regain control over the liberated womenfolk of Mecca and Medina, while in the case of the other, the act of unveiling was seized as a figurative construct that would reinforce the Babi discourse on equality.[35] Both of these historiographic practices, though dealing with events that are separated by many centuries, are examples of the ways in which discourse is a violence done to things. A critical stance against this kind of discursive violence is evident in Qurrat al-`Ayn's own rhetorical practices as recollected by Shaykh Abu Turab.

The Order of Discourse.

If we consider the gestures and rhetoric that are said to have occurred at Badasht as reported by Shaykh Abu Turab together as a co-determining whole, we are struck by the recognition and the awareness Qurrat al-`Ayn Tahirih herself is said to have professed of the place in which she spoke, not only as a public space that was exclusively reserved for men, but also as the space of the garden which for centuries had been associated with the space of the Islamic Paradise. In sustaining this recognition, I will propose that the gesture of unveiling by Qurrat al-`Ayn Tahirih in Shaykh Abu Turab signals a critical analytics on two fronts and an acknowledgment of a violence done to space by discourse on two levels.

On the one hand, we see that in the simple act of appropriating the Qur'anic verse, "Amongst gardens and rivers..." Qurrat al-`Ayn's speech acknowledged the structural imposition of the discourse of the Qur'anic Paradise on the space of the garden. On the other, her appearance unveiled in a male domain questioned the imposition of Islamic territorial partitioning upon an otherwise undifferentiated public space. In both cases she questioned the structural imposition of a so-called Islamic discourse on space.

Her use of Qur'anic language at once supported the authority of the Qur'an while simultaneously undoing its meaning through a specifically gendered mode of enunciation in the public sphere. She thus appropriated a vocabulary and "turned it against those who had once used it." In this act of appropriation Qurrat al-`Ayn effectively resituated paradise and hell on earth. She did so by suggesting that those sitting in the garden in that very tent, were the pious assembled before the potent King. In her speech and action Qurrat al-`Ayn thus, reintroduced human agency within the context of history and positioned authority and change within the realm of human activity. She questioned thereby the contiguous character of historical unfolding (or becoming to use Foucault's terminology) as prefigured and guided solely by a divine hand.

Qurrat al-`Ayn's address at Badasht questioned the homogenous unity established as the source of authorship of the Islamic garden and of the social division of space. Her speech and her act of unveiling in the public domain reconfigured the disjunction between the doer and the deed —a disjunction which ironically presupposes a continuity between the Author of Islam and "his" work and "his" people on earth. Put differently, whereas before it had been a given that it was Allah's will that Islamic space was to be divided by the believers into two gendered territories, and that the garden should be divided into four, to reflect Qur'anic Paradise, Qurrat al-`Ayn's action and speech now clearly posited human activity as the external condition of possibility for spatial discourse in Islam. Human activity was the only party responsible for this determination.

Because of the imbrication of spatiality and veiling in Islam, one can additionally say that if she could unveil despite the so called injunction to veil (exemplified by the appropriation of the Qur'anic verse), then others could appropriate the veil without that injunction in mind. Human activity alone could therefore be held responsible for the construal of a gendered space and the constitution and the authorship of the garden as the Qur'anic Paradise.

Her act and her speech introduced a disjunction between the Islamic discourses on space, "cutting" them off from their assumed Qur'anic injunctions. Qurrat al-`Ayn thus situated the deed and doer within the same discursive matrix. In effect her gesture and speech proposed the possibility of a reversal in the meaning of that space through the force of rhetorical and practical juxtaposition. The garden, previously regarded as the space of paradisiacal and poetical musings, was thus resituated as a space of activity and resistance.

Her appearance unveiled in the public and gendered space of the garden also questioned the hierarchical structure imposed on the space of the garden as space of piety as well as that of nobility. In questioning this hierarchical

structure Qurrat al- `Ayn claimed that her presence in the garden as the word spoken by the Qa'im would put to flight "the chiefs and nobles of the earth". Although physically unveiled her speech re-veiled her (so to speak) as the Word spoken by the Qa'im himself, the charismatic leader who according to Shi`ite tradition was to abrogate the Islamic Shari`ah and establish the reign of a new era in religious and political history. Her gesture thus introduced a "foreign other" into the realm dominated by the rhetoric of authority and power formerly attributed to her sexual counterpart. As such she launched a frontal attack on (Islamic) hierarchical and other-worldly discourse.

In the days that followed this historical speech each of the participants at the conference took on a new name whereby signaling their rebirth into a new era in time. Then, as if to acknowledge Qurrat al-`Ayn's gesture, the participants discarded their prayer rugs which by its design orients the pious body towards Mecca and broke their prayer seals, equating them to idols in a gesture not unlike Muhammad's when he, in the Holy City, tried to convey the definite break with an era of pagan devotion by destroying the objects of idol worship. The space of Islam was confronted by a discourse of antagonism at the Badasht Conference, thereby creating the conditions for a new discourse on space and a new era in (religious) history.[36]

Shaykh Abu Turab's recollections.

Shaykh Abu Turab's recollections of the events that took place at the Badasht Conference reconstruct a consistent, continuous, and antagonistic portrait of a revolutionary movement that through the gestures and words of one of its renowned female representatives introduced discontinuity into the life of the Islamic mind. In appropriating this stance Shaykh Abu Turab's recollections 'cut' our knowledge of Islamic history, disarm its notion of a unified subjectivity and question its sense of historical continuity. Ironically, this stance is only possible by the appropriation of an undivided subjectivity informed by Shaykh Abu Turab's recollections of Qurrat al-`Ayn Tahirih as a presentable female without equal. Indeed, a recollection that claims for her the status of the avatar of Fatimih in order to take her somewhat "existentialist" stance.

For if we look at other accounts of Qurrat al-`Ayn, there is reason to believe that matters are not as straight-forward as he has made them seem.[37] The British Orientalist Edward Browne's collections of various historical materials suggest that in one of his conversation with Mirza Yahya —also known as Azal, the half-brother of Baha'u'llah— it was remarked that Qurrat al-`Ayn never intentionally took off the veil.[38] Browne comments that if he can remember the conversation correctly, this early Babi responded to the

question of Qurrat al-`Ayn's discarding of the veil in the following words:

> It is not true that she laid aside the veil. Sometimes when carried away by her eloquence, she allowed it to slip down off her face, but she would always replace it after a few moments.[39]

Nabil's Narrative, Agency and Effective History.

Shaykh Abu Turab's recollections of the Badasht conference are rather precarious in the context of Babi history, since no one seems to elaborate on who Abu Turab is. Browne suggests that Abu Turab was one of the earliest disciples of the Bab and that he was married to one of Qurrat al-`Ayn's female students, a woman of "extraordinary virtue and piety"[40] Nabil on the other hand introduces Abu Turab as a Shaykhi who never really acknowledged the Bab's claims until much later in the Bab's career.[41] According to Nabil he apparently died in the Tehran prison where he was held captive with some well known Babi leaders including Baha'u'llah.[42] There appears to be no other reference to Turab anywhere else.

To add more complexity to the matter, Abu Turab seemingly plays the most insignificant role in the grand and at times grotesque history of the Babi movement as presented in Nabil's Narrative. He appears only four times in the more than seventy years of history narrated by Nabil. Once as the chronicler of the Badasht conference,[43] a second time as Qurrat al-`Ayn's body guard after the Conference,[44] a third time as the harbinger of glad tidings at Shaykh Tabarsi,[45] and finally as a character witness against Haji Mirza Karim Khan Kirmani in his recollections of Sayyid Kazim.[46]

It is the latter moment that I would like to pause and reflect on since here, once again, Abu Turab's recollections are drawn upon to elucidate a critical situation.[47] In Nabil's historiography, Abu Turab's recollection of Karim Khan is brought into the picture only paragraphs before Sayyid Kazim Rashti's death is characterized. This is obviously a moment that if not negotiated carefully would create a potential crisis for Babism's legitimacy as a religious movement.

Sayyid Kazim was known as the religious leader of the Shaykhi school, a heterodoxy of Shi`ih Islam situated in Karbala (Iraq). According to most accounts, the Bab's initial claims of Mahdihood were directed at Sayyid Kazim's students, many of whom accepted it after the teacher's death and became active participants in the movement.[48] Shaykh Abu Turab is claimed to be one of Sayyid Kazim's prominent students who late in the Bab's career accepted the latter's claim to Mahdihood. Qurrat al-`Ayn and Quddus were

among other students who accepted this claim.

Sayyid Kazim had, according to most sources, taught the Return of the Twelfth Imam for years and prepared his students to investigate this Return were it to occur in their life time. In 1844, when the Bab proclaimed his mission a great many of Sayyid Kazim's students recognized this claim. In effect the Bab took on "the successorship" of the Shaykhi school after the teacher's death.

The positioning of Abu Turab's recollection in the context of Nabil's historiography becomes clear, if we consider the role played by the third party (Haji Mirza Karim Khan Kirmani) to this recollection in relation to the development of the Babi movement. Karim Khan, another prominent student of Sayyid Kazim, left the Shaykhi school some years before the death of its leader (Sayyid Kazim) and established himself in Kirman where he started his own branch of the school (called the Kirmani school). Although familiar with the Bab's claims, Kirmani whole-heartedly rejected the Bab and was for years involved in the agitation of the remainder of Sayyid Kazim's students against the Bab and his followers.

Abu Turab's recollections, situated (in textual terms) only moments before Sayyid Kazim's death in Nabil's Narrative give Abu Turab's words a highly charged task: to recall a moment in which Sayyid Kazim rejects his own student, Karim Khan. In Abu Turab's recollection of this conversation Sayyid Kazim is said to have referred to Karim Khan as one "accursed," whose doctrines are "heretical" and "atheistic" and "who has grievously erred in his judgment".[49] Abu Turab's recollection of this conversation with his own teacher can be read as a self-serving character assassination. But its strategic positioning at a crisis point in Nabil's historiography, clearly situates its contents in a historiographic place that rids the reader of any doubt as to the successorship of Sayyid Kazim before the historical crisis is even recounted. For Nabil, Abu Turab's recollections situate the necessary continuity of his narrative of the Babi movement's revolutionary history and its legitimacy.

But why is this important? What relevance does this textual positioning have for a revolutionary history that relentlessly posits itself as the driving force for social change, and that uses strategy in the face of chance to disrupt the foundations of Islamic thought by revealing discontinuities in its history?

Abu Turab's role, although infinitesimal in Nabil's narration of Babism revolutionary history, is played on a measured field of continuity and discontinuity. Abu Turab's recollections of Badasht in the Narrative launch an account of the movement's discontinuity with Islamic traditions and values, forcing a break between Shi`ih Islam and Babism in the event of the Conference. Turab's recollections of Qurrat al-`Ayn's actions and words in

Badasht, much like his portrayed role as her body guard after the Conference suture the necessary subjectivity that would then posit human agency up against an identity in crisis. His recollections thus situate a continuous subjectivity against a perceived decrepit one in Islam. (The Conference participant's collective appropriation of new names, we should note, is important in the configuration of this new subjectivity). For Nabil, this still leaves the question of the movement's legitimacy unanswered.

In drawing on Abu Turab's recollections, Nabil situates the Babi movement's legitimacy in Sayyid Kazim's rejection of his pupil Karim Khan. More importantly, he does this before the teacher's death. Indeed, through this rejection and almost fortuitously, he posits the Bab as the legitimate claimant to Sayyid Kazim's successorship. Nabil thus creates through Abu Turab's recollections, a continuity between the two schools of thought: Shaykhism and Babism. Legitimacy is thus established in the face of every claim directed at the movement from it opponents.

Thus the figure of Abu Turab must be seen as problematical. Divided on the juncture between insignificance and infinite signification; split on the critical line dividing continuity and change; and called upon to bear witness to the movement's legitimacy and Qurrat al-`Ayn Tahirih's illegitimate gesture, Abu Turab is made to exemplify the Babi movement as such. For as Fischer and Abedi remark the Babi movement as a revolutionary movement can be seen as a "mixture of progressive ideas and initiatives and reactionary theocratic ones" often encountered on a rhetorical level (at least) within the body of Islamic and especially Shi`ih heterodoxies.[50]

If we are to rely to some extent on the implicit mirror that I have placed between the early days of the Islamic religion and the events at Badasht, it is clear that the historicity of revolt is not only in its innovations or, in Foucault's phraseology, in the introduction of "discontinuity" or "interruptions" in historical consciousness. Revolts must be narrated for their immediate audience so as to establish their legitimacy and to construe a unified subjectivity in the face of danger. In doing so they animate the moments of the present with images of distant or desirable pasts, constituting the continuity between the old and the new in consciousness.[51]

In this light, as Amanat notes, Edward Browne is not far from the mark when he argues that the Babi movement was essentially Shi`ite in its weltanschauung and that Babi history was a reenactment of the idealized Shi`ih past.[52] None the less, it is in the intermixture of the idealized old, appropriated for the constitution of the new, that future historians, such as Foucault, can find the unrealized historical potential introduced by revolutions. These constellations of the old and new, if interrupted and studied in their specificity, situate the urgent indexes which call for their redemption in the future.

Qurrat al-`Ayn's constitution of human responsibility as a force that must be materialized can only be seen in this light in the context of historiography.

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NOTES

1 See "Politics And The Study Of Discourse" in *The Foucault Effect* ed. G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1991), 53

2 Thomas R. Flynn *Sartre Foucault and Historical Reason* volume 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 324 note 9

3 *Foucault Effect* 56

4 ibid.

5 Foucault, Michel. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" *Foucault Reader*, Ed., Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 88

6 ibid., 88

7 ibid.,89

8 Kitab-i Nuqtat al-Kaf reviews these aspects of Shaykhi thought in great detail. Refer to E.G. Browne's version of Nuqtat al-Kaf on-line on the H-Bahai publications web site at http://www.h-net.msu.edu. Also see Juan Cole's three papers on Ahsa'i on-line at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jrcole/papers.htm. Cole also pursues these themes in some detail in the work of Baha'u'llah in his article ""I am all the Prophets": The Poetics of Pluralism in Baha'i Texts" in *Poetics Today* 14: 3 (Fall 1993), 447-476.

9 "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" 88

10 In July 1848 the Babi leader of this upspring, Mulla Husayn Bushru`i —the first

disciple of the Bab— raised the Black Standard in Mashhad and set off westward. The implications of this gesture for the government and the religious hierarchy alike were obvious. In Shi`ih Islam, there is a well known Tradition attributed to the Prophet that suggests, that should one see the Black Standard coming from Khurasan then one should go to it. The Mahdi -the religious leader who went into hiding in the early days of Islam —according to this Tradition— will be there. More importantly, however, the raising of the Black Standard in Khurasan was an act imbued with historical and contra-dynastic significance. The raising of the Black Standard is historically known as the gesture which inaugurated the final overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty by the Abbasids. This symbolic act not only signaled an impending attack on the existing religious order by the coming of the Mahdi, but also posed a definitive threat for the existing dynasty. Although, ironically, the importance of this challenge got buried under the confusion of the government over the death of Muhammad Shah, the populace in Barfurush en route confronted the Babis traveling under Mulla Husayn's banner, forcing them to take up positions around the Shrine of Shaykh Tabarsi. The conflict between the two groups lasted from mid-October 1848 to early May 1849.

11 Amanat, Abbas. *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran 1844-1850* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989), 325

12 Bah· or Baha'u'llah would in 1863 establish the Bah·'Ì Faith. See Balyuzi, H. M. *Baha'u'llah, The King of Glory.* Oxford: George Ronald 1980.

13 Amanat, *Resurrection* 326

14 ibid.

15 *Rabbani, Shoghi (trans). The Dawn Breakers: Nabil's Narrative of the Early Days of the Baha'i Revelation.* British Edition. (London: Baha'i Publishing Trust, 1953), 211

16 ibid., 211-213

17 ibid.

18 ibid.

19 This same word for word rendition can be found in Fadil Mazandarani 's *Tarikh-i Zuhur al Haqq* Volume II. (manuscript in private hands)

20 Mernissi, Fatima. *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam.* Trans. Mary Jo Lakeland. (New York: Addison Weslley, 1987), 65-70

21 ibid., 93

22 ibid., 85

23 This practice situates a significant difference between Western perceptions of stories and memories, where often times the latter are considered mere fables and thus disabling in an effort to constitute Truth and Knowledge.

24 For other references to Hadith that relate to this verse consult Leila Ahmed's *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate.* New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1992 (Chapter 3)

25 Mernissi, *The Veil and the Male Elite* 100

26 ibid. 92

27 Ahmed suggests other circumstances for the institution of the veil, drawing from Inb Sa'd's (re)collections. See *Women and Gender*, 54

28 In this particular context I am referring to the Prophet's wives, since his wives were the only ones that came along on the expedition.

29 Fatima Mernissi suggests this event as a symbolic expression of "regression on sexual equality" commingled with a "regression in social equality", but the coincidental imagery of the descent of the hijab over all women for the "fifteen centuries that followed" in this paragraph and her subsequent discussions strongly suggests the above reading (178-79).

30 See Fanon's discussion of the veil: "Algeria Unveiled" in *A Dying Colonialism* and Shirazi-Mahajan's discussion of the role of the veil in the Iranian Islamic revolution in "The Politics of Clothing in the Middle East: The Case of Hijab in Post-Revolutionary Iran." *Critique* (Spring 1993): 54-63

31 We have come to learn that sexuality, in the context of Islam, is territorial (Mernissi, *Beyond* 81). Sexuality is mapped, as it were, unto the specific topology of the public and the private. In this context, female veiling is formulated as a way to ensure the purity of the public sphere, generally designated as male, and the protection of the female, in the same context, through a gesture of dissimulation. As such, this construction permits the definition of female identity, in the Muslim context, as split. On the one hand, in the context of the perception of her natural constitution, the female is seen as a distraction that interrupts or otherwise complicates the male's formulation of his identity as pious or divine. Her presence as a sexual being in the public sphere, in other words, interferes with the Muslim man's relation to Allah. On the other hand, in the context of her cultural status in Muslim history and as the embodiment of the community's identity as such, the female is seen as weak, indeed in need of protection in the male domain. The veil thus covers over her constitutional split, creating a unified or whole subject that is both dangerous by nature and incapable to defend herself or the Muslim community's identity within the social domain. Without the veil this dual and dangerous quality is thought to come to the fore, unveiling a "scrambled" identity, dangerous and mutilated.

32 This reading stems from Nezami's *Haft Paikar* (*Seven Beauties*). Translated by C.E. Wilson. But also see Julie Scott Meisami's essay: "Allegorical Gardens in the Persian poetic tradition: Nezami, Rumi, Hafez."

33 From the Qur'an Verses 46-75 sura 55

34 As noted by G. MarÁias in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, "Persian horticulture flourished long before the birth of Islam and was associated with princely life." from BUSTAN: Encyclopedia of Islam , New Edition , London (1960)

35 This forgetting on the part of Babi historiography constituted the foundation for

the appropriation of that discourse for future feminist purposes. Consult for example the section on Tahirih Qurrat al Ayn in Farzaneh Milani's *Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers* where Qurrat al-`Ayn is placed as the first in the line of liberated/liberating women's voices in Iran. Also see Abbas Amanat "The Changing World of Taj al- Saltana" introduction to *Crowning Anguish: Memoirs of a Persian Princess from the Harem to Modernity.* By Taj al-Saltana. Ed. Amanat, Abbas. Washington D.C.: Mage Publishers, 1993, (59) where he places her within a similar trajectory. Amanat also rejects these views in an earlier book: Resurrection and Renewal, 330. Also for a delightfully utopian and early account of the coincidence between Qurrat al-`Ayn's 'originary' gestures and the concomitant development of the Women's Movement in the West see Martha Root's *Tahirih The Pure One 1938* Reprinted. Los Angeles: Kalimat Press, 1981

36 Amanat , *Resurrection* 327

37 Browne's edition of *Kitab-i Nuqtat al-Kaf* (a book which is said to be one of the earliest records of Babi history) does not refer to Qurrat al-`Ayn's unveiling at Badasht at all. Without giving a detailed account of the dispute between the two Babi leaders, Nuqtat al-Kaf records a speech delivered at the Badasht conference. Browne notes that because of the corruption of the manuscript at this point, he cannot say whether this speech was delivered by Quddus or Qurrat al-`Ayn (*Tarikh-i-Jadid* or *New History of Mirza Ali Muhammad the Bab.* Cambridge, 1893, 357). The speech, regardless, treats the doctrine of "Return" (rij'at) at some length. The outward forms of religion (such as prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and alms) are all explained allegorically. The abrogation of the laws of the previous religious dispensation is announced, and laws in general are declared to be necessary only until such time as people have learned to comprehend the "Doctrine of Unity" (Tawhid) by which is meant the recognition of the true nature of the "Point" or Divine Manifestation of the age." (*Tarikh-i-Jadid* 357; *Nuqtat al-Kaf* 151-152) The text regards the days in Badasht as a time in which the fruits of the Bab's revelation reached their height of ripeness —a ripeness which tore open the fruit's own skin the fruit's own skin az shiddat-i rasidigi pust ra parih namudand) to reveal an exquisite kernel (maghz-i dilkash). (145) This symbolism of the torn skin could be interpreted as Qurrat al-`Ayn's unveiling. More importantly, however, it concurs with the imagery of the Day of Resurrection in contemporaneous performances of the ta'ziyeh. (See my paper "Resurrection, Return, Reform: Ta'ziyeh as model for Early Babi historiography" presented at the Middle Eastern Studies Association Conference in San Francisco, November 1997.)

38 This statement may of course be understood in terms of the way in which the notion of female unveiling is conceptualized in Islamic ideology. Unveiling has at different times and spaces been understood as gesture of female nudity. It's citation therefore is incriminating to the woman and to the pious in Islam.

According to Amanat's assertions, many sources claim that Qurrat al-`Ayn did indeed unveil in public. Most say, however, that she only did so in the gathering of "believers". And while most sources agree that she never unveiled publicly before the Badasht Conference, others even doubt that she did so on that occasion. (Amanat, *Resurrection* 295-316). A double disavowal takes place in the reconfiguration of these various narratives, wherein firstly none but the 'believers' are incriminated by this public violation and secondly, no one is whatsoever.

39 Browne, Edward G. Ed. *A Traveller's Narrative: Written to illustrate the Episode of the Bab by Abdu'l Baha* 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: Philo Press 1975),314.

40 ibid. 247

41 A Shaykhi is a student of the Shaykhi school. This is a religious school from which the Bab drew many of his early adherents.

42 Nabil's Narrative 30

43 Nabil's Narrative 211

44 Nabil's Narrative 216

45 Ibid. 29-31. For a discussion of the Shaykh Tabarsi uprisings, also known as the Mazandaran upheavals, see Moojan Momen, "The Social Basis of the Babi Upheavals in Iran: a Preliminary Analysis " in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 15 (1983) 157-183.

46 Nabil's *Narrative* 29-31

47 ibid.

48 For a more detailed account of the movement and its history see Mangol Bayat *Mysticism and Dissent : Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran* Syracuse UP 1982.

49 Nabil's *Narrative* 29

50 Fischer and Abedi Fischer, Michael, and Mehdi Abedi. *Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tradition.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990, 231

51 For an excellent discussion of Walter Benjamin's Jetztzeit to which I am referring to here, see Ian Balfour's "Reversal Quotation (Benjamin's History)" *MLN* 106, 1991. A more detailed discussion of Benjamin's historical project in his unfinished Passagen-Werk on nineteenth century Paris can be found in Susan Buck-Morss' *Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin's Arcades Project* Cambridge: MIT Press 1989. See especially Part 2:5 "Mythic Nature:Wish Image."

52 see Browne, Edward G. *The Literary History of Persia.* volume 4 (Cambridge and London 1902-1904), 197

Strife Among Friends and Foes: The 1958 Anglo-American Military Interventions in the Middle East

JEFFREY M. NADANER

Dwight D. Eisenhower found it much easier to stop the British, French and Israelis at Suez than to maintain a pro-Western order in the Middle East afterwards. In the two years following the Suez imbroglio, the Eisenhower administration determined that it was locked in a struggle for the Arab world with Egypt and its Soviet patron, and that the West was about to lose. Post-Suez tension came to a head on July 14, 1958, when the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq fell in a coup d'tat. Fearing the demise of other pro-Western regimes, Eisenhower sent the marines to Lebanon and agreed to the British dispatch of paratroopers to Jordan. The administration, however, lacked a coherent idea on how to use the troops or what to do next. Using recently declassified sources, this article shows that the elements comprising a strategy evolved only later, in the days and weeks ahead. The Eisenhower administration would, over the course of the 1958 crisis, attain a modestly deeper understanding than before of the forces animating Middle Eastern politics. Equally significant, the administration would begin to prioritize among Western interests in the region and develop a more sophisticated approach than it had earlier of how best to secure them.

I. Post-Suez Problems in the Middle East

At the beginning of the Suez crisis in 1956, the Eisenhower administration envisioned that its stand against the tripartite attack would enhance the United States' anti-colonial bona fides and would safeguard American interests in the Arab world. Within weeks, however, the administration feared that the British collapse at Suez had created a vacuum in the Middle East, and that Nasser and Soviet Chairman, Nikita Khrushchev, would fill it. The Soviet Union appeared to earn more credit among Arabs for its belated threat to intervene in the Suez war than did the United States for its timely action.

Even though Eisenhower had saved Nasser from defeat, Nasser's prestige—as an Arab nationalist who had defied Great Britain, France and Israel—rose immensely throughout Arab lands. Suez intensified Nasser's propaganda campaign and covert machinations against pro-Western regimes.[1] A tidal wave of left-leaning Arab nationalism—promoting Arab unity, non-alignment, and socialism—threatened to sweep away pro-Western Arab regimes like sand-castles in a rough surf.[2]

In January 1957, in an effort to stem this perceived tide, President Eisenhower promulgated the Eisenhower Doctrine, whose purpose was twofold: officially, to support pro-Western governments in the Middle East against communist subversion and, unofficially, to help them withstand radical Arab nationalism. Under the Doctrine, the United States furnished economic and security aid, and if necessary, American military force, to endangered pro-Western governments in the Middle East.[3] Nasser and like-minded Arab nationalists considered the Eisenhower Doctrine a declaration of war shrouded in anti-Communist garb.[4]

Middle Eastern turbulence preoccupied the Eisenhower administration during the next two years. In April 1957, King Hussein seemed threatened by communists and radical Arab nationalists, who were supported by Egypt and Syria. Washington tried to strengthen the King's hand against both his internal and external opponents. The Eisenhower administration declared the "independence and integrity of Jordan as vital" to the United States, dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the Lebanese coast, and conveyed ten million dollars in emergency aid to Amman.[5]

Syria, an American worry since the early Fifties, drew closer to Egypt and the USSR in 1957. By that year, the Soviet Union had sent Syria twenty-four MiG-15 jet fighters, one hundred thirty T-34 tanks, and nearly one hundred Soviet advisors and technicians. A large communist party, estimated at ten thousand members, operated in the country. The United States judged many Syrian military officers leftist, Nasserite, Ba'thist or communist; it blamed Syria for many of King Hussein's troubles. At the end of July, Syrian Defense Minister, Khalid al-Azm, initialed a half billion dollar "grain-for-weapons" agreement with the Kremlin. Approximately ten days later, in early August, the United States Central Intelligence Agency moved ahead with a covert operation, Wrappen, aimed at installing right-wing military figures in power. Within days, Wrappen met disaster and Syria expelled three CIA agents.

In late August, the United States, Turkey and Iraq joined together to work on the Syrian problem. Turkish and Iraqi forces massed along Syrian frontiers.[6] Eisenhower ordered U.S. aircraft "from Western Europe . . . to Adana Turkey . . . and the Sixth Fleet again to the eastern end of the Mediterranean."[7] Except for Turkey, America's Middle Eastern allies quick-

ly grew tepid about the prospect of war.[8] Eisenhower also began to doubt whether he had sufficient legal justification and congressional support with which to act. He worried that the "Mid East Resolution said nothing about internal subversion and only mentioned . . . direct aggression against a country" that "asked for help. . . ."[9] More importantly, perhaps, the Soviet Union tested successfully its first intercontinental ballistic missile at the end of August.[10] At a National Security Council meeting on September 7th, Secretary of State Dulles declared that the United States had entered a "period of the greatest peril . . . since the Korean War. . . ."[11] Eisenhower writes in his memoirs that the

> Soviets . . . were conducting naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean; . . . their latest boasts concerning Soviet ICBMs had included threatening overtones; a recent note to us on the Middle East situation was couched in the rudest and most provocative terms.[12]

The Eisenhower administration clearly feared a forceful Soviet reaction to any Western move against Syria. The administration backed off.[13]

In 1957, not only did the Soviet Union draw closer into Syrian affairs, so did Egypt. Nasser forwarded a contingent of troops to Syria in October to help her deal with continued tension with Turkey. Egyptian diplomats developed strong ties with Syrian military officials. The Syrian Ba'th party—pan-Arab in orientation and closely associated with Nasser—knew that it could not attain control of Syria on its own even though it had supporters in the military. The Ba'th feared a Communist putsch on one hand and Western intervention on the other. Syria's chaos of communists, Ba'thists, and a faction riddled army ended when a group of powerful Syrian military officers—some motivated by Ba'thism, others by a desire to bring order to Syria, and almost all by some degree of opportunism—flew to Cairo and offered to merge Syria with Egypt. The United Arab Republic (UAR) was established on February 1, 1958 under Nasser's rule.[14]

The first concrete step toward Arab unification had been taken. Calls for Arab unification and expressions of support for Nasser reverberated loudly in Arab lands. The merger horrified the Iraqi, Saudi Arabian, Jordanian and Lebanese regimes. They feared their own populations, the Egyptian drive for hegemony, and Nasser's personal ambition. In a futile gesture to steal some of Nasser's thunder, Iraq and Jordan formed the Arab Federal Union on February 14, 1958. The Iraqi and Jordanian governments, as well as those in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, however, appeared to many of their subjects too closely associated with Western powers.[15]

Lebanon also witnessed its share of troubles in 1958. Successfully rigging

the 1957 parliamentary elections, the pro-Western Lebanese President, Camille Chamoun, secured a lock on the country's political institutions.[16] This Maronite fanned the enmity of the Moslem, Druze and Greek Orthodox opposition: for the parliament elected the president and the parliament could also amend the constitution to allow Chamoun to stand for another term.[17] The Moslem and Druze opposition prepared to cast off already weak government authority in areas populated by their coreligionists.[18] Nasser, who detested the Chamoun government, for its close ties with Washington and its endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, furnished the armed opposition, with additional weapons and even some Syrian volunteers.[19] The Lebanese president and his foreign minister, Charles Malik, lobbied the Eisenhower administration tenaciously, claiming that their troubles stemmed from their outspoken support of the Eisenhower Doctrine and of the West. Moscow and Cairo had targeted Lebanon as a result. Lebanon thus represented a test case of American resolve.[20] When it became known in early May 1958 that Chamoun definitely planned to use his control of parliament to obtain another six years in office, tremors shook the land of the cedars.[21] On May 13th, conscious that they sat on a bubbling volcano, Chamoun and Malik sought Washington's commitment to provide military force if the Lebanese government was in imminent danger.[22]

Eisenhower gave the Lebanese leaders that assurance on the same day they asked for it—even though neither he nor his administration had sufficiently analyzed the question.[23] On one hand, administration officials knew from the cables of the United States' Ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock, that Chamoun had stirred the Lebanese cauldron: both Eisenhower and Dulles were aware of Chamoun's overreaching.[24] On the other hand, administration officials also knew of Nasser's efforts against Chamoun.[25] Nonetheless, there had been no systematic attempt in the administration to sort out the conflicting information or ascribe a relative weight to each cause. The administration had hardly considered whether Chamoun caused more trouble than he was worth, whether suitable alternatives to Chamoun existed, and whether American interests required that he leave office regardless of Nasser's meddling. The Eisenhower administration had failed to weigh its options.[26] President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles focused instead on the need to back a pro-Western government that Nasser and also allegedly the Soviet Union opposed.[27]

Eisenhower's promise was imprudent. Even though contingency plans for a Lebanese intervention had been prepared with Britain, Eisenhower had barely considered the scope of a military deployment, the likelihood and extent of hostilities, or the local, regional and international implications of intervention. When making the decision, Eisenhower told his Secretary of

State that he thought Chamoun might have to leave office to resolve the Lebanese conflict; Eisenhower, however, did not stress the point.[28] Dulles' message to Chamoun setting forth the U.S. promise, likewise, underemphasized that issue.[29]

Once he had the U.S. commitment in hand, "blank checks" as Ambassador McClintock wrote shortly later, Chamoun lost whatever limited incentive that he previously had to compromise with the opposition: a problem when the cause of the Lebanese conflict was largely domestic and opposition demands on the whole reasonable.[30] Dulles now feared that Chamoun would unnecessarily call on U.S. troops. The Secretary of State tried to emphasize to the Lebanese president that the United States viewed military intervention as a last resort to protect Lebanon from aggression, not to help Chamoun achieve his personal ambition. Dulles advised Chamoun to resolve Lebanon's problems short of calling on the Marines.[31]

Lebanese strife increased; rebellion ensued against Chamoun's government. Though fighting was sporadic and destruction relatively limited, the government's previously tenuous hold over many Moslem, Druze, and Christian areas crumbled completely as private sectarian militias rose to the fore. The government even lost control over the Moslem half of Beirut.[32] General Chehab limited the participation of the Lebanese army in the fray. He blamed Chamoun for the revolt, feared that Lebanon's multi-confessional army would disintegrate, and sought to preserve a positive image among the various Lebanese factions so that he might one day serve as a unifying figure in Lebanon.[33] Eventually, a stalemate ensued, in which there were periodic skirmishes and in which each of the parties controlled different slices of territory.[34]

II. Caught Off Guard

While the United States was poised to intervene in Lebanon, the dam burst elsewhere. On July 14, 1958, the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq—a founding member of the Baghdad Pact, staunchly pro-Western, anti-Nasserist and anti-Soviet—fell in a military coup d'État. King Feisal II, Crown Prince 'Abdul Illah—indeed, most of the royal family—and veteran Prime Minister Nuri es-Sa'id were killed.[35] A group of Iraqi Free Officers, led by Brigadier 'Abd al-Karim Qassem and his aide, Colonel 'Abd al-Salam Aref, led a quick and successful military revolt. Once in power, they abolished the monarchy, arrested supporters of the old regime, withdrew Iraq from its federation with Jordan, and declared that Iraq would no longer attend Baghdad Pact meetings. The Soviet Union and UAR recognized the new

regime on July 15th. Iraq proceeded to open diplomatic relations with communist countries.[36]

American and British officials had known that the Iraqi monarchy was unpopular with its subjects, who resented Britain's long-standing political and commercial influence in Iraq, and Iraq's staggering economic inequality. The timing, success, and brutality of the coup nevertheless shocked Western policymakers. Iraqi, British and United States' intelligence services had failed to discover the existence of the Free Officers or any immediate threat to the monarchy.[37] Lebanon and Jordan, instead, had been considered vulnerable.

London immediately saw Nasser's fingerprints on the Iraqi coup. British officials believed that Nasser, following on the heels of Suez, sought to liquidate their remaining positions in the Middle East.[38] Indeed, Hashemite Iraq was their last powerful Arab ally. American policy-makers wavered as to the exact source of the Iraqi coup. Sometimes, they blamed Nasser; at other times, a Nasserist-Soviet conspiracy.[39] Neither the American nor British policy-makers believed that the coup, despite a large outpouring of Iraqi public support, was homegrown as was in fact the case.

Even though Hashemite Iraq was a British client, the United States nevertheless considered the regime critical to the Western position in the Middle East.[40] As a Baghdad Pact member, Iraq played a key role in the defense against the USSR and radicalism.[41] Eisenhower and his advisors panicked: they believed that the demise of remaining pro-Western regimes in the area was imminent. Conservative resistance to radicalism was collapsing. Allen Dulles predicted a Middle Eastern domino effect: "If the Iraq coup succeeds it seems almost inevitable that it well set up a chain reaction which will doom the pro-West governments of Lebanon and Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and raise grave problems for Turkey and Iran."[42] American and British officials feared that a Nasserist wave would sweep Kuwait.[43] Eisenhower suspected that Nasser sought to "get control of" the West's oil supply.[44] Regimes that survived might lose confidence in Washington and distance themselves from it.[45]

Eisenhower felt that tangible action had to be taken:

> This somber turn of events could, without a vigorous response on our part, result in a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East. . . That morning . . . I gathered in my office a group of advisers . . . Because of my long study of the problem, this was one meeting to which my mind was practically made up regarding the general line of action we should take, even before we met.[46]

When Chamoun's appeal for U.S. intervention reached the White House,

Eisenhower ordered the Sixth Fleet to proceed to Lebanon. Eisenhower sought, at a minimum, to safeguard the Lebanese regime from any Nasserist or Soviet takeover, and to assure pro-Western countries in the Middle East and Central Asia that the United States protected its friends.[47] The deployment was limited to primarily the Beirut airport, harbor and adjacent shore.[48] Despite all of Eisenhower's purported certainty on what needed to be done and all of the discussion within the administration during the prior few months, there had been little thought on how the troops would actually support the Lebanese government; nor had there been much contemplation of the scope of operations necessary to deal with this regional crisis.

Several American allies advocated United States' intervention in Iraq. King Saud of Saudi Arabia insisted that the "Baghdad powers intervene" in Iraq or "'[w]hat is the use of all these pacts?'"[49] He "demand[ed] action at once, stating that if the United States and United Kingdom do not act now they are finished as powers in the Mid-East."[50] King Hussein of Jordan urged the same.[51] Turkey considered moving unilaterally against the new Iraqi regime.[52]

The British leadership advocated essentially Suez II.[53] In a telephone conversation on July 15, 1958, British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, told President Eisenhower that "if we do this thing with the Lebanese it is only really part of a much larger operation, because we will be driven to take the thing as a whole . . . ." Eisenhower did not swallow the bait: "so far as we are concerned, as of this moment we can't talk about anything happening elsewhere. . . ." Macmillan persisted:

> If this thing is done, which I think is very noble, dear friend, it will set off a lot of things throughout the whole area. I'm all for that as long as we regard it as an operation that has got to be carried through.[54]

It was one thing for Macmillan to seek assurance that the administration would not leave Britain in the lurch if the American intervention prompted the sabotage of oil pipelines and facilities as occurred during Suez.[55] It was another matter for a British leader to advocate an extensive Middle Eastern war. Eisenhower became extremely concerned:

> Now just a minute so that there is no misunderstanding. Are you of the belief that unless we have made up our minds in advance to carry this thing on through to the Persian Gulf, that we had better not go in the first place? . . . I will tell you of course I would not want to go further.

Eisenhower, one not normally shy at using presidential prerogatives, wrapped

himself in the United States Constitution: "If we are now planning the initiation of a big operation that could run all the way through Syria and Iraq, we are far beyond anything I have to [the?] power to do constitutionally. . . ."[56]

Macmillan nevertheless persevered and immediately wrote to Eisenhower that:

> . . . we are quite prepared to face these risks if it is part of a determination between us both to face the issues and be prepared to protect Jordan with the hope of restoring the situation in Iraq. . . But what I would like to feel is that it is our joint intention, not merely to be content with rescuing Lebanon (not very important in itself) but to face the wider issues together.[57]

Tories had not lost their belief that military force was the solution to radical Arab nationalism. Now, however, chastised by Suez, they first sought American permission and cooperation.

A few points are in order at this juncture. Eisenhower told Dulles that he "agreed with Macmillan" that the United States "can't sit down in Lebanon and do nothing, while the British are taking the hard knocks all over the area. . . ."[58] So the United States would not leave Britain in the lurch if British oil facilities were sabotaged. Eisenhower, moreover, desired British political support for the American intervention in Lebanon.[59] He even wanted British forces to be available if the Western position in the Persian Gulf completely collapsed. However, he considered British eagerness to have the United States "clear. . . up the whole Mid-East situation. . . ." inappropriate, premature and dangerous.[60]

Dulles received similar British pressure.[61] He doubted the wisdom of any attempted U.S. overhaul of the Middle East:

> If we go in, our action is likely to accentuate the anti-Western feeling of the Arab Masses. While the governments of Iraq [Iran?] Saudi Arabia and Jordan want us to intervene, it is not clear that this action will prevent them from being overthrown . . . . Our intervention would not therefore be likely to be a quick and easy solution.[62]

"To intervene militarily [beyond Lebanon] would introduce problems that we have not even considered."[63] To ensure that Britain did not take any action inimical to the United States interest, Dulles had British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, come to the United States.[64]

President Eisenhower did consider Western intervention in Iraq. However, he refused to render a hasty decision. The Iraqi coup had taken the United States by surprise. As Dulles remarked, the United States had long planned for intervention in Lebanon and "had thought about many contingencies, but the Iraq development was a new one." Unlike Lebanon, intervention in Iraq was a much greater undertaking. Pertinent contingency plans did not exist.[65] Eisenhower wanted to see how the Middle Eastern situation unfolded. As he told Macmillan, "If this situation develops where our whole national interests are abandoned and destroyed"—that is, if other important pro-Western governments collapsed, then Eisenhower might consider more extensive action.[66]

III. Jordan

Even though King Hussein had not asked for American or British troops, London was nevertheless eager to sent them. On July 14th, Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower that they should "urge the King to make his request at once, since if our military support is to be effective and have a real impact upon the whole Middle East, it will have to be given promptly."[67] Eisenhower did not respond.

On July 16th, the United States received intelligence reports that a Nasserist plot against King Hussein was set for the next day. After the information was rushed to King Hussein, he appealed for Western forces.[68] The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, at the administration's direction, ordered the Commander of the Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral Charles Brown, to "[s]tand by to evacuate King Hussein from Amman" with two carrier-based propeller airplanes (which typically carry up to twenty-five individuals) and to provide such aircraft with "appropriate air cover."[69] Although Eisenhower and Dulles made provision to extricate King Hussein from Jordan, they were disinclined to "save" the country.[70]

Eisenhower and Dulles were likewise unenthusiastic about British intervention, questioning its "need" and "desirability."[71] Some in the administration questioned "British motives," perhaps fearing that Britain might try to snare the United States into a large Middle Eastern operation as it attempted to during Suez.[72] In the end, however, despite deep reservations, Eisenhower and Dulles decided not to object to British plans to send paratroopers to Jordan. They reluctantly agreed, feeling it was a close call. While they would provide Britain with logistical support if necessary, they would not provide troops.[73]

The British intervention almost met catastrophe at the start. As British

aircraft ferrying the paratroopers from Cyprus crossed Israeli airspace, Israeli fighter-planes fired warning shots at them, forcing the British to turn back. London had not sought permission to traverse Israeli airspace. As Macmillan recognized in his diary, the Jordanian intervention was poised to become another British debacle: if Israel had shot down or intercepted a British transport, "a terrible disaster, which would . . . have resulted in the collapse of all our policies and the fall of the Government. . . ." Repeated United States diplomatic intercession was needed to procure Israeli consent to British overflights over the next few weeks.[74]

In addition, once the flights resumed, it became evident that Britain hardly could pull off even this modest intervention. Britain lacked suitable means to supply by air its approximately two thousand paratroopers with necessary ammunition, weapons and petroleum, and had to call for American assistance.[75] Selwyn Lloyd informed Dulles that British paratroopers in Jordan were "logistically and military . . . in an exposed position."[76] Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower that "your Globemasters are so much bigger than any of our aircraft that the job could be done with far fewer sorties."[77] By getting the United States to shoulder the logistics problem, Britain hoped to stifle Israeli objections to overflights and to get needed provisions that even absent the Israeli problem were arriving too slowly.[78] The steady decline in British military strength since World War II now reached the point that Britain's status as a power, let alone a great one, was questionable in the Eastern Mediterranean.[79] During July, Britain and Jordan beseeched the United States to send troops.[80] Eisenhower agreed to send supplies and rescue British forces if necessary. In the third week of July, the United States even sent a demonstration flight of American aircraft over Jordan.[81] Using the Congress and public opinion as an excuse, however, Eisenhower would go no farther and refused the request for troops.[82]

IV. The International Arena

Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev charged that the Anglo-American interventions threatened world peace. He proposed a five power conference, in which the heads of government of the United States, the USSR, Great Britain, France and India would meet.[83] Though the British were eager to meet the Soviets, the Eisenhower administration did not want a high-level public confrontation with Khrushchev. The administration seemed to fear that such a confrontation would hurt the United States' image before developing countries. Washington's stance also reflected continuing ambivalence as to whether Nasser was a Soviet puppet or represented a separate, homegrown, non-communist force in the Arab world. The Eisenhower adminis-

tration tried to sandbag any high-level public meeting for the next two weeks by arguing over modalities and forum.[84]

V. Developing an Overall U.S. Strategy

Only once American troops were in Lebanon did the Eisenhower administration begin to clarify its goals. By July 16, 1958, Eisenhower concluded that he could not "send our troops further than Lebanon," ruling out an invasion of Iraq.[85] Eisenhower and Dulles wrote off the country as lost to Nasser and his Soviet sponsor—at lease for the time being.[86] Fear of confrontation with the USSR played little role in the decision: a consensus existed within the administration from the beginning of the crisis that the risk of a Soviet military response was low. Secretary of State Dulles stated that "[a]t the present time the Soviets do not have long range missiles, at least in any quantity. Nor do they have a substantial long-range air capability . . . ."[87] "Their long-range missiles are not ready . . . ." The Soviet Union "did not . . . wish. . . to risk general war."[88]

In addition, Eisenhower decided that he lacked legal justification to move into Iraq and thus, perhaps, lacked sufficient political cover at home and abroad to act further. Eisenhower explained to General Nathan Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Brigadier General Andrew Goodpaster, the White House Staff Secretary, that the United States needed a "moral ground" on which to intervene: an appeal from the home government would suffice. "If, however, our only argument is economic—saying that the life of the western world depends upon access to oil in the Middle East—this would be quite different, and quite inferior to a purpose that rests on the right to govern by consent of the governed." In Eisenhower's opinion, U.S. forces had entered Lebanon at the request of its legally-constituted government.[89] No such request, however, would issue from Baghdad.

Other factors in the Eisenhower administration's decision seem to have included the assumption that Iraq was truly a British concern and thus not as important to the United States.[90] It became clear, moreover, that intervention was infeasible. The old Iraqi regime had been leveled: most of its supporters were on the run, under arrest, or dead. Unlike Lebanon, there was no significant group or individual around which Western intervention could be based. Secretary Dulles told the president on July 15, 1958 that "as far as Lebanon was concerned, we were on pretty solid ground—that there was a large segment of the population on our side there. In the other countries, the thing might blow up. . . ."[91] The new Iraqi government controlled the country, possessed the support of the army, and enjoyed broad public favor.[92] In

addition, the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the West from the Middle East continued unhampered.[93]

Dulles informed the British government that the administration deemed the Iraqi situation irretrievable. He reached an agreement with British Foreign Secretary Lloyd that they would seek to "retain . . . positions along the Persian Gulf—Kuwait, Abadan, Dhahran, [and] Bahrain," and that neither side would "back a military effort to retake Iraq."[94] Better late than never, Eisenhower had finally settled American strategic priorities, drawing the line around Lebanon and the Gulf.[95] By writing off Iraq, the Eisenhower administration backed away ever so consequently from blind belief in the applicability of the domino theory in the Middle East.

VI. Resolving the Lebanese Situation

President Eisenhower had placed military forces in Lebanon without clear military or political goals. The troops had no specific orders beyond limited deployments in Beirut. The President dispatched to Lebanon, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Robert Murphy, whom he had known since the North African campaign during World War II. After arriving in Beirut, Murphy cabled Washington that the "mere presence of our forces in a small coastal portion of the country seems to have brought no fundamental change in the local political climate," his surprise representative of a peculiarly naive belief prevalent in the administration.[96] Although the Lebanese rebels were scared by the destructive potential of U.S. forces, the Lebanese conflict did not disappear with the arrival of the Marines.[97] Fearing that the United States might not gain anything from the intervention, Eisenhower and Dulles decided that they needed to work on an exit strategy.[98]

Upon meeting Chamoun, Murphy was shocked to discover that the Lebanese president had not left "his residence for 67 days" or even "dared to look out of the window of his house."[99] Murphy's early cables to Washington painted a portrait of a disturbed man.[100] Murphy concluded almost immediately that the key to solving the Lebanese problem was in Chamoun leaving office and electing a new Lebanese president.[101] Murphy did not recommend at any time that U.S. forces subdue the Lebanese opposition. He thought that the Lebanese problem was amenable to a political solution.[102] Eisenhower and Dulles endorsed Murphy's approach and agreed that U.S. troops should not attack the rebels.[103] Eisenhower came to believe that a severe anti-American backlash in the Middle East might arise if the United

States acted too forcefully in Lebanon.[104]

With U.S. troops in Beirut, however, Chamoun pressed for military action, including an attack on the UAR A negotiated solution was far from his mind; he was more inflexible than ever.[105] Murphy ignored Chamoun's entreaties and canvassed a diverse group of Lebanese on potential presidential candidates. Most factions, except those aligned with Chamoun, found General Chehab acceptable.[106] Chamoun dragged his feet, frequently complaining about a lack of American resolve in fighting communism. Nonetheless, Chamoun could do little to stop Murphy—for if Chamoun had power, he would not have summoned the Sixth Fleet. Chamoun, who was on record as having advocated Chehab as a suitable presidential candidate in the past, reluctantly gave his blessing on the ground that Chehab constituted the only choice even remotely acceptable to him.[107] Although the Lebanese presidential election did not have to occur until September 23, 1958, Murphy pressed that it be held immediately. Murphy left Lebanon on July 30, 1958 and on the next day, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies elected Chehab president, to assume office on September 23, 1958.[108]

In promoting Chehab's candidacy, Washington took a chance. Chehab did not talk the same anti-Communist and anti-Nasserist game that had so endeared Chamoun and Malik to the Eisenhower administration. While all agreed that Chehab was pleasant and professional, little was known about his views. Originally he had opposed American intervention.[109] While Chehab had been endorsed by most Lebanese parties, he had the dubious honor of bearing Nasser's imprimatur.[110] Fearing the disintegration of Lebanon's multi-confessional army, Chehab still refused, despite American pressure, to use his army against the opposition. Murphy nonetheless suspected that Chehab was a Lebanese patriot and would not merge Lebanon into the UAR.[111]

The Lebanese opposition continued to demand an immediate U.S. withdrawal. Though Chehab had opposed the entry of the Marines, now that he was president-elect, he wanted them to remain—at least for a while. Chehab contended that the American presence deterred Nasser from supplying the opposition with weapons and volunteers, and would enable the Lebanese army to disarm private militias Chehab did not want to become titular head of a country ruled by war lords. With American military forces potentially at his disposal, Chehab's hand was strengthened as he tried to create a new Lebanese political order.[112] However ill-thought out the initial introduction of United States troops to Lebanon, now that they were there, they played a role in bringing about peace. At the same time, the political settlement that the Eisenhower administration promoted, in which Chehab replaced Chamoun, likely could have been engineered earlier in the year without resort

to the Marines. The settlement constituted tacit admission by Washington that the Lebanese problem had its roots primarily in the land of the cedars, not the Nile.

VII. The Jordanian Dilemma

Insofar as the Eisenhower administration derived satisfaction from the Lebanese intervention, they found none in Jordan. Even though King Hussein was pro-Western, administration skepticism about the value of maintaining Hashemite Jordan increased after the British deployment. Eisenhower reflected on July 20th, that "for the West to save Jordan may be largely a 'beau geste.'. . . it is very questionable whether we should get into the position of supporting Kings against their people."[113]

Jordan was isolated, under a virtual blockade, bordered by a hostile UAR (Syria) and Iraq, a cold Saudi Arabia, and an enemy by Jordanian choice, Israel. The port of Aqaba was Jordan's lifeline: the kingdom had no overland supply of petroleum from its neighbors.

The country lacked economic resources: all of its expenditures were funded by foreign contributions, the Arab component of which now ceased. King Hussein enjoyed little support among his subjects.[115] The King and his Prime Minister, Samir al-Rifai pleaded for U.S. backing. British leaders knew at this point that an invasion of Iraq out of question: now they just wanted U.S. help to prevent a second Hashemite collapse.[116]

In an option referred to as "fortress Jordan" and circulated within the Eisenhower administration, the United States would try to fabricate an iron throne for King Hussein: that is, provide Jordan with such massive military and economic assistance that the Hashemite kingdom could survive a hostile domestic and external environment. The bill would amount to approximately $100 million a year on top of the annual $50 million that Jordan already needed: a huge some for a tiny country at that time.[117] Dulles ruled out "fortress Jordan" as too expensive and not worth the investment. The Eisenhower administration agreed to fund Jordan's ordinary budgetary needs for the current and upcoming year; it would not promise funding beyond the coming year.[118]

Dulles was torn. On one hand, he felt that King Hussein's position was hopeless and that Jordan was not a viable entity. Dulles was cognizant that Britain had created Jordan after the First World War, that Britain had installed and maintained the Hashemites, and that King Hussein's hold over his population was tenuous.[119] On the other hand, Dulles realized that any change in Jordan portended Middle Eastern chaos: a pro-Nasser government in Amman or an attempt to merge Jordan into the UAR would increase

Israeli fears—they had a vulnerable border in the east. Israel might seek to create a new defensive line at the Jordan River and occupy the West Bank. An Arab-Israeli war might occur, enhancing Soviet opportunities to curry Arab support.[120]

VIII. International Negotiations

With Lebanon looking increasingly positive from the American perspective at the end of July, the United States tried to open some diplomatic channels. At Dulles' instruction, Robert Murphy undertook a Middle East tour that brought him to Cairo on August 6, 1958. His meeting with Nasser got off to a difficult start, Nasser indicating that he feared the American military presence in the area; he suspected that the United States would use an upcoming meeting of the UN Security Council to attack him. A skillful diplomat, Murphy treated Nasser like a confidant. Murphy tried to convince Nasser that this visit from an American representative was different than others. Nasser was treated to a detailed briefing on Murphy's activities in Lebanon. Nasser warmed up and indicated some potential flexibility on issues of U.S. concern.[121]

At the same time, the United States became open to a United Nations meeting; perhaps the Soviet Union and UAR would lend a constructive hand in resolving the Lebanese and Jordanian crises.[122] In early August, a Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly was convened.[123] In a series of separate meetings with UAR Foreign Minister Fawzi and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, Dulles tried to secure Lebanon and Jordan from foreign interference. The negotiating tactic that Dulles employed is astonishing. In a defeatist, confessional tone, Dulles told each of them that the United States had a weak hand in Jordan. He did not accuse the USSR of causing or exacerbating Lebanese and Jordanian distress; instead, Dulles told Gromyko that:

> He did not see clearly how to keep Jordan going or how to face the consequences of its collapse. Jordan was originally created by the British as a base as an alternative to the one they had at Suez. It was subsidized by them. . . Now the United States is supporting it. It has no resources. No solution has been found for the problem of Arab refugees. It is nothing but a headache. The Secretary said that he had been unable to thing of any program that would not reopen the Israeli war.[124]

Dulles told Fawzi that:

> If the UAR really wanted to take over Jordan, they could probably do so since the United States was not willing to go to all lengths, including a commitment for substantial financial assistance over a an extended period of time, to keep Jordan out of UAR hands.

Dulles, who believed that Iraq was controlled by pro-Nasser figures, even raised the possibility of an Iraqi-Jordanian "association." The only reason that Dulles offered to Fawzi against a Nasserist takeover of Jordan was that it would impose took great a financial burden on the UAR.[125] Fawzi matched Dulles' candor: King Hussein had to go and Jordan had to enter the Arab fold—that is, follow Nasser's lead.[126] Fawzi, confident that King Hussein would not survive once Britain withdrew its forces, suggested that all interested parties cease interfering in Jordan. Let the chips fall where they may.[127]

Dulles did not want a mutual non-interference agreement; he wanted an Egyptian non-interference agreement. Dulles pressed Fawzi for a commitment. In return for complete Western military withdrawals from Lebanon and Jordan, Fawzi agreed.[128] On August 21, 1958, with the Dulles-Fawzi understanding having cleared the way, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution, sponsored by ten Arab states including the UAR, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq that instructed the UN Secretary-General to make "arrangements" that "help in upholding" the "[UN] Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan . . . and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries."[129]

Dulles was confident that Lebanon would hold its own after the American withdrawal. Regarding Jordan and its king, Dulles did not labor under any illusion that he had arranged a new lease on life for it. Dulles merely hoped for a grace period in which there could be an "honorable evolution" in Jordan. Dulles believed that as a starter, King Hussein would have to dump his overtly pro-Western Prime Minister and replace him with someone more acceptable to Arab nationalists. Dulles even had the United States chargé d'affaires in Jordan, Thomas Wright, explore this prospect.[130] Dulles hoped that a cabinet could be assembled that would satisfy Arab nationalists yet not strike fear among Israelis.[131] Dulles told Jordanian officials to reach an understanding with their Arab neighbors that would lift the blockade.[132] Dulles thought that an even more far-reaching change in Amman was likely. With a breather, the West would have the option of loosening some of its ties with the Hashemite kingdom and would not suffer the same degree of embarrassment that would occur if the country folded immediately after the withdrawal of British forces.[133]

King Hussein realized that Britain was powerless to maintain his throne

and that United States' support was shaky. Suitably skeptical of UAR promises whispered to Dulles at the United Nations, the King's despair deepened.[134] To British officials, Dulles' approach was bitter medicine. Britain had to withdraw. Macmillan and Lloyd, however, never lost hope: they looked to the promised break in UAR subversion as a period during which the United States might change its mind and embrace Hussein.[135]

IX. The Withdrawals From Lebanon and Jordan

In Lebanon, a gradual United States withdrawal was underway, the final departure set for the end of October.[136] Chehab, the president-elect and chief of staff, did not reassert government authority in the country nearly as quickly as American officials desired.[137] Nonetheless, Syrian volunteers returned home.[138] Chehab succeeded in reopening the Moslem sector of Beirut.[139] Chehab wanted to compromise with the non-Maronite opposition, not subdue it, and his approach brought incremental results.[140]

When Chehab assumed office on September 23, 1958, a strike was announced in Maronite communities. The Maronite Phalange militia began violent attacks that underscored their antagonism to and Chamoun's displeasure with Chehab's planned cabinet, which was devoid of Maronites, instead consisting of the former Moslem and Druze opposition.[141] With American mediation, this latest twist in the Lebanese saga was resolved. Chehab found an acceptable formula that included both Moslems and Maronites in the government.[142]

The United States and Britain completed their withdrawals by October 25, 1958, ahead of schedule.[143] The change that U.S. policy on Lebanon underwent between July and October was reflected in an October discussion at the National Security Council between the Secretary of State and his brother, Allen Dulles, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Allen Dulles declared the new Lebanese cabinet anti-Western. Foster Dulles disagreed strongly, stating that the "new government was not really anti-American" and had the virtue of getting along with Arab nationalists.[144] Time proved Foster Dulles correct. The new Lebanese Prime Minister, Rashid Karame, once considered by many American officials an anti-Western leftist, sought United States' financial assistance, even considered endorsing the Eisenhower Doctrine to get the money (only to be dissuaded by Ambassador McClintock), and even had a successful visit with President Eisenhower in 1959.[145] Allen Dulles reflected the old, narrow-minded tendency to view any Arab leader who espoused anything less than the Cold War gospel as anti-Western. Foster Dulles represented the new subtle and dis-

criminating approach to Arab politics.

X. Anglo-American Relations with the New Iraqi Regime and the Qassem-Nasser Split

As for Iraq, the place where the '58 Crisis- ignited, change remained the order of the day. As British officials emerged from the shock of losing their long-standing Iraqi friends and accepted, albeit with disappointment, the American decision against intervention, they reconsidered whether they had too ·hastily determined that all of the new Iraqi leaders were Nasserists. While Nasser's picture appeared all over Baghdad after the coup, there were indications, for the observant, in Qassem's early proclamations, that he might not be a pan-Arabist.[146] By July 18, 1958, Macmillan noticed that there was "quite a chance . . . from the character of the men and some of their first statements that they may turn out to be more Iraqi nationalist than Nasserite."[147] A few days later, British officials contemplated "establishing good relations with the new Iraqi Government and building it up as a counterpart to the power of the UAR."[148] Considering how reflexive British Middle Eastern policy had been since 1955, the British government began to show significant open-mindedness and flexibility.

While British policy-makers rapidly discerned promising elements in the chaos of revolutionary Iraq, it took their American counterparts much longer. American officials were convinced that the new Iraqi regime was fully in Nasser's grip and even expected its incorporation in the UAR.[149] Although Eisenhower and Allen Dulles thought it possible that Nasserism and pan-Arabism might be overcome eventually by latent, state-based nationalism in the Arab world, they never imagined that such a development could occur in 1958.[150] They did not pick up the signs of this phenomenon nearly as quickly as British policy-makers did. Only by late August 1958, did information reach the top echelon of the Eisenhower administration that Nasserists and other pan-Arabists faced vigorous opposition within Iraq.[151]

The two top figures in the Iraqi coup, Brigadier Qassem and Colonel Aref, quickly fell out with each other in a dispute mixing personal ambition and ideology. Aref led pan-Arabist forces favoring Iraq's immediate accession to the UAR Qassem, in the words of British ambassador to Iraq, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, was "not prepared to accept Arab unity at the price of subordinating himself to Nasser and Iraq to Egypt" on the other hand.[152] Qassem led a diverse coalition of Iraqis opposed to pan-Arabism. Although Qassem supported inter-Arab cooperation in specific circumstances, at bottom, he was not a pan-Arabist: he was an Iraqi nationalist. He opposed

incorporating Iraq into a unitary Arab state. He believed strongly in the existence of an independent Iraq and in fostering a form of Iraqi nationalism, in which Iraq's ethnically and religiously heterogeneous population of Arabs, Kurds and Turcomans, and Sunni and Shi'i Muslims could unite. Qassem led the Iraqi revolution to end, what he perceived as, Iraq's humiliation before the West—not that of the entire Arab world. Qassem's avowed anti-imperialism and neutralism comported with his Iraqi nationalism. He wanted to use Iraq's petroleum resources to benefit Iraqis, not Arab masses stretched from Algeria to Syria. At essence, Qassem appears to have believed that he had not freed Iraq from British tutelage to hand it over to Nasser.[153]

By September, Qassem had prevailed over Aref.[154] He dismissed Nasserist and other pan-Arabist officials from the government. As Middle East scholar Malcolm Kerr has written, Qassem posed a serious obstacle to Nasser's drive for power in the Arab world. Qassem was a "revolutionary" who "failed to cooperate in the march towards Arab unity. . . ."

> Had he been just another reactionary, like King Husayn or Nuri al-Sa'id, he would have posed no serious threat to Nasir's moral prestige, and the line of counter-attack would have been clear and familiar. . . But of course he was no reactionary: he was a flaming radical, a hero to the slum dwellers of Baghdad, the enemy of Nasir's presumed imperialist enemies and a friend of Nasir's presumed friend, the Soviet Union. Qasim showed signs of a certain mass appeal.

Qassem, thus, "posed a threat to the integrity of the Syrian-Egyptian union." Qassem paid no homage to Nasser unlike other Arab leaders, [and] chucked Nasser's "suspected admirers in jail by the thousands. . . ."[155]

The Nasser-Qassem feud became vitriolic, and would eventually force Nasser "to mend his relations with the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian governments," as well as with the United States. The fight dominated regional foreign affairs for at least the next year.[156] With the Nasser-Qassem split, radical nationalism in the Arab world revealed two different faces: one pan-Arabist, and the other local and state-centered.

The British hunch, formed after their initial hysteria following the Iraqi coup, about the independent path that Iraq might take, proved accurate. During the months following the coup, Qassem exhibited temperance on issues of British concern. He kept his promise, made immediately after the coup, that Iraq would honor existing oil agreements. Even though Qassem had ended Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact, he delayed Iraq's formal secession from it. He allowed Britain to resume certain military overflights over Iraq. Although Anglo-Iraqi relations were far from what they had been

under the monarchy and although Iraq propagandized against Britain, the two countries reached an uneasy, yet functional, relationship. The Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), which was nearly three-quarters British-owned, operated relatively unhindered.[157]

United States-Iraqi relations, nonetheless, never reached the modest Anglo-Iraqi level.[158] Though the Eisenhower administration extended low-key feelers to the new regime in August—offering to resume some military and economic assistance programs—it is clear from declassified records that the administration never adequately grasped the strategic import of the Nasser-Qassem rift on the regional balance of power, despite the potential for an immense reduction in Nasserist pressure on pro-American countries such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Arguably the United States did not sufficiently try to reach out to Qassem and exploit the breach with Nasser.

At the same time, it is equally clear that at least certain figures in the new Iraqi regime were deeply antagonistic to the United States. As August progressed, the focus of Iraqi propaganda attacks shifted from Britain to the United States. American officials were perplexed. British diplomats appear to have been the first to recognize the source of change: communist influence was growing in the Iraqi government and in Iraqi society. Qassem relied, in part, on communists in his campaign against Arab nationalists.[159] No later than the beginning of October, even Eisenhower knew that Iraq had embarked on a path independent of Nasser.[160] Yet, he could find not satisfaction in this development. Just as the United States was pulling its forces out of Lebanon, communism—ever so worse in Eisenhower's eyes than radical Arab nationalism—began to rear its head in Iraq. The administration that had so often conflated communism and Arab nationalism gained additional sensitivity to the difference.

XI

The 1958 Middle Eastern Crisis marked an important stage in United States' relations with Great Britain and with the Arab world. From the Iraqi coup of July through the troop withdrawals in October, much of the crisis transpired in the shadow of Suez. The first contacts between Washington and London after the Iraqi coup illustrated the degree of suspicion and anxiety that had come to permeate the trans-Atlantic "special relationship." Eisenhower and Dulles mistrusted London. Cognizant of the divergence in Anglo-American interests in the Middle East and apprehensive that Britain again might try to draw the United States into conflicts of British choosing, Eisenhower and Dulles placed Britain on a short leash this time.

Concurrently, they maintained solid lines of communication with London to help Whitehall avoid another catastrophic misunderstanding of American views.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the dark days of 1956 had taught British leaders that their country's economic and military weakness precluded action independent of the United States. British leaders, however, had not given up their dreams of Suez; that is, of dealing radical Arab nationalism a devastating blow on the field of battle. In 1958, they thought that the key was to induce the United States to assume the lead and, at times, they were not beyond attempting to finagle Washington to their ends. While British officials had learned some lessons from Suez, they had not grasped one of the most important: the United States feared British perfidy.

Likewise, while Nasser, Chamoun and King Hussein each had derived lessons from Suez, albeit different ones, the '58 Crisis disabused them of a few, at least temporarily. Suez had fueled Nasser's ambition; the Anglo-American interventions in Lebanon and Jordan sobered him for a time. Likewise, Britain's decline after Suez and Nasser's concomitant rise had inspired Lebanese President Chamoun and Jordanian King Hussein to enhance their anti-Communist credentials to draw additional U.S. support, and it worked. Both men discovered during the '58 Crisis, however, the limits of such a strategy. Anti-communism did not always ensure unconditional and permanent American backing, especially if Washington deemed the anti-communist detrimental to the West's overall position in the Middle East or the Cold War in general.

The '58 Crisis is also notable for President Eisenhower's good fortune. The United States' military entered Lebanon without a defined mission. Eisenhower had not decided on whether the intervention would extend to other countries. Militias opposing Chamoun could have initiated a guerrilla war against U.S. forces. Eisenhower, who had brought the troops home from Korea, risked placing U.S. soldiers in the middle of a civil conflict that he little understood, a potential quagmire. Eisenhower was blessed in that American forces did not become involved in fighting before he arrived at a strategy: otherwise, his options might of narrowed if United States had become a combatant in a civil war.

Though it took a few days, Eisenhower and Dulles eventually opted against invading Iraq or attempting to rollback radical Arab nationalism. They limited their goals to preserving Lebanon within the Western framework, trying to deter Nasser with a powerful show of American force, and to assuring pro-Western governments in the Middle East of the worth of siding with the United States. Eisenhower and Dulles exercised suitable flexibility in following Richard Murphy's lead. By shifting away from Chamoun, the

United States reduced its likelihood of becoming a combatant in Lebanese civil strife. In a neutral corner, American forces exercised a positive political influence, facilitating a political compromise between Maronites and their Moslem and Druze opposition—a solution that worked for almost a decade and a half. Even though the new Lebanese President, Fuad Chehab, and his Prime Minister, Rashid Karame, lowered Lebanon's profile as a citadel of anti-communism and of opposition to radical Arab nationalism, neither leader evinced a desire to merge their country into the UAR or align themselves against the United States. With initial luck and then skill, the Eisenhower administration successfully mixed diplomacy with a tangible threat to use force.

On the other hand, the Eisenhower Doctrine died a quiet death during the '58 Crisis—for it was too clumsy a vehicle to secure American interests. Before the Iraqi coup, the Eisenhower administration mistakenly had sought overt acceptance of the Doctrine by Arab governments and overt identification with the United States. At a time when many Arabs placed a high premium on independence from foreigners, the Eisenhower administration's effort possibly had contributed to the domestic weakening of the Lebanese and Jordanian regimes. The Eisenhower administration had forgotten that the actions of Arab governments were more important to American interests than formal adherence to the West in the Cold War.

Though unconsciously at first, as the '58 Crisis unfolded, the Eisenhower administration eliminated some of the hard edges of its Middle Eastern policy. In facilitating a Lebanese solution, the Eisenhower administration recognized that greater Lebanese neutrality did not harm any core U.S. interest in the Middle East. While the United States continued to support pro-Western regimes in oil-laden areas with military and economic assistance, the United States demanded less of them publicly. During the '58 Crisis, the Eisenhower administration had became more discerning than before of the difference between communism and Arab nationalism. Similarly, the administration became less prone to label a government or individual anti-Western by shallow and mistaken criteria. Eisenhower and Dulles had begun to learn the virtues of speaking softly and carrying a big stick.

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NOTES

1 See Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain & Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 232, 237-238 and 241; and Thomas G. Patterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 176-177.

2 Arab nationalism, which originally grew out of the weakening and eventual disintegration of the Ottoman empire, emphasized the linguistic, racial and cultural bonds of Arabs. Beyond that emphasis, the definition and goal of Arab nationalism varied widely depending on who rendered the definition and when. During the Fifties, a popular form of Arab nationalism was "pan-Arabism," which sought to give all Arabs some greater form of political unity. Proposals varied from loose federalism to a unity state; exponents of pan-Arabism were both on the right and left. "Radical Arab nationalism" was frequently pan-Arab, anti-imperialist, neutralist, and socialist. "Nasserism" was form of radical Arab nationalism associated with Egyptian President Nasser, emphasizing his leadership of the movement. On the other hand, pre-coup Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri es-Sa'id, was a prominent pan-Arabist, closely associated with Britain, who promoted Arab unity under the Hashemite dynasty of Iraq.

3 President Eisenhower's Special Message to Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, January 5, 1957, which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. *Papers of Presidents: Eisenhower, 1957*, 6-16. Congressional support for the Doctrine is embodied in the Joint Resolution, Public Law 7, 85th Congress, signed by President Eisenhower on March 9, 1957. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, 829-31; Department of State Bulletin, January 21, 1957, pp. 83-87. See also Patterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat*, 179-180.

4 Fawaz Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 80-81; Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 4-5; Peter Mansfield, *Nasser* (London: Metheun, 1969), 108; and Robert B. Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 161.

5 Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956-1961*, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965), 195. United States Department of State,

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1988) (Foreign Relations of the United States will referred hereinafter as "FRUS"), 100-113. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, pp. 100-102, Doc. 67, Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, April 21, 1957, 5 p.m.; FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, pp. 102-103; FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, pp. 107-108, Doc. 72, Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Unified and Specified Commanders, April 21, 1957, 7:10 p.m.; FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, pp. 109, James Hagerty statement, April 24, 1958, 5:30 p.m., citing Eisenhower Library, Kevin McCann Collection of Press and Radio Conferences and Press Releases, 1952-1961; and FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, pp. 1112-113, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, April 25, 1957, 8:16 p.m. A comprehensive analysis of the crisis, with appropriate emphasis on the actual Jordanian matrix instead of just the perception of the Eisenhower administration, is found in Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein*, 160-174. See also Uriel Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 55-67.

6 Douglas Little, "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958," *Middle East Journal* 44 (Winter 1990): 51-75. See also Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 283-306.

7 Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 199.

8 Little, "Cold War and Covert Action," 72; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 200-202.

9 Pre-Press Conference Notes, August 21, 1957, DDE Diary Series, Whitman Files, Eisenhower Library, cited in Little, 72.

10 Little, "Cold War and Covert Action ," 73.

11 Memorandum of Conversation, September 7, 1957, FRUS, 1955-57, Vol. XIII, 685-689. Soviet Prime Minister, Nikolia Bulganin, also warned Turkey against any action. See letter from Bulganin to Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of September 10, 1957, published in *Soviet News*, September 1957, reprinted in *Documents on International Affairs, 1957*, pp. 333-337.

12 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 202.

13 Little, "Cold War and Covert Action ," 73.

14 On the formation of the UAR, see Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 301-326; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 7-11. See also David Lesch, *Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). In our own time of national fragmentation and secessionist movements, the support of many Syrians for their country's disbandment and merger into another state remains amazing.

15 Gerges, *Superpowers and the Middle East*, 90-96. Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism*,78-82. The formation of the UAR put both the

United States and the Soviet Union in a quandary. On one hand, Nasser's power had increased dramatically, placing immense pressure on pro-Western Arab countries to join the UAR or at least accept Egyptian hegemony. On the other hand, Nasser clamped down on Syrian communists, eliminating their opportunity to take over the country. See Gerges, 90-96.

16 Miles Copeland, a former Central Intelligence Agency operative in the Middle East, professes that the CIA and the Egyptian General Intelligence Agency and the Soviet, British and French embassies all funded favorite candidates in the 1957 Lebanese parliamentary elections. However, "pro-Western, anti-Egyptian candidates did come out on top in the elections." Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), 226-227. Wilbur Eveland, another former member of the Central Intelligence Agency, claims substantial U.S. involvement in the 1957 poll. Wilbur Crane Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (New York: Norton, 1980), 248-258, and 266.

17 See for example the analysis of U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock in FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 10-11, Doc. 7, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, February 21, 1958, 11 a.m. See also Sidney Nettleton Fisher, *The Middle East: A History*, 3rd ed.(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 628-629; Emory C. Bogle, *The Modern Middle East: From Imperialism to Freedom, 1800-1958* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996), 397-398.

18 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 20-21, Doc. 12, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, April 3, 1958, 6 p.m.; FRUS microfiche supplement, Telegram 3274, April 1, 1958.

19 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 18-19, Doc. 11, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, March 20, 1958, 5 p.m. Fisher, The Middle East: A History, 628-629; Bogle, The Modern Middle East, 397-398.

20 E.g. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 1-2, Doc. 1, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to Department of State, January 9, 1958, 6 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 3-5, Doc. 2, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to Department of State, January 16, 1958, 3 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 8-9, Doc. 5, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to Department of State, January 30, 1958, 3 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 23, Doc. 14, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, April 18, 1958, 2 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 27, fn. 6, summarizing letter from Malik to Secretary Dulles, May 11, 1958, Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/5-1258.

21 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 28-29, Doc. 18, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 4, 1958, 8 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 35-36, Doc. 23, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 11, 1958, 5 p.m.; and FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 38-39, Doc. 25, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 11, 1958, 11 p.m.

22 FRUS XI, 1958-60, pp. 40-41, Doc. 26, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 12, 1958, noon; and FRUS XI, 1958-60, pp. 41-42, Doc. 27, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 13, 1958, 2 p.m. See also FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 38, Doc. 24, Telegram from Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 11, 1958, 8 p.m.

23 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 46-48, Doc. 30, Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, May 13, 1958, 5:50 p.m.; and FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 49, Doc. 31, Telegram from the Department of State (Dulles) to the Embassy in Lebanon, May 13, 1958, 9:23 p.m.

24 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 13, doc. 8, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, February 27, 1958, 4:17 p.m.; FRUS Microfiche Supplement, Telegram 3817 from Beirut, May 13, 1958; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 265. See also fn. 17 and 21.

25 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 18-19, Doc. 11, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, March 20, 1958, 5 p.m. Fisher, *The Middle East: A History*, 628-629; Bogle, The Modern Middle East, 397-398.

26 For example, both Chamoun and opposition leaders had at one time or another thought the commander of the Lebanese Army, General Fuad Chehab, suitable to become the next Lebanese president or prime minister. Chehab, however, declined so long as it appeared that Chamoun would exercise true control. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 24-25, Doc. 15, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, April 23, 1958, 4 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 29, Doc. 18, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 4, 1958, 8 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 31, Doc. 20, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 7, 1958, 5 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 35-36, Doc. 23, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 11, 1958, 5 p.m.

27 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 48, Doc. 30, Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, May 13, 1958, 5:50 p.m.; and Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 265-266.

28 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 47, Doc. 30, Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, May 13, 1958, 5:50 p.m.; and FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 33, pp. 52-53, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, May 14, 1958, 1:13 p.m.

29 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 49-50, Doc. 31,Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, May 13, 1958, 9:23 p.m.

30 FRUS Microfiche supplement, Telegram 4151 from Beirut, May 23, 1958.

31 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 73-74, Doc. 49, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, May 23, 1958, 8:14 p.m. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, doc. 87, p. 142. FRUS microfiche supplement, June 19, 1958. FRUS XI, DOC 75, P. 118. Dulles, nevertheless, kept watering down his message by reas-

suring Chamoun that the United States stood by its promise of military force.

32 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 71, quoting from Memorandum of Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the National Security Council held on May 22, 1958—the memorandum prepared on May 23, 1958; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 79-80, quoting from Memorandum of Discussion at the 367th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 29, 1958; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 81-82, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 20, 1958, 11 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 86, Doc. 56, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, June 2, 1958, 7 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 110-111, Doc. 69, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, June 11, 1958, 8 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 119-120, Doc. 76, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, June 14, 1958, 9 p.m.;

33 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 98, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, June 6, 1958, noon; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 120-121, Doc. 77, Special National Intelligence Estimate 36.4-1-58, June 14, 1958; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 124-126, Doc. 80, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, June 15, 1958, 2 p.m.; .

34 FRUS Microfiche Supplement, telegram 4710 from Beirut, June 14,1958; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 181, Memorandum of Discussion at the 370th Meeting of the National Security Council of June 26, 1958—memorandum prepared June 27, 1958; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 190-191, Doc. 112, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 1, 1958, 4 p.m.;

35 The Hashemites of Iraq were close blood relations of those in Jordan. The Hashemites originated from the Hejaz in the Arabian Peninsula. Because of the relationship Britain developed with the Hashemites during World War I, Britain placed two Hashemite princes, Abdullah and Feisal I, on the thrones of Jordan and Iraq respectively. Iraqi King Feisal II was the cousin of Jordanian King Hussein.

36 Uriel Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1969), 19-32. Marion Farouk-Sluglett, and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution To Dictatorship* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1990), 47 and 50.

37 Memorandum From Harold W. Glidden of the Division of Research and Analysis for Near East, South Asia, and Africa to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) July 16, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, p. 322. See also Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 8-12.

38 N.J. Ashton, "'A Great New Venture'?—Anglo-American Cooperation in the Middle East and the Response to the Iraqi Revolution July 1958," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, March 1993, 67-68, 78-81 and 84-85.

39 Briefing Notes by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, July 14, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, pp. 308-309; Memorandum of a Conference With the

President, White House, July 14, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, pp. 218-219; Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Department of State, July 14, 1958, FRUS, VOL. XI, pp. 209-210; Memorandum Conversation Between the President and the Vice President, July 15, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XI, p. 244. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, July 15, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, p. 245.

40 The United States had left Iraq in British hands: in view of the Saudi-Hashemite feud, which originated when both dynasties lived in the Arabian Peninsula, the division of labor made sense.

41 United States' relations with the Baghdad Pact were deep and extensive. For example, "[a]lthough not a member of the Pact, the United States was largely responsible for its formation and has consistently given it strong moral and material support. In April, 1956 the United States agreed to participate in the Pact's Economic an counter-subversion Committees. . . . in March of 1957, the United States accepted an invitation to participate in the work of the Pact's Military Committee." The United States distributed military largess to Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan according to the "force objectives approved by the Pact." FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, pp. 42-43, Doc. 12, Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Irwin to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, February 28, 1958.

42 FRUS 1958-1963, Vol. XII, p. 310, Doc. 110, Briefing Notes by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, July 14, 1958.

43 FRUS 1958-1963, Vol. XII, p. 84, Doc. 26, Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, July 20, 1958, 3:45 p.m.

44 FRUS 1958-1963, Vol. XI, p. 244, Doc. 139, Memorandum Conversation Between the President and the Vice President, July 15, 1958, 9:00 a.m.

45 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 219, Doc. 127, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, July 14, 1958, 2:35 p.m.

46 Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 269.

47 On importance that Eisenhower placed on maintaining American credibility among supporters of the West in the Cold War, see FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 219, Doc. 127, Memorandum a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, 2:35 p.m.

48 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, pp. 247-148, Doc. 141, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 15, 1958, 4 p.m.; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 248, fn. 3, citing USARMA telegram CX 241 to the Department of the Army, July 16, 1958, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, RG 218, JCS files: CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) Sec. 3; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 253, Doc. 146, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 16, 1958, 4 p.m.

49 FRUS 1958-1963, Vol. XII, p. 310, Doc. 110, Briefing Notes by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, July 14, 1958.

50 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 212, Doc. 124, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958.

51 FRUS, 1958-1960, VOL. XII, DOC. 110, Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, Amman, July 14, 1958, p. 313. FRUS VOL. XI, DOC. 174, Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, July 15, 1958—4 p.m., p. 303. King Hussein urged the administration repeatedly. E.g. FRUS, 1958-1960, VOL. XII, DOC. 110, , p. 313, fn. Telegram 107 from Amman, July 15, 1958, Department of State Central files, 787.00/7-1558, The King suggested that the United States and Britain put enough troops in Jordan so as to free his forces to invade Iraq. FRUS VOL. XI, DOC. 190, Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, July 18, 1958, p. 324. However, such talk was far-fetched: King Hussein's hold on power was tenuous and lacked the military capability to go into Iraq. FRUS, 1958-1960, VOL. XII, DOC. 111, Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, Amman, July 14, 1958, p. 314. Sir William Hayter, the British Foreign Office Deputy Under Secretary, thought that the King's proposal was "made for the record and was not to be taken seriously." FRUS, 1958-1960, VOL.. XI, DOC. 202, Memorandum of a Conversation, British Embassy, Washington, July 19, 1958, p. 342.

52 Turkey genuinely feared Nasser and the Soviet Union. FRUS, VOL. XI, DOC 124, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, p. 2. FRUS, VOL. XI, DOC 178, Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, July 16, 1958, pp. 306-308. Testimony of William B. MacComber, Jr., Special Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles on July 24, 1958, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. X, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 597-598; Ibid., July 28, 1958, pp. 628-629. FRUS, VOL. XII, DOC 27, Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 30-2-58, July 22, 1958, p. 90 ("Most of them [the Turks] continue to believe that the only answer to the challenge of Arab nationalism is military force."). George S. Harris, a specialist on Turkey finds that "the violent overthrow of an allied regime threw a scare into the Ankara leaders. Their own military establishment had been rocked by accusations of plotting, leading to the arrest of nine middle-grade officers in December 1957." The Iraqi coup "sharpened Menderes' fears that revolution might be a contagious disease and spread to his country." Nonetheless, "however much he may have wanted to make the move, his forces were not prepared for attack from this angle and could not have been deployed rapidly in numbers sufficient to accomplish this objective, given the difficulties of terrain and lack of roads in the vicinity of the Iraqi-Turkish border." George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 65-66.

53 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 175, Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Department of State, July 15, 1958, p. 304; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 177, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Minister of the British Embassy (Lord Hood), July 15, 1958, p. 305.

54 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 231-234, Doc. 131, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower in Washington and Prime Minister Macmillan in London, July 14, 1958, 5:43 p.m.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid. The White House transcription of the telephone conversation does not confirm Macmillan's account in his memoir, where he alleges that he told Eisenhower "'[y]ou are doing a Suez on me,' at which the President laughed . . . ." Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm 1956-1959*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 512. The actual conversation lacked laughter; nor is it likely that Eisenhower would have found such a joke funny.

57 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 132, Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, July 14, 1958, p. 235.

58 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 234, Doc. 131, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower in Washington and Prime Minister Macmillan in London, July 14, 1958, 5:43 p.m.

59 Memorandum of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles, July 14, 1958, Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations, FRUS Microfiche Supplement.

60 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 140, Memorandum a Conference With the President, White House, July 15, 1958, 11:25 a.m., p. 245.

61 Dulles reported to Eisenhower: "[t]he British are greatly concerned that we should commit ourselves to act with them in Jordan and possibly Iraq." FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 137, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, July 15, 8:40 a.m., p. 241. The British, in Dulles' opinion, sought a "blank check which" he thought should not be issued. Memorandum of telephone conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles, July 14, 1958, Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations, FRUS Microfiche Supplement. 144, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, July 15, 1958, 5:55 p.m., p. 251.

62 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 127, Memorandum a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, 2:35 p.m., p. 219.

63 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 137, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, July 15, 1958, 8:40 a.m., p. 242.

64 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, pp. 305-306, Doc. 177, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Minister of the British Embassy Lord Hood, Department of State, Washington, July 15, 1958.

65 FRUS, VOL. XI, DOC 177, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Minister of the British Embassy (Lord Hood), July 15, 1958, p. 306. FRUS, VOL. XII, DOC 117, Memorandum of Conversation, July 15, 1958, p. 320-321. FRUS, VOL. XII, DOC 115, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, July 15, 1958, 8:40 a.m., p. 317. FRUS, VOL. XI, DOC 137, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, July 15, 8:40 a.m., p. 242.

66 FRUS, VOL. XI, DOC 131, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower in Washington and Prime Minister Macmillan in London, July 14, 1958, 5:43 p.m., p. 233. FRUS, VOL. XI, DOC 124, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, p. 212; FRUS, VOL. XI, DOC 123, Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Department of State, July 14, 1958, 9:30 a.m., p. 210.

67 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 172, Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, July 14, 1958, p. 301. See also FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, pp. 299-301, Doc. 171, Telegram form the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, July 14, 1958, 3 p.m.; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, pp. 414-315, Doc. 182, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between Prime Minister Macmillan in London and Secretary of State Dulles in Washington, July 16, 1958, 6:20 p.m.

68 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 179, p. 309; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 309, fn. 2; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc 181, p. 312-313.

69 FRUS 1958-1969, Vol. XI, Doc 180, p. 310; CNO telegram 29527 to COMSIXFLT, July 16, 1958, 110:05 p.m., Microfiche supplement.

70 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 134, Memorandum of A Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Minister of the British Embassy (Lord Hood), Washington, July 14, 1958, p. 238. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 179, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 1, 1958, 11 a.m., p. 310.

71 Ibid.

72 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 175, Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, July 15, 1958, pp. 303-304. Historian, Nigel Ashton writes that the information on the alleged plot against King Hussein originated from British intelligence" and the United States confirmed it from a source in Israel. Ashton finds that the "convenience of the timing of the plot for British purposes . . . is rather suspicious." N.G. Ashton, "'A Great New Venture'?—Anglo-American Cooperation in the Middle East and the Response to the Iraqi Revolution, July 1958", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1993, p. 75.

73 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 182, p. 314 & 184.

74 On the British-Israeli problem, see Telegram 57 from Tel Aviv, July 16, 1958;

telegram 37 to Tel Aviv, July 17, 1958; telegram 58 from Tel Aviv, July 17, 1958, telegrams 358 from London, July 17, 1958; Telegram 371 from London, July 17, 1958, Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7-1758, all in FRUS 1958-1960, microfiche supplement; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 321, Doc. 188 (Israel sought to ensure that the United States "supported the British request."); and FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 193, p. 329. Macmillan's quotation is from his diary, which is published in Alistair Horne, *Harold Macmillan*: Volume II, 1957-1986 (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), pp. 95-96.

As for Israeli motives, Nigel Ashton writes that Ben Gurion sought, in return for the British overflights, "integration into the Western defense system, a tacit guarantee of Israel's present frontiers and the supply of armaments she needs." Ashton, "'A Great New Adventure?,'", p. 77, quoting Rundall—Foreign Office, 19/7/58, PREM11/2377. Macmillan recorded in his diary that "an extreme party in Israel thinks Jordan had better 'collapse' and that they can then seize all territory up to the West Bank. . . ." Quoted in Horne, Harold Macmillan: Volume II, p. 97. The declassified U.S. record indicates that Israel sent the United States conflicting messages over the period. On certain days, they urged maintenance of British forces in Jordan. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XIII, p. 66; Doc. 28, Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, July 20, 1958, 8 p.m.; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XIII, Doc. 29, Memorandum of a conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 21, 1958, p. 67-68. At other times, the Israelis broached the possibility of dismembering Jordan and Israel occupying of the West Bank. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XIII, Doc. 31, Memorandum of a Conversation Embassy Residence, London, July 27, 1958, 10 a.m., pp. 74-75.

75 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 366-367, Doc. 214, Letter from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, July 22, 1958.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 375-376, Doc. 220, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 23, 1958, 11 a.m. See also Macmillan note of July 27, 1958, FRUS microfiche supplement; Memorandum from British Air Marshal Dickson given to Walworth Barbour (Minister-Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Britain and liaison with the British command in London) on July 27, 1958, FRUS microfiche supplement; Dulles message from London, July 27, 1958, FRUS microfiche supplement;

76 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 380, Doc. 224, Message from Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles, July 24, 1958.

77 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 366-367, Doc. 214, Letter from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, July 22, 1958.

78 FRUS 1958-60, p. 348, Doc. 205, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, July 20, 1958, 3:45 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, pp. 366-367, Doc. 214, Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, July 22, 1958.

79 British troops were ill-equipped even toward the end of August after they had

received U.S. support. The "British have informed us their forces Jordan have urgent need anti-tank rifles and ammunition to protect themselves in event Jordanian army should turn against them. . . ." (sic) FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 510, Doc. 286, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, August 21, 1958.

80 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 193, p. 329, Message from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, July 18, 1958; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 366-367, Doc. 214, Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, July 22, 1958; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 363-364, Doc. 212, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, Amman, July 22, 1958, 1 a.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 397-398, Doc. 233, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, Amman, July 22, 1958, 7 p.m.

81 The aircraft crossed Israeli airspace. Telegram 35 to Tel Aviv, July 16, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 315, fn. 2; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 226, p. 385, Memorandum of Discussion at the 373d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 24, 1958.

82 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 187, pp. 319-321, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 17, 2:30 p.m.; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 188, pp. 320-321, Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, July 17,1958, 3:30 p.m.; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 378-379, Doc. 222, Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan, July 23, 1958.

83 U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, August 11, 1958, 231-233; UN document S/4059 July 20, 1958. See also Letter from Khrushchev to Macmillan, published in Soviet News, July 21, 1958, reprinted in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1958, 300-304.

84 See U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, August 11, 1958, 229-231 and 233-234; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 205, p. 349, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White house, Washington, July 20, 1958, 3:45 p.m. In addition, the British thought that perhaps the Soviet Union could secure stability in Lebanon and Jordan. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 208, pp. 353-357, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 21, 1958. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 357, fn. 6.

85 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 310, Doc. 179, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, July 16, 1958, 11 a.m. Although the president decided against intervention on Iraq on July 16th, on July 18th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered their Deputy Director for Strategic Plans to prepare "an outline plan covering a U.S.-British occupation of Iraq, with and without Turkish assistance . . . with the main objective of controlling Iraqi oil." Memorandum for Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Group from Brigadier General, R.D. Wentworth, U.S.A.F., July 18, 1958, NARA, RG 218, Central Decimal File 1958, 381 (8-23-57) Section 6 Red Band.

86 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XII, Doc. 26, Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, July 20, 1958, 3:45 p.m., p. 83. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XII, Doc. 27, Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 30-2-58, July 22, 1958, pp. 89. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XII, Doc. 31, Memorandum of Discussion at the 373d Meeting of the National Security Council, July 24, 1958, p. 102.

87 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 212, Doc. 124, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, 10:50 a.m..

88 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 219, Doc. 127, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, 2:35 p.m..

89 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 245, Doc. 140, Memorandum Conference with the President, White House, Washington, July 15, 1958, 11:25 a.m. In that conversation, the day before deciding against intervention in Iraq, July 15th, Eisenhower stated that "he is giving deep thought to finding a moral ground on which to stand if we have to go further." Ibid.

90 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 124, Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, July 14, 1958, p. 213.

91 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XII, p. 317, Doc. 115, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, July 15, 1958, 8:40 a.m..

92 FRUS 1958-60, Vol.. XII, Doc. 25, Minutes of Cabinet meeting, July 18, 1958, 8:35-10:08 a.m., p. 80. FRUS, VOL. XII, DOC 112, Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, Baghdad, July 14, 1958, p. 314. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XII, Doc. 124, Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, Baghdad, July 19, 1958, p. 327. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XII, Doc. 126, Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to Counselor Reinhardt, Washington, July 20, 1958, p. 329.

93 If the pro-Western rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Iran had fallen, Eisenhower likely would have rendered a different verdict. FRUS, VOL. XII, Doc. 25, Minutes of Cabinet meeting, July 18, 1958, 8:35-10:08 a.m., p. 80. Though not mentioned in the primary sources, it is interesting to note that American oil companies had a massive stake in Saudi and Iranian oil production unlike Iraq.

94 FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 202, Memorandum of a Conversation, British Embassy, Washington, July 19, 1958, p. 342. FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Doc. 122, Memorandum of Conversation, July 17, 1958, p. 326. On July 19, 1958, Secretary Dulles notified Amman that the United States would not support any Jordanian advance into Iraq. FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 203, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, July 19, 1958, p. 344. See also FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Doc. 26, Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, July 20, 1958, 3:45 p.m., p. 83.

The evidentiary record indicates that Eisenhower held the reigns of power firmly during the early days of the crisis with Dulles in a subordinate role. Though he followed Eisenhower's line, Dulles, for his own part, revealed himself

relatively prudent, not a reckless crusader. Annoyed with Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik, who sought to involve the United States in Suez II, Dulles told him that "[t]here was no use in talking in grandiose terms about uprooting Communism and Nasserism. This was something were not prepared to go to war to do. . . we did not contemplate using Lebanon as a base for general war in the Middle East." FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 198, pp. 335-6.

95 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 194, p. 330; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 196, p. 332.

96 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 197, p. 333. Secretary Dulles was also not immune from this naive faith at some points. E.g. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 202, p. 342.

97 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 226, p. 383. See also Telegram 649 from Robert McClintock, Beirut, to Department of State, July 24, 1958, Department of State, Central Files,, 783A.00/7-2458, Microfiche supplement, where McClintock recounts how a Lebanese opposition leader was visibly shaken after Murphy stated that the assembled U.S. forces could destroy the Moslem half of Beirut in seconds.

98 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 196, p. 332, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, July 19, 1958, 10:04 a.m.; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 202, p. 342, Memorandum of a Conversation, British Embassy, Washington, July 19, 1958, 6 p.m.

99 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 197, p. 333, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 19, 1958, 5 p.m.

100 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 199, p. 338, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 19, 1958, 7 p.m.

101 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 197, p. 333-4, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 19, 1958, 5 p.m.; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 219, p. 373, Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 22, 9 p.m.

102 Murphy wrote in his memoirs that "much of the conflict concerned personalities and rivalries of a domestic nature, with no relation to international issues. Communism was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection, although Communists no doubt hoped to profit from the disorders, as frequently happens when there is civil war. The outside influences came mostly from Egypt and Syria. Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, (New York: Pyramid Books, 1964), 404.

103 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 202, p. 342, Memorandum of a Conversation, British Embassy, Washington, July 19, 1958, 6 p.m.

With forces on the ground, some American military officials advocated greater military action. The commander of the Sixth Fleet, Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown, recommended that U.S. troops spread out from Beirut, seal the

Lebanese border with Syria, and seize the port of Tripoli. Vociferous objections were raised by Deputy-Secretary Murphy, Ambassador McClintock, and Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr., the Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean and the Middle East, based in London, Under-Secretary Murphy and Ambassador McClintock. They did not want U.S. forces to engage the Lebanese opposition. They thought that disaster would ensure, preclude a political solution at a minimum. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 209, p. 358. Dulles ruled against Admiral Brown and sided with the latter group. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 229, p. 392, fn. 6, citing telegram 487 to Beirut, July 25, 1958.

104 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 210, p. 359, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State, White house, Washington, July 21, 1958, 5:05 p.m. Dulles to Murphy, Telegram 399, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7-2158, FRUS Microfiche supplement. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 292, fn. 6, telegram 487 from Department of State to Embassy in Beirut, July 25, 1958. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 234, p. 401, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, July 25, 1958, 10:38 p.m. Eisenhower returned to his Suez view that the use of force would reap a temporary result at the likely cost of lasting Arab enmity.

105 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 206, p. 350, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 21, 1958, 1 p.m. See also FRUS Microfiche supplement, July 21, 1958.

106 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 227, pp. 386-388. Telegram 715 from Murphy, Beirut, to Department of State, July 15, 1958. See also Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 403-408.

107 Before the introduction of American forces in Lebanon, Chamoun proposed that Chehab become his prime minister or even succeed him as president. Chehab was willing to become president; however, he declined because he thought that he would be Chamoun's pawn as things then stood in Lebanon. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 241, p. 411. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 227, p. 389. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 229, p. 391. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 240, p. 408-9. Chamoun lost confidence in Chehab for the same reason that the opposition liked him: Chehab refused to commit the Lebanese army to Chamoun's use during the civil war. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 229, p. 391. See also, FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 242, p. 411-2. See also Telegram 870 from Beirut to DOS, July 31, 1958, Microfiche supplement.

108 Telegram 747 from Murphy Beirut to Department of State, July 27, 1958, FRUS microfiche supplement. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 415, fn. 2, Telegram 861 from Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 31, 1958. While Chamoun's term ended September 23, 1958, the Lebanese opposition wanted Chehab to succeed him immediately. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 244, p. 416. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 255, p. 432. Chehab tried to secure

Chamoun's approval for an interim government; nonetheless, no agreement was forthcoming. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 255, p. 432. Pedantic, the United States supported Chamoun on the ground that completion of his term would constitute a good example in Lebanon's constitutional development. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 262, p. 446.

109 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 247, Doc. 141, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 15, 1958, 4 p.m.

110 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, pp. 67-70, Doc. 44, Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, May 20, 1958, 7 p.m.

111 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 234, p. 396. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 245, Editorial Note, Memorandum of Discussion at the 374th Meeting of the National Security Council, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records July 31, 1958. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 265, p. 452.

112 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 244, p. 417, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 31, 1958, 9 p.m. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 247, p. 421, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, August 1, 1958, 4 p.m. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 249, Murphy in telegram from Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, August 2, 1958, p. 424. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 255, p. 433, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, August 5, 1958, 6 p.m. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 259, p. 437, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, August 7, 1958, 11 p.m. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 274, p. 477, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, August 15, 1958, 6 p.m.

113 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, pp. 348-349, Doc. 205, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, July 20, 1958, 3:45 p.m.

114 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 591, Memorandum of Discussion at the 381st Meeting of the National Security Council on October 2, 1958, memorandum prepared October 3, 1958; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 436, Memorandum of Discussion at the 375th Meeting of the National Security Council of August 7, 1958, memorandum prepared on August 8, 1958; FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 486-487, Doc. 277, Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, August 17, 1958.

115 The king and his prime minister admitted as much. FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 361-362, Doc. 211, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, July 21, 1958, 7 p.m.

116 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, pp. 451-452, Doc. 265, Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, August 11, 1958; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, pp. 580-581, Doc. 332, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, September 25, 1958, 6 p.m.

117 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, Doc. 253, p. 429, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan

to the Department of State, August 4, 1958, 5 p.m.

118 FRUS 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 531-532, Doc. 300, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 7, 1958, 5:30 p.m.

119 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 268, p. 462, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 12, 1958.

120 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 220, p. 374, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 23, 1958, 11 a.m.; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 221, p. 377, Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, July 23, 1958, 3 p.m. FRUS 1958-1960 Vol. XI, 267, pp. 455-461, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 12, 1958, 3-4:30 p.m.

121 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 260, pp. 439-443, Telegram from the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State, August 8, 1958, 3 p.m.

122 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 252, p. 428, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, August 3, 1958, 5 p.m. See also FRUS Microfiche supplement, August 5, 1958, Telephone conversation between Herter and Dulles, General Telephone conversations, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library. Britain sought a guarantee of Jordanian independence. UN Doc. A/PV.734.

123 Eisenhower addressed the Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly on August 13, 1958 and though he said that Lebanon and Jordan were subject to "indirect aggression," he was careful not to attack the U.A.R; he limited his negative remarks to the Soviet Union. Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1958.

124 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 268, pp. 461-467, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 12, 1958. Gromyko eventually stated that they could work on a joint statement or even seek UAR cooperation against foreign intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. Yet, the conversation came to no resolution. Ibid. Dulles' subsequent meeting with Gromyko was not productive; Gromyko was inflexible and became too involved in semantics. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 495, pp. 495-501, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 18, 1958, 3 p.m.

125 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 270., pp. 469-473, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 14, 1958. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 278, p. 489, Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Department of State, August 18, 1958, 7 p.m.; and FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 285, p. 507-509, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 21, 1958.

126 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 285, p. 507-509, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 21, 1958.

127 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 270., pp. 469-473, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 14, 1958.

128 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 278, p. 489, Telegram From the Delegation at

the United Nations to the Department of State, August 18, 1958, 7 p.m.; and FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 285, pp. 507-509, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 21, 1958.

129 UN doc A/Res./1237 (ES-III), Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1958. American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1958, 1047-1048.

130 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 291, p. 519, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in New York and the Under Secretary of State Herter in Washington, August 23, 1958, 11 a.m.; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 329, pp. 576-577, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, September 23, 1958, 1 p.m.

131 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 335, p. 585, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, September 26, 1958, 5:40 p.m.

132 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 353, pp. 609-10, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 15, 1958.

133 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 291, p. 519, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in New York and the Under Secretary of State Herter in Washington, August 23, 1958, 11 a.m.; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 295, p. 523, Letter from Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles, August 25, 1958.

134 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 288, p. 512, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, August 22, 1958, 5 p.m.; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 290, p. 516, Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, August 23, 1958, 1 a.m.

135 The British press for more assistance to Jordan continued. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 332, pp. 580-581, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, September 25, 1958, 6 p.m.

136 To bolster Chehab, the United States withdrew one battalion from Lebanon on August 12, 1958. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 267, p. 459, Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 12, 1958, 3-4:30 p.m. See also FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 459, fn. 6. The United States continued its withdrawal, bringing American troops to seven thousand by the end of September. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 317, p. 563, Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, September 12, 1958. American political and military officials planned a total withdrawal by October 15, 1958; however, to avoid leaving Britain in Jordan alone, the departure from Lebanon was delayed to October 31, 1958. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 327, p. 575, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, September 20, 1958, 2:16 p.m.

137 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 292, p. 520, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, August 23, 1958, 11 a.m.

138 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 299, p. 530, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, August 27, 1958, 5 p.m.

139 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 345, p. 598, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon in the Department of State, October 4, 1958, 9 p.m.

140 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 305, p. 541, Airgram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, August 29, 1958. Chehab now liked the U.S. military presence because he believed that it made all sides in Lebanon more amenable to comprise than otherwise. Telegram 1420 from Beirut, October 2, 1958, 783A.00/10-158.; Telegram 1790 from Beirut, October 1, 1958 Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10-158; Telegram 1862 from Beirut, October 6, 1958, in FRUS microfiche supplement.

141 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 328, Editorial Note, p. 576. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 333, p. 581, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, September 25, 1958, 7 p.m. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 336, pp. 585-587, Telegram from Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, September 27, 1958. Chehab picked Rashid Karame, the leader of the Moslem opposition controlling the Lebanese port of Tripoli, to be his prime minister. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 311, p. 551-552, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, September 5, 1958. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 316, p. 561, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, September 11, 1958, 6 p.m.

142 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 339, pp. 589-90, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, October 1, 1958, 11 a.m. See also FRUS Microfiche Supplement, Telegram 1791 from Beirut to Washington, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10-158; FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 347, pp. 600-601, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, October 9, 1958, 10 a.m. Moslem Rashid Karame was to be Prime Minister and to hold the Defense, Finance, Economic and Information portfolios. Another Moslem, Hussein Oueini would serve as Foreign Minister. Maronite Christian Pierre Gemayel was to become Minister of Public Works, Education, Agriculture and Health, and Maronite Christian Raymond Edde Minister of Interior and Social Affairs. FRUS XI, p. 613, fn. 2, citing Telegram 1966 from Beirut, October 15, 1958.

143 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 615, Editorial Note. See also FRUS Microfiche supplement, Telegram 1183 from Amman, October 24, 1958, Central Files, 785.00/10-2458, Department of State.

144 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, p. 591, Memorandum of 381st Meeting of the National Security Council on October 2, 1958, prepared by Gleason on October 3, 1958, NSC Records, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library.

145 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Doc. 358, pp. 615-617, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, October 28, 1958, 5 p.m. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 289.

146 Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, 76.

147 Macmillan-Lloyd, 18/7/58, Public Records Office, PREM 11/2408, quoted in

Ashton, "'A Great New Venture'?," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, March 1993, 79.

148 GEN 658, 1st meeting, 22/7/58, PRO CAB130/153, quoted in Ashton, "'A Great New Venture'?," Diplomacy & Statecraft, March 1993, p. 79.

149 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Doc. 31, Memorandum of Discussion at the 373d Meeting of the National Security Council, July 24, 1958, p. 102. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Doc. 44, Paper Prepared by Secretary Dulles, August 23, 1958 (Comments on Mr. Murphy's Memorandum of August 15, 1958), p. 157.

150 Memorandum of Discussion at the 374th Meeting of the National Security Council, July 31, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, p. 127. Special National Intelligence Estimate, August 12, 1958, SNIE 30-3-58, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, p. 140.

151 Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, August 22, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, p. 337.

152 Annual Report, 1958 - Iraq, Foreign Office 371/140896, p. 10, published in Foreign Office Annual Reports from Arabia, 1930-1960, Iraq-Jordan-Kuwait-Persian Gulf-Saudi Arabia-Yemen, Vol. 4., 1954-1960 (Chippenham: Archive Editions, 1993), p. 354.

153 Ibid. See also Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, August 22, 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, vol. XII, 387. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem,1-2, 35, 54-68, 77, and 155-160. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp. 57-60. In addition, though only twenty-five percent of the population, Sunni Arabs traditionally dominated Iraq and, of all the ethnic groups in the country, were most drawn to pan-Arabism (Most Arabs throughout the Middle East are Sunnis, not Shi'i). Shi'i Arabs constituted approximately fifty percent of the Iraq population. The Kurds and Turcomans represented almost another twenty-five percent of the population. Other than the Sunnis, a majority of the other groups saw no great benefit in incorporation into Sunni dominated pan-Arab state. See generally, Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 1-2.

154 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, 59-60. By early to mid October, the top level of the Eisenhower administration was aware that Qassem had defeated the Nasserists in Iraq. FRUS, Vol. XII, p. 341, Editorial Note, citing, Eisenhower Diaries. FRUS Vol. XII, p. 341, Memorandum of Discussion of 381st Meeting of the National Security Council, NSC Records. FRUS Vol. XII, Doc. 138, Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, Baghdad, October 14, 1958, p. 345.

155 Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, 17-19. In addition, transliterations of a given Arabic name such as Qassem (e.g., Qasim or Kassem), Hussein (Husayn) or Nasser (Nasir) varies depending on the English language source quoted.

156 Ibid.

157 Annual Report, 1958 - Iraq, Diary 1958, p. 5, Foreign Office 371/140896, pub-

lished in Foreign Office Annual Reports from Arabia, p. 361; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 78.

158 U.S.-Iraqi relations had gotten off to a rough start following the July 14th coup. The concentration of American troops in Lebanon and the American administration's delay until August 2, 1958 to recognize the new regime naturally increased Iraqi fears that the United States would seek to reverse the coup. Memorandum From Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, July 23, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, pp. 331-333 and fn. 1, p. 333; Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, July 30, 1958, cited in FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, p. 334, Editorial Note. (Even after ruling out intervention in Iraq, the Eisenhower Administration waited an additional two weeks to recognize the new Iraqi regime on the ground that pro-American countries such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan might feel that the United States to easily abandoned its supporters).

159 Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, August 22, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XII, pp. 336-337. p. 10, found in Annual Reports from Arabia, p. 353.

160 FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, p. 341, Editorial Note, citing, Eisenhower Diaries. FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, p. 341, Editorial Note, citing, Memorandum of Discussion of 381st Meeting of the National Security Council, NSC Records. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, Baghdad, October 14, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, p. 345.

Protestant "Righteous Indignation": The Roosevelt Vatican Appointment of 1940

David Settje

Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1940 appointment of a personal representative to the Vatican outraged most Protestant churches. Indeed, an accounting of the Protestant protests regarding the Holy See appointment reveals several aspects of American religious life at that time. As the United States moved closer to becoming a religiously pluralistic society and shed its Protestant hegemony, mainline Protestant churches sought to maintain leverage by denouncing any ties to the Vatican. Efforts to avert this papal affiliation also stemmed from traditional American anti-Catholicism. Therefore, the attempt to preserve Protestant influence with anti-Catholic rhetoric against a Vatican envoy demonstrates how mainline churches wanted to sway governmental policy, even in the area of foreign affairs. Protestant churches asserted that they were defending the principle of the separation of church and state. But an inspection of their protests against the Vatican appointment illustrates that they were also concerned about how such representation would affect their place in U.S. society and proves that they still distrusted Catholicism. In short, although they cloaked their arguments in the guise of defending the separation of church and state, the Vatican appointment became a forum in which Protestant denominations displayed their anxiety about the development of religious pluralism in America, voiced traditional anti-Catholicism, and ultimately influenced diplomatic policy.[1]

The first official hint of American ties with the Vatican occurred seven years into Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency. In March 1939, Roosevelt sent the current ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph P. Kennedy, to the coronation of Pius XII. Although Kennedy only stayed through the coronation and no U.S. official remained thereafter, this marked the first time an American president had been represented at a papal coronation ceremony. The mainline Protestant churches balked slightly at this move, but most ignored the

event or merely reported about the new pope's personal background. Roosevelt saw Kennedy's attendance at the coronation as a trial balloon and assumed that the low level of opposition indicated an ambivalent populace. This lack of a public reaction changed drastically later that year.

On 24 December 1939, Roosevelt announced the appointment of Myron C. Taylor as his "personal representative" to the Vatican. Roosevelt gave Taylor this ambiguous title to avoid having to ask for Senate approval. This dodging was possible because Taylor, who had recently retired from the chairmanship of the U.S. Steel Corporation, owned his own home in Italy and needed no government funding to travel to Europe. Although much speculation has surrounded Roosevelt's motives for sending Taylor, William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason offer the most plausible explanation. They state that the president hoped to persuade the Vatican to use moral suasion to force European countries to end the war. Recent scholarship has further speculated that Roosevelt wanted to secure the Catholic voting bloc in the upcoming 1940 election and gain inside information into the activities of other European nations, especially Italy and Germany. Regardless of Roosevelt's motives, throughout the next decade Taylor served as the president's representative by voyaging off and on to the Holy See and conferring with Pius XII. But no significant diplomatic developments occurred. Generally, Taylor tried unsuccessfully to win papal support for U.S. policy and to nudge the Catholic church away from neutrality.[2]

At the initial announcement of the appointment, Roosevelt carefully outlined to the press that Taylor's presence at the Vatican would not constitute formal diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Because he foresaw the negative reaction this decision might generate, he underlined the limited nature of the appointment. Publicly, the president stressed the need to establish European contacts that could aid the United States in efforts for peace in Europe. However, Roosevelt typically responded to questions about the appointment by brushing the subject aside or ignoring Protestant objections. In fact, the president avoided public pronouncements about the matter until April, when he reiterated the temporary nature of Taylor's post and allowed the release of a letter he had sent to Dr. George Buttrick, president of the Federal Council of Churches. Just like Roosevelt's public statements, the letter accented his hope for peace and emphasized the temporary nature of Taylor's mission. Other than these small references and an occasional White House meeting with Protestant leaders to assure them of their continued influence on presidential policy, Roosevelt remained silent about the appointment in order to maintain Catholic support and dodge Protestant ire.

Although historians have investigated the political and diplomatic aspects of the Taylor mission, no detailed analysis of religious opinion respecting the

appointment exists. In fact, only a few scholars have attempted general conjectures regarding the meaning of the strong Protestant outcry against Roosevelt's announcement. Alex Karmarkovic defends the Protestant protests, uses only a few sources, and never gives credence to larger religious trends of the twentieth century. Other studies either concentrate merely on one denomination or focus on the political and diplomatic effects of the appointment. For example, George Q. Flynn directs his discussion of public opinion to Roosevelt's efforts to maintain electoral support. Furthermore, Dorsey Milan Deaton does not begin his examination of the controversy until 1952, well after the initial 1940 furor over Roosevelt's move. The best sources available to understand public reaction are the religious periodicals, newspapers, and news magazines from 1940. The religious leaders who wrote in these publications held great leverage over their members because they served as spiritual mentors. Furthermore, the periodicals contain lay letters to the editor and represent the literature that many Protestants looked to for religious guidance.[3]

Despite Roosevelt's efforts to elude Protestant disapproval of the appointment, most Protestant denominations distrusted such a move; two historical factors led to this demonstration of intense anti-Catholicism. First, denunciations of Taylor's mission reveal the continued persistence of a nativist-driven anti-Catholicism in America. John Higham defines nativism as an "intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., 'un-American') connections"; he further breaks nativism down into three primary components: anti-Catholicism, anti-radicalism, and anti-immigration. As Higham explains, nativism was a nationalistic spirit gone afoul. It propelled its proponents to defend the majority way of life against an imagined enemy of foreign infiltrators trying to transform American institutions. According to historians of nativism, the Protestant majority displayed their fear by combating Catholicism's different structure and even exaggerating this to mean that Catholics wanted the U.S. government to mirror their church polity. The history of such anti-Catholicism began before the Civil War and peaked again after Reconstruction with the formation of the Ku Klux Klan. Thereafter, it fluctuated in national importance until 1928, when Al Smith made inroads against anti-Catholicism by becoming the first Catholic presidential candidate. Later, Roosevelt embraced Catholic support during his presidential campaigns. But it was his Vatican appointment that recharged nativist suspicions of Catholic motives, especially in light of the fact that the Catholic church's membership had grown during the 1930s.[4]

The second historical factor that led to the 1940 display of anti-Catholicism occurred in conjunction with these nativist fears. Vatican pronouncements had always intensified Protestant misgivings because their

dread of the Catholic church included a suspicion that the pope wanted to take over the world as temporal ruler. The 1870 papal proclamation of infallibility did nothing to allay these fears. In 1928, as Protestants worked diligently to form ecumenical ties, Pius XI refused to participate on the grounds that the Roman Catholic church was the only true church. Moreover, Pius XII's visit to the United States as Vatican Secretary of State prior to his papal election antagonized fears that he had plotted for years to subvert American democracy. Such Vatican actions did little to alleviate American anti-Catholicism, and Roosevelt's 1940 appointment merely fueled this long-standing fire. Although anti-Catholicism waxed and waned over time, it appeared readily at the mention of papal authority because many Protestants feared that the pope wanted to control American politics.

Another factor, a more recent development than nativist anti-Catholicism, that led to Protestant protest against the appointment involved the gradual pluralism that emerged onto the American religious scene. William R. Hutchison states that, between 1900 and 1960, Protestant mainline churches went through a "gradual and somewhat painful adjustment from one social reality to another" because they lost their dominant role in shaping societal religious opinion. Rather, they had to begin sharing this task with other religions, especially Catholicism and Judaism. In addition, the controversy over Biblical authority that pitted fundamentalists against modernists further eroded Protestant cohesiveness. But Hutchison also points out that Protestant leaders were unprepared to accept this reality and fought to maintain their hegemony well into the 1950s. His volume further illustrates that church leaders were actually concerned about their perceived loss of influence. Prior to the gradual twentieth-century transformation of Protestant hegemony, mainline churches had traditionally held all of the power in influencing presidents and setting governmental policy. Furthermore, the fact that Catholic membership numbers swelled during the 1930s added to these Protestant fears. In addition, the formation of a strong ecumenical movement during the twentieth century demonstrates how Protestants worked to hold onto their power by presenting a unified front. The opponents of the Vatican appointment largely reflected the denominations within this alliance.[5]

The 1940 Vatican controversy commanded so much attention because traditional anti-Catholicism persisted as Protestant churches felt that they were losing clout. Most Protestants worried about the fact that Roosevelt courted the Catholic vote and gave Catholics a significant voice in politics not long after a Catholic had won the Democratic nomination for president. Ultimately, Protestant attempts to stifle this Catholic voice by opposing the Vatican appointment revealed a traditional paradox in their thinking. They fought to maintain a separation of church and state, but this effort therefore

sought to preserve their influence over the government. Although this was the case throughout the nineteenth century, documenting its persistence into the twentieth century aids an overall understanding of how Protestants tried to maintain their central voice in American policy amid the profound religious changes of this century.

During the first five months of 1940, almost every Protestant denomination came to view the Taylor appointment as antithetical to American ideals. But not every denomination arrived at this conclusion in the same manner. In fact, close scrutiny of the specific reaction by the most prominent Christian denominations in America reveals four distinct categories. Several Protestant groups, including the Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, and Seventh-day Adventist churches, immediately condemned the president's action, sustained this posture throughout the controversy, and spurred other Protestant groups to join the protest. A second cluster of denominations, encompassing Presbyterian, Congregationalist, and Universalist followers, originally sanctioned the Taylor mission but quickly changed their stance to one of opposition. A minority of Protestant churches make up a third category of denominations that split over the issue. The Disciples of Christ and Episcopalians debated whether or not the appointment would help find a solution to the war in Europe; some leaders and adherents supported this attempt while others joined the majority of Protestants in questioning Roosevelt's decision. Yet, even the supportive voices within these divided denominations only advocated the idea of a representative to the Vatican so long as it remained temporary and unofficial. The obvious backing from the Catholic church in America represents the final category; it was the only denomination that totally supported the appointment.

The first group of churches is the most important for this study because their response best depicted the continuance of anti-Catholicism amid the Protestant loss of status. These denominations began protesting Taylor's appointment before the end of the holiday season. Although they insisted that the appointment violated the separation of church and state, their rhetoric contained anxiety about their continued influence and anti-Catholic sentiments. For example, Walter A. Maier, a Missouri Synod Lutheran minister who broadcast a weekly radio program entitled "The Lutheran Hour," spoke out immediately against the Taylor mission by using rhetoric that became common among religious leaders throughout the debate. He declared that the government was "desert[ing] a traditional American policy by entering the church life of the nation." In another opening argument, the Christian Century editor Charles Clayton Morrison maintained that Roosevelt made the appointment only to secure the Catholic voting bloc. These first denunciations in January 1940 called the appointment a "step with

ominous implications" for the future of American religious freedom. In fact, the initial outcry often called the Vatican appointment "unfair" because it provided the Holy See with access to Washington unavailable to Protestant churches. Therefore, religious leaders considered any ties with the Vatican a threat to religious liberty and discounted the theory that a Vatican envoy could help the United States gain vital information about the European war.[6]

Even Roosevelt's assurances that "no church would receive better treatment or greater recognition than any other" failed to assuage Protestant allegations that the appointment was "unfair." Most periodicals defined their reason for objecting to the appointment by stating that a diplomatic relationship with the Holy See was "un-American" because it violated the separation of church and state. This fact reveals that most Protestant periodicals viewed the pope as a monarch who opposed religious liberty and would try to infiltrate American institutions. Thus, the Christian Century reported the appointment as "repugnant not only to American tradition, but to democratic principles." Later in the year, Louie D. Newton, the vice president of the Baptist World Alliance, stated that the appointment favored one church body over another and concluded that only Protestant convictions had uncovered the danger to American principles. These religious leaders established the need for Protestants to assert their majority opinion in order to hinder Roosevelt's perceived efforts to erode religious freedom by recognizing the Catholic church.[7] *Christian Century* 57 (10 January 1940): 38-40; "Dr. Newton Answers Archbishop Francis J. Spellman," *Baptist Standard* 52 (28 March 1940): 3.

Another key anti-Catholic element to the protests centered around a fear that Roosevelt would allow the pope to control administrative policy. This uneasiness about papal motives revealed American anti-Catholicism's persistent history of thinking that the pope wanted to rule the world. No proof existed that the pope had such a motive, and Roosevelt was unlikely to share his authority with another ruler. But Protestants could not understand this historic factor and instead claimed that the appointment endangered the separation of church and state. The growth of the Catholic church in the 1930s furthered this fear because Protestants worried that this would lead to an increased ability for the pope to influence more Americans' voting behavior. The Lutheran church especially warned against ties with the pope, professing that popes throughout history had declared their supreme status and infallibility on earth. The Lutheran linked such past papal statements with the current appointment and cautioned that diplomatic ties meant agreement with these principles. Further heightening Protestant, and especially Lutheran, qualms about the pope, the Lutheran Standard stated that "history teaches us that the temporal designs and aspirations of the Vatican are nothing to trifle

with."[8]

Other denominations also raised concerns about papal motives. An article by a Baptist minister asked: If the pope wanted world peace would he also be willing to "agree to liberate the world from slavery to papal intrigue in national affairs?" Finally, this pastor stated that the pope's "political power is more greatly feared than his piety is admired." Even the liberal Christian Century proclaimed that the appointment represented the "first step along a road which in Catholic diplomacy is always expected to arrive ultimately at a concordat." In short, the Protestant churches that immediately fought the appointment followed the editors of the Lutheran Standard in maintaining that "because Rome thinks in terms of centuries and makes plans today for things which she will do her best to bring to pass fifty or a hundred or five hundred years from today," the Protestant majority had to protest posthaste. Therefore, Protestant denunciations of Roosevelt's Vatican appointment used old nativist prejudices against the pope to allow anti-Catholicism to influence opinions about the Vatican envoy.[9]

Other forms of anti-Catholicism accompanied these anxieties about the pope. In an April interview with Time magazine, Charles Clayton Morrison responded to the attempt by Roosevelt to calm Protestant fears in the aforementioned letter to Dr. Buttrick: "Protestantism is the majority faith in the United States. The so-called interfaith movement derived its initiative from Protestantism. The movement arose because Protestants said: We who are the dominant faith in American democracy ought to exercise tolerance toward Catholics and Jews." In short, Morrison felt that Protestant denominations, through their democratic impulses, allowed all faiths to flourish in America. But he indicated that Catholics currently agreed with the separation of church and state because they constituted a minority religion; later, when Catholics had a larger percentage of the population, Morrison worried that they would attempt to force their convictions upon all Americans. The Lutheran more pointedly warned its readership to prevent Catholics from entering public office because their Roman affiliation would lead them blindly to do whatever the pope dictated. The tradition of anti-Catholicism so embedded itself in American society that even these intelligent, ecumenically minded, and respected religious leaders continued to worry about the aims of the Catholic church. Thus, fear of Catholicism in 1940 allowed Protestants to link their traditional anti-Catholicism with the Vatican appointment because they thought that it was another deliberate step toward Catholic domination that would hasten a decline in Protestant influence.[10]

Protestant periodicals also accused the president of masking the truth that Taylor acted as a full ambassador. Dr. J. L. McElhany, spokesperson for the Seventh-day Adventists, asserted that the Vatican already acted as if formal

ties existed when the pope announced his satisfaction with the president's goodwill gesture. The Christian Century called the appointment "devious" and said it certainly constituted the first step toward a permanent ambassadorship. After discovering that the Vatican had received Taylor in the same manner it accepted other diplomats, the periodical's editors stated that Roosevelt was ignoring the Constitution. A Methodist periodical, the Christian Advocate, also questioned the president's hidden objectives. Referring to the meeting Roosevelt had with Buttrick, the editors called it an "obvious device" for trying to trick America. In short, Protestants thought that there was no difference between formal recognition and a personal representative. These arguments outline two important points: They indicate that Protestants knew Roosevelt merely used the "temporary" rhetoric to appease their outcries despite indications that Taylor functioned as a full ambassador. And Roosevelt's attempt to cloak his motives by avoiding public discussion or by manipulating semantics helped fuel Protestant anxieties. These presidential efforts underscored Protestant fear about an underhanded Catholic church and added to their belief that they were losing influence over the president. Roosevelt's coyness gave Protestants proof that he tried to mislead them about Taylor's appointment.[11]

Although a few letters to the editor and some religious leaders within the first group of denominations supported the president's appointment, they constituted a small minority. Strong reactions against the appointment characterize the Protestant response from those churches that immediately fought the appointment and maintained this stance throughout the controversy. These denominations focused on the "inequality" of the appointment, the concern about papal motives, and a traditional fear that Catholicism would try to replace Protestantism as the dominant force in American religious life. Additionally, these leading protestors accused the president of hiding secret ambitions to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Holy See and cited the reception Taylor received at the Vatican as proof. Due to the persistence of anti-Catholicism and anxieties about Protestantism's ability to maintain its influence, many editors and lay people agreed with the words of a Lutheran Standard editor who proclaimed that he could not "write on this subject without righteous indignation."[12]

The second group of denominations diverged little from the first by the end of May 1940. The Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Universalists began the year supporting the appointment and its efforts for world peace. But as the controversy progressed and the original Protestant protestors persisted in denouncing the move, even these churches fell in line with the majority of Protestants and began fearing the onset of papal influence in American culture due to Myron C. Taylor's presence in Rome.

The United Presbyterian initially supported Roosevelt because the editors believed that the president really was trying to foster world peace and keep the United States from entering the European fray. It is crucial to note, however, that Presbyterian leaders accepted Taylor's appointment only on condition that it remain temporary. Indeed, a majority of the Protestants who supported the appointment insisted that this backing was subject to Taylor's return once the war ended. Thus, they also feared U.S. contacts with papal power, but momentarily suspended these misgivings with the hope that such a relationship could help end the war. The editors explained this acceptance by arguing that "however strong our prejudice against the Roman Church and papal claims," the pope still had power to influence a large number of people away from the violence of a world war. Nevertheless, they tempered this favor with the fear that Roosevelt really wanted to secure the Catholic voting bloc and admitted to misgivings about recognizing the temporal authority of the Holy See. The Congregational periodical Advance echoed this reluctant acceptance by the Presbyterian journal, stating that Protestant churches must use caution but could support Roosevelt because he was trying to keep the United States out of war.[13]

This consent of early 1940 quickly dissipated for the Presbyterian and Congregationalist denominations. Already on 18 January, the United Presbyterian mirrored the first group of denominations when it asserted that the president hid the true circumstances behind the official diplomatic arrangements to send Taylor to Rome. Additionally, the editors assumed that Taylor's reception by the pope "was planned apparently to make it perfectly clear that Mr. Taylor will occupy the position of a regular ambassador." In addition to questioning Roosevelt's motives and wondering about papal aims, the Presbyterian journal's arguments against the appointment revealed anti-Catholicism. The periodical reported on a letter to the editor of the New York Times in which a bishop of the Catholic church supported the Vatican envoy. The United Presbyterian stated that this bishop labored "under the handicap of being an official in a totalitarian Church and, as such, is incapable of understanding the spirit of men who hold to democracy in religion as well as in government." Once again, the Congregational Advance paralleled the Presbyterians by changing their initial support to opposition. They criticized the president for his "too clever manner" and claimed that his actions hindered his efforts for peace by alienating the American people. Therefore, these two denominations fell in line with the first category of Protestants by revealing Roosevelt's deceit, combining it with a fear of the pope, and persisting with anti-Catholic rhetoric when they denounced the Vatican appointment.[14]

The Christian Leader, a Universalist periodical, also demonstrated early

acceptance of the appointment by asking whether "the Christian ideals of good will and Brotherhood" were to be "an exclusively Protestant project." But like the Presbyterians and the Congregationalists, the editors stressed the condition that the Taylor appointment remain temporary. Furthermore, they doubted that Roosevelt wished to end the separation of church and state and thus trusted him to work only toward peace in Europe. The Christian Leader's editors maintained their support of the appointment throughout the year but always cautioned against a permanent ambassador. This periodical differed from others by trusting Roosevelt and asking for Protestant denominations to continue ecumenical efforts to support a worldwide drive for peace, even if it meant temporary cooperation with the Vatican.[15]

In contrast to the editors' tempered support, readers of the Christian Leader denounced the appointment and thus disagreed with the periodical's qualified endorsement. A minister wrote to the editors and asserted that Roosevelt's willingness to listen to advice from the Vatican hierarchy threatened American religious freedom. Another writer proclaimed his tolerance for efforts for peace but "not at any price" and implored the president to stop defacing the Constitution. Yet another reader dreaded the rising tide of fascism and warned that allowing Roosevelt to subvert the Constitution in even this seemingly insignificant manner would lead him to grasp for more and more power. Thus, Universalist adherents followed other Protestants and objected to the appointment. Like the Presbyterians and Congregationalists who came to oppose ardently a Vatican tie, the Universalists had misgivings about associating with what they perceived to be a totalitarian dictator (the pope) who opposed religious freedom.[16]

Although a majority of Protestant faiths protested the decision to send an ambassador to the Holy See, a few denominations split over the Taylor mission. Not every Episcopalian or Disciples of Christ editor denounced the president's move, even though readers and most church leaders objected. The Episcopal church may have shied away from the controversy because both Roosevelt and Taylor belonged to that denomination. Furthermore, the Episcopal church polity paralleled that of the Catholic church more than any other denomination and thus produced less fear of papal infiltration. The case of Disciples of Christ support remains less clear. Most likely, those who advocated the move hoped such efforts would indeed contribute to staving off American involvement in the war. Yet both denominations' periodicals made it clear that their backing of Taylor's efforts rested on the temporary nature of his assignment: if the appointment became permanent, they threatened to withdraw their support because they, like their Protestant colleagues, feared that a prolonged affiliation with the Vatican could harm American religious liberty.[17]

The supporters of the appointment within denominations with divided opinions reprimanded fellow Protestant protestors. One predominant thrust in their argument against the majority stated that "bigotry would even obscure the principle of church and state which the opposition believes Mr. Roosevelt violated." In short, by condemning the appointment, they claimed that these churches had entered the political arena in which they wanted religions to have no authority. The Episcopal periodicals Living Church and Churchman also applauded the Vatican envoy and disliked the negative Protestant attitudes. In addition, dissenters tried to expose the anti-Catholicism of many protestors. For example, the editors of a Disciples of Christ journal, the Christian-Evangelist, stated: "We fear that anti-Catholicism is so deeply ingrained in many Protestant leaders in the United States that they are blinded with passionate prejudice" and unable to accept the president's efforts for a stable world. These supportive Protestants also sarcastically accused the protestors of petty bickering, especially the Christian Century:

> In a recent issue of The New Republic, a reviewer of the movie, "The Grapes of Wrath," characterizes it as the greatest show on the face of the earth. That may be an exaggerated opinion, but not having seen the film yet, we cannot gainsay this judgment or other reviewers' which are almost as praiseworthy. However, we are glad that what is the next best show is going on in the Chicago editorial offices of The Christian Century and that we are among the thousands cheering from the grandstands. On with the show![18]

While the Christian-Evangelist supported Roosevelt, another Disciples of Christ journal agreed with the Protestant majority. The Christian Standard called efforts to change Roosevelt's policy "wise and patriotic" because "it has become the habit in Washington to send out 'trial balloons,' and we ought to act accordingly," meaning the editors felt Americans should denounce official ties with the Vatican. Even one editor of the supportive Christian-Evangelist dissented from his colleagues and stated that the president had blatantly disregarded the wishes of Americans. In fact, this editor claimed that Pius XII now had begun his plot to subvert American institutions. Furthermore, letters to the editor lamented "the editorial glee" of the periodical and forewarned that this "indifference" might miss the critical danger of Taylor's appointment. Still another response, this time by a minister, asserted that supporting the president condoned a "risky" involvement with the pope. These Protestant dissenters thus followed the original protestors and

denounced the Vatican envoy by using traditional anti-Catholicism and coupling it with a fear that Roosevelt intended to dilute Protestant influence.[19]

Most letters to Episcopal journals mirrored the attitudes of those in Disciples of Christ journals by questioning the editors for accepting a position that could ultimately harm the Protestant church. Also, the Protestant Episcopal Church League, representing a large number of church members, passed a resolution censuring Taylor's mission and calling for him to return to the United States. These two denominations clearly split over the subject of sending Taylor to Rome. Although similar in tone to the Universalists, only the Episcopalian and Disciples of Christ churches debated in their periodicals and showed distinct lines of division between the pro-Taylor faction and the anti-Vatican contingent. This indicates that no Protestant body fully supported sending Taylor to meet with the pope. In fact, the highest degree of Protestant acceptance came from the two denominations that split over the issue.

The Catholic church was the only Christian denomination that embraced the move and defended the president's action. Generally, Catholic journals believed Roosevelt's claim that Taylor's mission was only temporary, reiterated that the president had consulted with other Protestant leaders, and felt that this appointment was the best chance for "a peace that is greater than the mere absence of war." Additionally, the Catholic press discussed the nature of American anti-Catholicism. Commonweal editors summed up the problem by quoting William Howard Taft: "I decide every question that comes up on the merits as I understand them. . . . But it is useless to persuade a man with the anti-Catholic virus to look with patience at any treatment of the Catholic church that does not involve hostility." America editors worried that anti-Catholicism would plague the 1940 presidential election with a reprisal of the rhetoric that surrounded Al Smith's presidential bid: "Religious bigotry won the election in 1928. We pray to God to avert a similar calamity in 1940."[20]

Catholic denunciations of Protestant protests also sounded a cynical tone. One editor pointed out that the United States had an ambassador to the government of George VI, who also served as head of the Church of England. Thus, the column's headlines read, "Let's Investigate Ambassador Kennedy." Other editors supplemented the argument about the King of England by pointing out that no one complained of relations with the Japanese government, whose emperor claimed to be the Son of Heaven, which "mean[t] a union of the Japanese religion and the United States government." Commonweal further reported that other world democracies "have survived 'unscathed' from their diplomatic relations with the Vatican." Other editorials took special umbrage at the fact that so many accused the Catholic church

of being dictatorial, asserting that "human dignity and liberty" belonged to all Christians, not only Protestants. They also chided the Christian Century's constant protesting by entitling one article, "The 'Christian Century' Carries On."[21]

Furthermore, the American Catholic leadership vocally defended their denomination. One Catholic archbishop spoke against the fear of a papal takeover, stating that "there are still un-instructed Americans who think that the Catholic church is a foreign institution and that we Catholics owe allegiance to a foreign potentate, namely the pope." He denied such "silly but harmful insinuations." Furthermore, Archbishop Francis J. Spellman publicly defended the pope and the president. The bishop of Omaha, James H. Ryan, additionally admonished Protestant ire in a New York Times editorial. He questioned the argument that a diplomatic tie to the Vatican threatened the separation of church and state because those opposed never explained how this association affected the division of powers. In short, he resolved that a Vatican envoy did not jeopardize American autonomy. Thus, the Catholic church defended the Taylor mission by accusing Protestants of anti-Catholicism, asserting that the U.S. government was not in danger, and supporting all efforts for peace. Indeed, given American Catholics' traditional independence from and challenges to Roman authority, had they suspected that the pope wanted to try to govern American secular or religious policy they in all probability would have responded negatively.[22]

The subject of sending Myron C. Taylor to the Vatican as President Roosevelt's personal representative, a position that did not require Senate approval or federal funding, erupted onto the American scene in early 1940. Traditional anti-Catholicism, based on nativist fears and misgivings that the pope was plotting to reign over the world spiritually and secularly, underlay much of the rhetoric against Taylor's mission. Furthermore, the protestors of the appointment accused Roosevelt of hiding an ambition to allow Catholic influence to hold sway over political considerations, an arena that had been traditionally reserved for Protestant leverage. In fact, the denunciations of Taylor's mission were often repetitious; editorials and letters to the editor repeatedly called the pope a dictator, feared a papal takeover, accused Roosevelt of underhanded politics, and persisted with a suspicion of Catholicism. Finally, mainline Protestants became apprehensive about the emergence of religious pluralism. As the American Catholic church grew during the 1930s, Protestant numbers declined and its adherents divided between modernist and fundamentalist ideologies. Protestants tried to quell this change and maintain their leverage over U.S. society in part by disallowing U.S.-Vatican interactions. In this manner, the Protestant majority continued to have influence over the sphere they wanted to shelter from Catholic

sway, namely politics. Indeed, the Protestant community successfully altered diplomatic policy by stopping Roosevelt from formally appointing Taylor and by forcing him to remain quiet about the United States' Vatican tie. On the other hand, the few defenses of the move applauded the efforts for peace and outlined how such a representative could not harm the government.

Despite the harsh outcry during the first half of 1940, the controversy died away later that year because World War II pulled the United States into its fray and provided people with larger worries. Still, the seeds were planted for a future problem because the Vatican issue went unresolved. Taylor remained as the Vatican envoy through the Roosevelt administration and stayed there as Truman's representative until he retired in 1950 due to poor health, when his departure again raised the question of Vatican recognition. President Truman attempted to have him replaced, but with no major world wars to concern them, the Protestant protestors' campaign against a Vatican representative was successful. They forced Truman to give up and the United States once again went without ties to the Holy See.[23]

NOTES

1 *Between the Times: The Travail of the Protestant Establishment in America, 1900-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), edited by William R. Hutchison, offers a good survey of the Protestant denominations' encounter with religious pluralism in America before 1960. The essays demonstrate that Protestants recognized the imminent changes in U.S. religious life but resisted relinquishing their traditional hegemony.

2 For the view that Roosevelt appointed Taylor to inject moral convictions into European politics, see William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1952). By no means a complete list, the following sources may be consulted to obtain detailed answers regarding Roosevelt's motives, knowledge held by the Catholic church about European events, the results of the affiliation between the Vatican and the United States, the constitutional implications of sending an ambassador, and the actual events surrounding Taylor's appointment from 1940 to 1950: James E. Wood, Jr., "U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican," *Journal of Church and State* 26 (Spring 1984): 197-207; Robert A. Graham, *Vatican Diplomacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); John S. Conway, "Myron C. Taylor's Mission to the Vatican, 1940-1950," *Church History* 44 (March 1975): 85-99; and Martin Hastings, "United States-Vatican Relations," *Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia* 69 (March and June 1958): 20-55. See also *Wartime Correspondence Between President Roosevelt and Pius XII* (New York:

Macmillan, 1947).

3 Alex Karmarkovic, "The Myron Taylor Appointment: Background; Religious Reaction; Constitutionality" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1967). Karmarkovic focuses on the religious leaders' reaction without addressing the larger public outcry, and his research mirrors 1940s anti-Catholicism by fearing the authoritarian pope and criticizing American Catholics for blindly following Pius XII. George Q. Flynn, "Franklin Roosevelt and the Vatican: The Myron Taylor Appointment," *Catholic Historical Review 58* (July 1972): 171-88; Flynn, *Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and American Diplomacy, 1937-1945* (London: Greenwood Press, 1976), 98-126. Flynn merely states that Protestant anger existed and therefore forced Roosevelt to respond. Dorsey Milan Deaton, "The Protestant Crisis: Truman's Vatican Ambassador Controversy of 1951" (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1970). Deaton understood that the emergence of religious pluralism played a role in fomenting Protestant outrage, but he primarily studies Harry S. Truman's failed effort to have Congress approve an official ambassador in 1951. Therefore, he cites postwar circumstances, such as the Red Scare, as the primary causes for the protest; this approach fails to understand fully the fact that the outcry began before World War II and persisted throughout the 1940s. Thus, Deaton downplays the continued effects of nativism and anti-Catholicism. Vicki Ann Crumpton's "An Analysis of Southern Baptist Response to Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the Vatican" (Ph.D. diss., South Western Baptist Theological Seminary, 1988) and Donald Bert Morlan's "The Persuasive Campaign of the Christian Century Against Diplomatic Relations with the Vatican, 1940-1952" (Ph.D. diss., Purdue University, 1969) prove too narrow to understand the larger implications of the opposition. Crumpton theorizes that anti-Catholicism alone led to Baptist anger, while Morlan claims that only the Christian Century instigated the protesting.

4 John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1955); 4. Anti-Catholic prejudices existed well before 1860: see Ray Allen Billington's *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860* (reprint, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1963).

5 Hutchison, vii, viii, 4; Sydney E. Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 875-950; Martin E. Marty, *Pilgrims in Their Own Land: 500 Years of Religion in America* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 387-412; Mark A. Noll, *A History of Christianity in the United States and Canada* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992), 431-36; Peter W. Williams, *America's Religions: Traditions and Cultures* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), 323-28. For this study, mainline Protestantism refers to Williams's definition as encompassing white, middle- and upper-class Protestant churches, including Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Methodists, Baptists,

Lutherans, and Disciples of Christ. Hutchison's volume concurs with this definition. Franklin H. Littel provides solid proof that Protestant churches feared the emerging pluralism in *From State Church to Pluralism: A Protestant Interpretation of Religion in American History* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1962), 129-69. Quantitative proof of Catholic growth and Protestant decline can be found in Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, *The Churching of America, 1776-1990: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992).

6 *New York Times*, 1 January 1940; "How 'Personal' is this Representative?" Christian Century 57 (3 January 1940): 5. The last quotation was by Joseph Lewis, president of the New York League for the Separation of Church and State, *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 January 1940. In researching this study, I investigated over forty religious journals from various denominations; but due to space constraints not all consulted journals appear in the footnotes. For example, I investigated six different Lutheran periodicals representing the various divisions within the Lutheran church but cannot cite each of them without redundancy. The same situation applies to other denominations, such as the separation of the Northern and Southern Baptists and the split in the Presbyterian church. Unless otherwise noted, denominational factions tended to agree with one another about the need to protest Roosevelt's Vatican appointment.

7 *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 January 1940; "An Unamerican Appointment," *Christian Century* 57 (10 January 1940): 38-40; "Dr. Newton Answer Archbishop Francis J. Spellman," *Bapist Standard* 52 (28 March 1940: 3.

8 "Against Vatican Relations" and "The Vatican-White House Peace Axis," *Lutheran* 22 (10 January 1940): 6-8, 12; "We Must Speak Out," *Lutheran* Standard 98 (13 January 1940): 5.

9 "The President's Vatican Appointment," *Baptist Standard* 52 (25 January 1940): 5; "Background of the Taylor Embassy," *Christian Century* 57 (13 March 1940): 350-52.

10 "An Illegal Ambassador," *Christian Century* 57 (13 March 1940): 343-45; "Protestants v. Pope," *Time*, 15 April 1940, 47-48; "Absolute Monarch," *Lutheran* 22 (8 May 1940): 15.

11 *Christian Science Monitor*, 5-6 January 1940; "An Unamerican Appointment," *Christian Century* 57 (10 January 1940): 38-40; "Call Mr. Taylor Home," *Christian Century* 57 (28 February 1940): 272-73; Harold Paul Sloan, "The American Representative at the Vatican" and "Of Ambassadorial Rank," *Christian Advocate* 62 (25 January 1940): 89, 92; "The American Unamerican Ambassador to the Vatican," *Baptist Standard* 52 (25 April 1940): 4.

12 "Adding Insult to Injury," *Lutheran Standard* 98 (20 April 1940): 7.

13 "President Roosevelt's Letter to the Pope" and "President Roosevelt's Personal Representative," *United Presbyterian* 98 (4 January 1940): 7-8; "The Pope and the President," *United Presbyterian* 98 (11 January 1940): 6; "Cooperation for World

Peace," *Advance* 132 (February 1940): 58-59.

14 "Our Ambassador to 'Rome,'" *United Presbyterian* 98 (18 January 1940): 5; "Vatican Welcomes U.S. Ambassador," *United Presbyterian* 98 (7 March 1940): 6, 11; "The Catholic Case for Taylor," *United Presbyterian* 98 (23 May 1940): 8-9; "Vatican Jurist not 'a responsible source' President Indicates," *Advance* 132 (1 May 1940): 205-6.

15 "How the Christian Century Rages!" *Christian Leader* 122 (23 March 1940): 272; "An American Way," *Christian Leader* 122 (27 January 1940): 81.

16 "McKnight Protests," *Christian Leader* 122 (10 January 1940): 139; "That Envoy to the Vatican State," *Christian Leader* 122 (2 March 1940): 210; "On the Taylor Appointment," *Christian Leader* 122 (11 May 1940): 451.

17 "Christian Century' Hits Roosevelt Move," *Living Church* 102 (10 January 1940): 15.

18 "The Appointment to the Vatican," *Christian-Evangelist* 78 (25 January 1940): 103; "Anti-Catholicism and the Vatican Envoy," *Christian-Evangelist* 78 (28 March 1940): 339-40; "An Open Forum for Readers," *Christian-Evangelist* 78 (2 May 1940): 205-6; "Next Best, Anyhow," *Christian-Evangelist* 78 (29 February 1940): 232.

19 "Americans On Guard," *Christian Standard* 75 (20 January 1940): 5; "Pacelli Story," *Christian-Evangelist* 78 (1 February 1940): 138; "Protests 'Sarcastic Snicker,'" *Christian-Evangelist* 78 (14 March 1940): 301; "Our 'Silence' Oppressive," *Christian-Evangelist* 78 (11 April 1940): 404.

20 "World's Men of Good Will," *Commonweal* 31 (5 January 1940): 233; Cyril Clemens, "Myron T. [sic] Taylor," *Commonweal* 31 (23 February 1940): 386; "Let's Investigate Ambassador Kennedy," *America* 62 (9 March 1940): 602-3.

21 "Let's Investigate Ambassador Kennedy," *America* 62 (9 March 1940): 602-3; "The Appointment to the Vatican," *Commonweal* 31 (22 March 1940): 461; "The 'Christian Century' Carries On," *Commonweal* 32 (26 April 1940): 3.

22 The archbishop's comments appeared in Walton H. Greever, "The Vatican-White House Peace Axis," *Lutheran Standard* 98 (17 February 1940): 3-4, 7; "Archbishop and U.S.," *Time*, 25 March 1940, 72; *New York Times*, 12 May 1940.

23 The best discussion of the Truman attempt is George J. Gill's "The Truman Administration and Vatican Relations," *Catholic Historical Review* 73 (July 1987): 408-23; also see Dorsey Milan Deaton's dissertation. After Taylor's term, the United States went without a Vatican ambassador until Ronald W. Reagan successfully appointed an official representative in the 1980s.

Book Reviews

WILLIAM GILDEA. *When the Colts Belonged to Baltimore: A Father and a Son, A Team and a Time.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994

VINCE BAGLI and NORMAN L. MACHT. *Sundays at 2:00 with the Baltimore Colts.* Centreville: Tidewater Publishers, 1995.

Sports history has been one of the most rapidly growing subdisciplines of social and cultural history. Almost nonexistent as an academic field two decades ago, its practitioners have since generated a wide-ranging literature, and the usual scholarly apparatus journals and professional organizations. Yet, as is often the case scholars study a topic of popular interest, their work has done little to excite or engage the general reader. Sports histories written for the average fan focus on the great athletes, teams, and games. Academic histories try to imbed those sports in the social and cultural milieu of their community, explaining why they attract the interest they do, and how they shape public space.

Recently, two books have appeared which bridge the gap between the popular and the scholarly. Ironically, both also focus on the same team-the former Baltimore Colts of the National Football League. William Gildea's *When the Colts Belonged to Baltimore: A Father and a Son, A Team and a Time* is a personal memoir of what the team meant to him. Gildea was a young boy when the Colts were created. His father was a busy manager for a chain of drug stores. Watching, discussing, and reading about sports were central to their shared father-son experiences. Gildea describes their autumn ritual of attending mass, and driving across Baltimore to Memorial Stadium, sharing insights into the upcoming game. He also locates the Colts in his geographic memory, explaining where the team fit into the landscape of trolley routes, movie theaters, and schools that made up his youth.

As Gildea says: "When I think of the Colts I think mostly of Pop. The Colts were the generational glue that bound us, and fixed him in my memory. When I still sometimes imagine him with me, I know its because that's where he was on so many Sundays. (p. 310) For many other fathers and sons in Baltimore, Colt games probably played a similar function.

Besides just his personal relationship to the Colts, Gildea describes the role the team played in shaping Baltimore's sense of civic pride. The Colts were Baltimore's first major league franchise, and the residents responded by adopting the players as members of their extended family. Having worked as a sports writer for The Washington Post and other area newspapers Gildea has the contacts among the former players and fans to show what appears to have been a warm, friendly relationship between the two groups. Players were present in local restaurants, at lodge meetings, and stayed late after preseason practices to sign autographs or just talk with the fans.

The sense of community between players and fans continued until March 28, 1984, when Colt owner Robert Irsay, trying to stay one step ahead of a Maryland law giving the state eminent domain over the team, packed the team's equipment into eleven moving fans, and left town in the dead of night. In an interview Steve LaPlanche, a captain in the Anne Arundel sheriff's department, described how he spent that night watching the moving vans pull out, only leaving when Chris Hinton, one of the Colts' offensive linemen, took him home.

While the loss of a team might move the fans, like Gildea, to contemplate the role it had played in their community, Vince Bagli's and Norman L. Macht's *Sundays at 2:00 with the Baltimore Colts* shows that the players could contemplate the role the community had played in their team as well. Organized as an oral history, with thirty-one interviews, primarily of players and coaches, this book also straddles the line between traditional and academic sports history. The players discuss themselves as players, remembering their great games and championship seasons, but the fact that the Colts are no longer there continually draws them back to their relationship with the people and city of Baltimore.

This could be done through simple affirming statements, like that of Ernie Accorsi, who said: "This sounds crazy, and maybe it happens in other places, but these guys played for the town." (p. vi) It could also be more analytical. Don Shula pointed out that Baltimore was primarily a blue collar city. Fans had limited money for entertainment. The fact that they chose to spend their money on the Colts was something Shula saw as proof of their loyalty,

sincerity, and friendship. The team was determined to respond in kind.

The early team management under owner Carroll Rosenbloom was given credit by many of the players for developing the sense of player-fan-Baltimore solidarity. Gino Marchetti, a Hall of Fame defensive end, remembered being sent to speak at local civic groups, and the way Rosenbloom prodded him and other players to get involved in business. Marchetti explained that he came out of retirement in 1966 not because he wanted to, but because the team needed him, and "because the organization was always so good to me." (p. 34) Joe Ehrmann remembered the teams widespread involvement in local charities and non-profit institutions. Ehrmann himself became a non-denominational minister, and returned to Baltimore to work with underprivileged youth.

For some players, like Lydell Mitchell, the very sense of being part of a team tied into a community and a tradition made Baltimore a good place to play. In his interview he said: "To this day, the most significant thing I remember about Baltimore was as a rookie in 1972, when the alumni came back and the guys ran out through the goal posts to the middle of the field. That was exciting to me. When I saw that, I said, 'Man, I hope I have a long career here and do that.'" By the time Mitchell's career was over, though, the Colts were almost gone.

Perhaps the best proof of the special ties between the Colts and the people of Baltimore is the fact that, even after the team had left, many of the old players remained. Bagli and Macht point out proudly that sixteen of their first twenty-five interviews still made their homes in Baltimore, even though they had no family ties to the area. And they have remained active in the community. Recently, when Parks Sausages, the first African-American owned company to sell public stock, and a Baltimore institution since 1951, ran into financial difficulties, Lydell Mitchell was one of the investors who helped organize a bailout.

When the Colts Belonged to Baltimore: A Father and a Son, A Team and a Time and *Sundays at 2:00 with the Baltimore Colts* are not academic books. They lack footnotes and a historiographic setting. They are, however, books sports historians need to be aware of. They provide interesting models for how scholars might approach the question of the role of spectator sports in American communities and the American imagination.

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OLWEN HUFTON. *The Prospect Before Her: A History of Women in Western Europe, 1500-1800.* New York: Knopf, 1996.

Olwen Hufton writes that one of the most commonly produced mass images in Northern-Western Europe from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries was the ladder of life. This metaphor for the female life cycle symbolizes the various stages women are expected to pass through, including youth, marriage, child bearing, and grandparenting. As a representation of cultural assumptions giving meaning to womanhood, the ladder reveals ideas concerning woman's appropriate roles. "The ladder of life depicts what is seen as essential and appropriate," writes Hufton, "that which is God-ordained, the universal to which each man and woman should aspire." It is the gap that exists between early modern woman's imagined experience, as represented by the ladder, and her actual experience that Hufton seeks to elucidate in her impressive work *The Prospect Before Her: A History of Women in Western Europe 1500-1800.*

Olwen Hufton offers a rich narrative of Europe's early modern woman, concentrating on the centuries between 1500 and 1800. This social history which weaves together the lives and experiences of women from various nations, suggesting an interconnectedness in lived histories. However Hufton is careful to distinguish between women of different classes, ages, and regions, writing the story of the wealthy aristocrat with the story of the beggar, domestic servant and prostitute. Her description of early modern living and working conditions is stark and painstaking details flood the pages of the text. "Syphilis in a virulent form spread throughout the European continent in the aftermath of the Italian Wars at the end of the fifteenth century. Sores and pustules and noses eaten away by the ravages of sexually transmitted diseases were the hallmark of the veteran soldier or sailor or whore plying her trade on the city street. Scurvy was the lot of many...and the knock kneed from rickets should be added to the gallery of deformations visible particularly in the north and north-west where fresh fruit and vegetables were seasonally circumscribed." Such intense specificity is the hallmark of Hufton's work, shaping the vivid and real history she writes.

Hufton emphasizes that most early modern women of Western Europe had little option but to marry, so the quest for a dowry became a focal point in all marriageable women's lives. Considered inferior and discouraged from

pursuing an education, women's personal relations became a critically defining factor. Marriage was a woman's life's strategy, structuring all other actions and happenings. This is not to suggest Hufton's neglect of the religious, intellectual and cultural forces at work during the early modern period. Hufton adeptly forefronts the importance of these forces in influencing women's experience while emphasizing the universal weight of patriarchy. She shows her readers examples of a woman centered world in which motherhood is a holy experience and where Catholic women from Saint Teresa reshape religious orders so that they might pursue spiritual work and charity reform. While Hufton writes the history of early modern patriarchy, she also writes the history of women's power and autonomy.

Other chapters explore French culture, misogynistic Bible stories, folk superstitions, the horrendous life of the silk maker, and the fate of women accused of witchcraft. In the end, this impressive study of European women's history is readable, engaging and full of detail. Indeed, the text is so full of anecdotal material that occasionally the reader can become sidetracked as to the larger points. Also, the narrative tends to swing back and forth wildly, between centuries, making it difficult to maintain a sense of the progression in Hufton's story . Still, her rich and multifaceted work, the first of a two volume set, is a must read for anyone interested in European, women's, social or cultural history. Hufton successfully examines the interaction between early Medieval European beliefs about appropriate behavior for women, and the realities of everyday early modern life.

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JAMES OLIVER HORTON AND LOIS E. HORTON. *In Hope of Liberty: Culture, Community, and Protest Among Northern Free Blacks,* 1700-1860. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997

In 1979, James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton wrote *Black Bostonians*, a path-breaking social history of the black community in antebellum Boston.[1] *In Hope of Liberty*, the Hortons' latest collaboration, is a long-overdue comprehensive history of African Americans in the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century North. Since *Black Bostonians*, many historians have written social histories of black communities in the pre-war North, but there has been no major work to integrate these studies.[2] In 1993, James Horton published *Free People of Color*, a volume of essays on antebellum free black communities.[3] He called it "a progress report, a preview of work that is ongoing."[4] *In Hope of Liberty* is the logical and necessary synthesis of the work that historians, including the Hortons, have completed thus far on the Northern black experience in early America.

Perhaps the most important function of the book is to remind its readers of the critical role of African Americans in the colonial, early national, and antebellum North. The book is filled with examples of black participation in the important events of American history. The reader sees Crispus Attucks not as a black Bostonian who happened to be the first casualty in a war between white Britons and white Americans but as a rebel in the fight for independence, a goal he shared with his white countrymen but which had special significance for black slaves. Slaves appear in the Salem witch trials as accused, accusers, and expert witnesses. The Hortons demonstrate similar black involvement in the Great Awakening, Bacon's Rebellion, the War of 1812, and other events often thought of as white history. The Hortons, wisely, are not content to point out black participation but, in each case, show how African Americans affected that history. For example, they argue that eighteenth-century black-led interracial riots and protests contributed to the atmosphere of rebellion and the philosophy of republicanism in the years before the Revolution. The book also indicates the central role that Northern blacks played in efforts to improve the status of their race. While internal divisions were frequent and at times bitter, the evidence reveals that Northern blacks tended to be extremely concerned about the conditions of their fellow African Americans. This concern led to mutual aid societies and philanthropic household arrangements in Northern communities and to an often intense involvement in abolition efforts, from formal anti-slavery organizations, both black and interracial, to the underground railroad.

Although the Hortons have done little new research for this book, they achieve a rich understanding of the history of Northern blacks through the diversity of their secondary sources. These sources, which extend back to the nineteenth century, are admirably wide-ranging in subject and style. In addition to social histories of the American North, the authors draw on intellectual and cultural histories of race, such as those by Winthrop Jordan, Edmund Morgan, Gary Nash, and David Roediger.[5] Their familiarity with the colonial and antebellum histories of women and Native Americans, as well as more traditional scholarship, contributes to the depth of *In Hope of Liberty*. The Hortons draw on many important black autobiographies and also innovatively use white Northerners' writings that mention free blacks in asides or anecdotes.

In Hope of Liberty is not only a vital work of synthesis; it forwards important arguments about African-American history. Its copious examples of black involvement in anti-slavery efforts undermine previous arguments that African Americans in the North neglected abolition.[6] The authors also take issue with George Levesque's contention that black leaders could not truly have believed that racial "improvement" could persuade whites of the injustice of slavery.[7] On the contrary, they maintain, previous interracial cooperation had convinced many antebellum African Americans that they could persuade white Northerners to work with them against slavery. Finally, the theme of identity pervades the book. The authors cite the survival of many Africanisms in the culture of the North, from words such as "tote" to American folk music. They make a convincing argument that, as Northern blacks in the early nineteenth century pressed for their rights as Americans, they came to identify themselves as colored Americans rather than as Africans. They still retained strong elements of African culture, blended with Europeanisms. At the same time, the Hortons argue, African American and Native American cultures influenced white Northerners. Although whites seldom acknowledged the fact, American culture has always been an amalgamation, and racial diversity is an integral part of American identity.

In Hope of Liberty is an important extensive history of African Americans in the colonial and antebellum North. Its deft analysis and critical themes make it a valuable resource. It is an ideal book to use in an undergraduate class to convey the essential role and diverse experience of African Americans in American history and culture.

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NOTES

1 James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, *Black Bostonians: Family Life and Community Struggle in the Antebellum North* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979).

2 Important recent works on African Americans in the North include Robert J. Cottrol, *The Afro-Yankees: Providence's Black Community in the Antebellum Era* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982); Leonard P. Curry, *The Free Black in Urban America, 1800-1850: The Shadow of the Dream* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Gary B. Nash, *Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720-1840* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); Gary B. Nash and Jean R. Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees: Emancipation in Pennsylvania and Its Aftermath* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); William D. Piersen, *Black Yankees: The Development of an Afro-American Subculture in Eighteenth-Century New England* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988); Shane White, *Somewhat More Independent: The End of Slavery in New York City, 1770-1810* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991); and Julie Winch, *Philadelphia's Black Elite: Activism, Accommodation, and the Struggle for Autonomy, 1787-1848* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).

3 James Oliver Horton, *Free People of Color: Inside the African American Community* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993).

4 Ibid., vii.

5 Winthrop Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968); Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery and American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975); Gary Nash, *Red, White, and Black: The Peoples of Early America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974); David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York: Verso, 1991).

6 For example, Frederick Cooper, "Elevating the Race: The Social Thought of Black Leaders, 1827-50," *American Quarterly* 24 (December 1972): 604-625.

7 George A. Levesque, "Interpreting Early Black Ideology: A Reappraisal of Historical Consensus," *Journal of the Early Republic* 1 (Fall 1981): 269-287.

DAVID G. GUTIÉRREZ. *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995.

David G. Gutièrrez' *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity* explores the historical relationship between Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants from the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 to the 1990s. In tracing this at times fluid and often conflicted relationship, Gutièrrez fills a gap in traditional immigration and Chicano Studies scholarship and also broadens the current immigration debate. Gutièrrez writes, "One of the least understood dimensions of the debate over the immigration issue in the United States is the response the controversy has elicited among Mexican Americans and other long-term Latino residents." (2) Moreover, by sketching the evolution of this relationship, primarily through Mexican American organizational responses in Texas and California, Gutiérrez also addresses the contradictions, ambivalence and shifting positions over Mexican immigration within the Mexican American community. For instance, not only does the author challenge studies and generalizations that conflate Mexican immigrant and Mexican American populationsó"until fairly recently few Americans have recognized much of a distinction between long-term U.S. residents of Mexican and Latin descent and more recent immigrants from Mexico" (20)óhe also frustrates the notion of homogeneity within the Mexican American community. In fact, Gutiérrez examines the "intriguing contradiction" created by the differences and commonalities in the "walls and mirrors" in between Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants in order to broaden the scope of Mexican American identity and social history, as well as to ventilate the often reductive and narrow scope of the national debate over immigration policy (4).

Mostly a classic history text, proceeding chronologically from the political genesis of the Mexican American taxonomy at the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848, *Walls and Mirrors* creates an historical context for the diverse Mexican American viewpoint on immigration today and shatters the not uncommon notion that today's immigration issues have only recently emerged. Likewise, his documentation of Mexican American civil rights struggles and their evolving identity politics from 1848 onward also challenges the view that the 1960s and the Chicano Movement were the genesis of Mexican American activism. Gutiérrez thus details, over the course of a century and a half, the continuous struggle and debate on the part of Mexican American and Mexican immigrant activists in accumulating political power.

The text thus operates as an oppositional history, responding to Mexican American historical erasure and drawing on a variety of sources, from Mexican corridos, GAO reports and newspapers, to the private papers of Mexican American and Chicano activists. Gutiérrez details the systematic, political and economic disenfranchisement of Mexicans and Mexican Americans who remained in the U.S. after 1848, as well as their consistent and diverse methods of social resistance, including social banditry, the formation of cultural enclaves, and the creation of mutualistas, or mutual aid societies. He posits that the proximity of Mexico to the U.S. and the almost constant flow of immigrants reinforced Mexican cultural practices and greatly supplemented the natural growth of the Mexican American population. As the Mexican American community grew, like other non-white communities, it encountered a discriminatory and racist U.S. society. Gutiérrez thus couches Mexican immigration within U.S. immigration historiography and policy, which includes the country's penchant for nativism and restrictionism.

Although the mainstream point of view that Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants exist as a singular community temporarily disguised the growth of Mexican immigration at the turn of the century, to Mexican Americans, *los recién llegados* inspired attitudes of both uneasiness and empathy from the outset. Gutiérrez captures this "tradition of misunderstanding and suspicion" between Mexican and Mexican Americans by tracing the ebbs and flows of contradictory positions of Mexican American civil rights organizations on the issue of immigration in the twentieth century (57). Key organizations include the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), El Congreso de Pueblos de Habla EspaÒola, the Mexican American Movement (MAM), the American G.I. Forum, the Mexican American Political Association (MAPA), the United Farm Workers (UFW), and others. For example, LULAC, which "considered themselves part of a progressive and enlightened leadership elite" (77), excluded non-citizens at its inception and promoted an assimilationist perspective which prioritized citizens over immigrants. Like other organizations and intellectuals, LULAC rationalized it restrictionist position with an expediency argumentóa "rational attempt to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of Mexican Americans" (79).

As Gutiérrez explores the internal differences within these organizations, it is immigration policy in the 1950s that best illuminates the ambivalence of Mexican American immigration positions. At this time, U.S. policy is itself in deep contradiction: the importation of immigrant labor through the Bracero Program occurs simultaneously with the passage of deportation legislation and the INS's administration of Operation Wetback. GutiÈrrez details the increased ambivalence of LULAC, MAM, and the American G.I.

Forum, who generally supported U.S. policy, yet became alarmed as deportations and INS harassment affected Mexican Americans both personally and indirectly, as families and communities were being disrupted by raids and deportations. We thus begin to see a gradual shift in the restrictionist position of the Mexican American community. For example, activist and intellectual Ernesto Galarza, who once actively opposed the Bracero Program, began to see the problems of immigration as responsibilities of government and business, and not solely that of immigrants.

Ultimately, as Gutiérrez insists, "Increasing awareness of the racist dimensions of immigration policy contributed to the development of a broader sense of community solidarity with resident aliens . . . and demonstrated once again how little difference before the law actually existed between citizens and noncitizen members of the extended Mexicano community" (175). As such, a decisive shift in the political positions of Mexican American organizations occurred, as most groups moved to oppose restrictionist immigration policy. For example, Gutiérrez argues that "the UFW's shifting position on the immigration question provided a good barometer of the extent to which Mexican American thinking on immigration had changed by the mid-1970s" (199). As well, an awakened Chicano identity and activism fostered cultural affinities with Mexican immigrants as immigration became a pivotal issue for Mexican Americans. Community activists Bert Corona and Soledad "Chole" Alatorre, who organized immigrants into an autonomous social welfare organization, "asserted that naturalization, and surely Americanization, was largely irrelevant in a society that refused to recognize the full rights of citizenship for its ethnic and racial minorities" (191). These strong oppositional positions crystallized during the 1970s and 1980s, as extremely restrictive immigration proposals surfaced. Mexican American organizations formed broad coalitions to collectively oppose such legislation and the scapegoating of immigrants.

One of Gutiérrez' major contributions to policy debates is his exploration of cultural and political identity within the relationship between Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants. Gutiérrez writes, "I came to believe that Mexican Americans' views about Mexican immigrants and immigration policy often reveal more about their own sense of ethnic and political identity than about their feelings concerning the immigration debate" (6). According to Gutiérrez, the discrimination which contributed to a collective Mexican identity in 19th century had a similar effect for Mexican American identity in the 20th century, and ultimately effected the change in political positions that culminated in widespread Mexican American organizational support of Mexican immigrants' rights. Gutiérrez thus interweaves the evolution of Mexican American identity with the evolution of Mexican

American civil rights organizations, and this identity's importance to community survival. As Gutiérrez argues, "The development among Mexican Americans of a sense of themselves as Mexican Americans provided a far more important defense against discriminatory practices than did armed resistance or the formation of formal voluntary organizations" (35). It must be mentioned, however, that although Gutiérrez successfully explores Mexican American identity construction in terms of Mexican immigration, he provides few insights into the identity of Mexican immigrants.

In all, Gutiérrez' history expands the discourse on immigration and critiques the use of ahistorical, simplistic and reductive arguments. He advances the premise that "to rail . . . that the United States has lost its sovereign right to secure its borders, without also acknowledging that the nation's leaders themselves have consistently abrogated that right, is to engage, at the very least, in selective memory" (212).

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KLAUS KREIMEIER. *The Ufa Story: A History of Germany's Greatest Film Company, 1918-1945.* New York: Hill and Wang, 1996.

The fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II is quickly fading into memory, but the history of Germany in the twentieth century continues to be dominated by the long shadow of Nazism and the Holocaust. The past fifty years of German scholarship has been characterized by the inescapability of the period 1933-1945, and the historiography reflects this fact. The Sonderweg (special path) debate centered around defining German history in terms of explaining the rise of Hitler, and the Historikerstreit (historian's conflict) of the 1980s tried to historicize Nazism and the Holocaust.

The history of Ufa, Germany's most influential film company of the interwar period, is intricately tied to these questions, as German interwar film has been accused of a rightist slant that paved the way for National Socialism and, after 1933, helped the Nazi regime manipulate the German film-going public. The company both began and ended its existence as the servant of a nationalistic German state. Yet at the same time, Universum-Film AG was a cultural and technical pioneer, a major player in the international development of film as a new medium for artistic and popular expression. Klaus Kreimeier addresses both perspectives in *The Ufa Story*, attacking the thesis that Ufa was little more than a platform for the Right while recognizing the role Ufa played in the rise of Nazism and the support of the Nazi state. Kreimeier reconciles the paradox of Ufa by creating a dichotomy between a leadership linked to the state and conservative business interests and a rank-and-file of producers, directors, and technicians who asserted an artistic and professional independence that established Ufa's claim to greatness.

The genesis of Ufa goes back to World War I, and the desire of the German High Command to create a national film company that could coordinate propaganda in support of the German war effort. The company survived the German defeat, its financial existence transferred from the state to the German Bank and private shareholders in 1921, and was able to assert itself in the chaotic early years of the Weimar Republic. Although Ufa only produced 57 of the 545 films made in Germany in 1920, its vertical organization gave it a disproportionate influence through its control over distribution and exhibition (Ufa owned 91 theaters by 1925, including many film "palaces" where film premiers took place) as well as production. Ironically, while it survived the hyperinflation of the early twenties relatively intact, its overaggressive expansionary policies led it to financial crisis in 1925 and forced it into a submissive deal with American film companies. A new dis-

tribution organization, "Parufamet"- an amalgam of Paramount, Ufa, and MGM- was created, and Ufa was forced to commit to releasing forty American films a year in Germany, further weakening its position.

In 1927, Ufa was "rescued" through the intervention of the conservative businessman Alfred Hugenberg, and its management shifted to the Right. Despite calls for a more nationalist orientation for German film, however, Kreimeier argues that commercial demands and public tastes kept the level of politicization in films low. He acknowledges that right-leaning films were made, and Ufa's leading figures included conservatives like the scriptwriter Thea von Harbon, but they were only one element in Ufa's diverse ideological spectrum. Even into the 1930s, the technical quality of Ufa films remained high, despite demands from Hugenberg and Ufa directors for less "escapism" and more politically-oriented material.

When the Nazis rose to power in 1933, they found a film industry willing to cooperate with them. Despite some dissenting voices on both sides, "On all fundamental matters government and film industry were in agreement" (p. 225). Indeed, the creation of a Film Credit Bank by the new regime benefited large companies like Ufa at the expense of small producers, and steps toward the consolidation of the German film industry were essentially in accord with the Spio plan introduced by industry leaders several years before. Ufa speedily carried out the "cleansing" of its ranks of Jews and the politically unreliable demanded by the new regime, and an exodus of some of its best talent followed (many of whom ended up in Hollywood). This and the collapse of its export markets hurt Ufa, but were countered in part by a steady rise in theater attendance throughout the 1930s. The state imposed a system of "positive" censorship based on a system of tax breaks, loans, and other perks for films of "national value," and the industry voluntarily cooperated. A gradual assimilation of Ufa into the state apparatus followed, with a transition back to state ownership by 1937.

Although the company had transformed, the films themselves had not. Again, Kreimeier contrasts the willing collaborators at the top with the resistance of the rank-and-file, who continued to produce films that "offered vicarious experience, an antidote against propaganda and politics" (p. 216). A few blatantly propagandistic films were released, but it was clear that the public wanted more of the pure "entertainment" films that had built Ufa into an industry leader in the 1920s. Although Kreimeier catalogs a number of directors, "cinema sergeants" like Karl Ritter, who enthusiastically joined forces with the Nazi regime and its message, most films remained "unpolitical" and

many directors, actors, and other film professionals tried "neutrality" as an alternative to full support of the regime and its policies. Since open opposition to the Nazi order was virtually impossible, these neutrals become the heroes of the Ufa story.

The coming of World War II both brought "a peak of prosperity" for Ufa, and the final destruction of its artistic legacy. The "escape" films became more popular to a population facing increasing suffering, even as the nationalist message in Ufa films became more and more blatant. Ufa's professionals continued making movies until the very end; by then, however, there was hardly anyone left who believed in the simplistic alternative realities and nationalist messages a bankrupt regime foisted on them.

Kreimeier is good at putting Ufa's story into historical context; he describes how the emergence and development of the company was intricately tied to the tumultuous events of the time. He writes with an episodic flair, and frequently leaves the narrative to digress into the story of a particular actor, director, or film. This makes the book a bit disjointed at times, but adds a degree of depth sometimes lacking in business histories and makes the book more accessible to the nonhistorian.

General readers and those familiar with film history will get different things from the book. Kreimeier is thin on general developments in film except when they impact on Ufa, and other players in the German film industry are only peripherally mentioned. To be fair, this book is intended to tell Ufa's story, not that of the German film industry, but it is easy to forget that in the late 1920s Ufa controlled only about 7 percent of German production and at the same time the U.S. film industry controlled upwards of 97 percent of the world market (by Kreimeier's own estimates), and had heavily penetrated the German market. Even under Nazi rule foreign films remained popular, at the same time that German companies like Ufa found it harder and harder to export their own products. Kreimeier does offer some chapters on Ufa's influence outside of Germany, but they are very brief.

Kreimeier's argument does not quite amount to an apology for Ufa, although at times his dichotomy of "bad" managers and "good" producers seems a bit thin. Although he asserts the persistent artistic autonomy of German film well into the Nazi period, and highlights the limits of state control over the film establishment, he admits the role that Ufa played in manipulating the German masses and perpetuating the message first of the conservative Right and later of the National Socialists. In the end the belief of those in German film that they could maintain their "art" and remain politically

disconnected proved a fantasy, the same sort of self-deception that many Germans had to come to grips with following the war. Ultimately, however, Kreimeier successfully demonstrates that characterizing Ufa as simply a tool of the conservative Right or the Nazi state is simplistic and misleading. His convincing and detailed analysis of the complicated relationships between government, business, ideology, and artistry in the history of Ufa makes *The Ufa Story* an necessary addition to the reading list of anyone interested in the history of film.

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PAGE SMITH. *Democracy on Trial: The Japanese American Evacuation and Relocation in World War II.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

While no historiographical consensus can be expected to remain unchallenged, a good candidate for such consensus is the idea that the removal of 120,000 Japanese Americans from the West Coast during World War II was due to American racism. Historians from the late 1940s to the present have concluded almost unanimously that the removal was not due to military necessity at all, but to a racist mindset variously attributed to the Hearst press and white West Coast farmers, to the U.S. military, to the Roosevelt Administration, or to all three.[1] Not only historians, but all three branches of the federal government, after Japanese-American organizations campaigned long and hard for redress, are now formally on record with apologies to those who suffered loss of property and jobs, poor living conditions in the relocation camps, and public stigma solely due to race rather than to any individual actions.[2]

But Page Smith, in his last book, *Democracy on Trial: The Japanese American Evacuation and Relocation in World War II*, published just before his death in 1995, paints a very different picture. Smith denies that racism was behind the removal, and he points to the benefits of the experience for the Japanese-American community. Smith's work, however, while challenging, is

riddled with errors, injudicious use of evidence, and questionable assumptions. While it is not likely that *Democracy On Trial* will upset the consensus among historians, one can easily imagine Smith's thesis spreading via Rush Limbaugh, Dinesh D'Souza, and the College Republican circuit. In this era when the New Deal is under far more attack from the right than from the left, and when best-selling books challenge the underpinnings of racial equality, historians should be prepared. This essay will first present *Democracy on Trial*'s thesis, then discuss its several strengths and its many flaws.

Smith makes a number of interrelated arguments. First, the patterns of Japanese immigration to the U.S. left many of the Issei (first-generation immigrants, prevented by law from becoming U.S. citizens) and their Nisei children (U.S. citizens if born in the U.S.) more loyal to Japan than to the U.S. Smith is careful to say, to be sure, that such loyalty was natural and logical, not "wicked" or "evil" (426).[3] Second, the disastrous military situation of the U.S. in early 1942, combined with the knowledge of Japanese-American loyalty to Japan, made the evacuation of all Japanese Americans from the West Coast zone "wise and prudent," even if not "essential" (437). Third, wrangling between federal governmental agencies, and between the federal and state governments, rather than any conscious, racist plan, led to the specific form that removal took. For example, no one had envisioned at the outset the setting up of relocation centers. While racism against Japanese Americans existed, "It was obviously not the case that the decision to relocate was the result of racist attitudes," Smith concludes (436).

The author argues further that the War Relocation Authority, although often hampered by mistaken or unfortunate policy decisions from above, generally ran the camps with the interests of the "residents" at heart. The camps provided a level of "comfort" and "security" which made Japanese Americans, for the most part, satisfied with life there and reluctant to leave. Camp life, Smith asserts, was a "vacation" from a previous life of toil. Finally, removal and internment ended the dominance of the Japanese-American community by its most tradition-bound groups. It facilitated the broadening of social experience which allowed Japanese Americans, in the end, to become fully American. To clinch his case Smith quotes the provocative statement of Japanese-American internee and sociologist Charles Kikuchi that "on the whole the Nisei group didn't get too damaged by relocation. Generally, we probably gained" (421).

Democracy on Trial is not without virtues, especially its attention to the political history leading to the decision to expel Japanese Americans from the West Coast in conjunction with the social history of this immigrant and ethnic community before and during the war. Smith offers a useful overview of almost all of the major phases of the relocation experience, including the stu-

dent relocation program, resettlement to jobs in the Midwest and elsewhere after the autumn of 1942, Nisei experiences in the armed forces, and movement back to the West Coast in 1945 and 1946. Among the better features of the book is its attention to those white American liberal, pacifist, and religious groups and individuals who did what they could to make the experience less harsh for Japanese Americans.

Smith also takes a fresh look at the motivations and actions of key individuals involved in what he calls "the decision nobody made" that led to the establishment of the relocation camps. While he downplays the well-known racist attitudes of Gen. John DeWitt of the Western Defense Command, he points out in DeWitt's defense that the general had envisioned the internment of Italian and German nationals on the West Coast as well as Issei and Nisei. It was War Department officials in Washington who exempted the Italians and Germans, for political reasons. While going overboard in his praise for WRA officials Milton Eisenhower and Dillon Myer, Smith does rescue them from the more dogmatic critiques of some historians.[4] His attention to Myer's efforts as early as March 1943 to allow Japanese Americans to return to the West Coast is important in this regard (313).

The weaknesses of the book, however, far overshadow its strengths. They include numerous errors in the text, a consistent tendency to present the condition of the camps in a more favorable light than they deserve, generalizations which do not follow from the information presented, and premises which are simply unproven.

Some errors are simply nuisances, such as statements that Germany attacked the Soviet Union at the end of 1941 (12-13), or that Theodore Roosevelt mediated a peace agreement between Japan and the U.S. (not Russia) in 1905 (42). Minor distortions arise from equating the Congressional testimony of a Seattle banker who believed that the "oriental mind" was unknowable with the views of the mayor of Tacoma who spoke out clearly against removal and who emphasized that Nisei were thoroughly American (137). The Rev. E. Stanley Jones, who made fiery speeches denouncing removal, is misidentified as the head of the Federal Council of Churches (204), which exaggerates the extent of the Council's public opposition to mass evacuation (226).

More significant interpretive problems emerge from other errors. Smith argues, for example, that one of the main reasons FDR did not end the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast before the 1944 elections was his desire to protect Helen Gahagan Douglas in her tough reelection campaign against the red-baiting Richard Nixon (370). Despite Smith's claims that Douglas was an "outspoken champion" of Japanese Americans, a recent scholarly biography of her makes no mention of such activities or

views, and Douglas herself later stated that she reluctantly favored mass evacuation.[5] More importantly, Douglas was not an incumbent in 1944 and she was not running against Richard Nixon; that infamous race would not come until 1950. Thus, Smith's point is not at all convincing.

The absence of footnotes, and the inclusion of an incomplete bibliography, would make it difficult even for a sympathetic reader to find out more about each of the issues that Smith discusses. It becomes just about impossible for critics to investigate some of Smith's more controversial claims. For example, Smith asserts that Morton Grodzins, the first historian of the evacuation to attribute it to American racism, later in his life told Charles Kikuchi that it was the military situation in the Pacific, not racism, that led to removal (437). But a search through the only entries in the bibliography to either Kikuchi or Grodzins reveals no mention of Grodzin's startling change of heart.

Smith's tendency to minimize the physical discomforts of camp life simply ignores the readily available testimony of Japanese Americans, and is occasionally contradicted by Smith's own evidence. The WRA, he writes, counteracted the bleak desert setting of the Topaz camp by planting thousands of trees and shrubs (243). Fair enough, but almost none of these trees and shrubs survived, as he vaguely admits later (344). Smith quotes WRA materials that described living conditions of white staff members in the camps as similar to those of Japanese-American residents (247). Reliance on such sources ignores the persistent theme in narratives by Japanese Americans about a wide — and widely resented — gap in accommodations. Documenting the resistance of Japanese Americans in the relocation centers to employment, he hardly mentions their anger about the insultingly low wages. Paying closer attention to the voices of the victims of U.S. policy would seem to be an obvious starting point in any history of the internment.[6]

Smith often presents pertinent information, only to mar it by questionable conclusions or generalizations. He prefaces his survey of Japanese-American reaction to Pearl Harbor with the flat statement that all Japanese Americans felt "freed" by the attack, only to follow it with a diary entry from Kikuchi contradicting this assertion (91). Smith describes the shockingly offhanded approach of Roosevelt to the issue in early 1942, and his deference to political and bureaucratic considerations in his final decision. This portrait is a far cry from Smith's thesis that "military necessity had been the overriding consideration for the President" (122). Smith details the protests by Japanese Americans against registration for the draft, which declared that while they were prohibited from returning home they should not have to serve in the U.S. Army. He concludes unconvincingly, however, that such arguments were "disingenuous," masking the allegiance of decisive numbers of Nisei to Japan

(337-8).

Smith's most questionable and offensive assumptions concern his descriptions of the "Japanese psyche," which he even characterizes as "inscrutable" to Westerners (70). Because of the subordination of the individual to the family and emperor in traditional Japanese society, Smith assumes that any persistence of cultural identity with Japan signified loyalty to the Japanese state in World War II, though the evidence presented often does not support this generalization (76-82). From this obsession with an ingrained Japanese psychology, it is only a small step for Smith to accept DeWitt's openly racist argument that the "undiluted racial strains" of the Issei and Nisei would lead to cooperation with the Japanese military (124). In a truly bizarre passage, he presents as evidence of this Japanese psyche the controversial cooperation of the Japanese American Citizens League with the FBI in rounding up suspected Japanese sympathizers. This kind of intrigue, the argument goes, is supposedly characteristic of Japanese politics (83).[7] Without this essentialist notion of an ingrained Japanese psychology, Smith's interconnected thesis falls apart.

In the end, Smith advances an updated vision of the old Oscar Handlin-style immigration history. That is to say, U.S. society was quite harsh on first-generation immigrants, but such treatment was necessary in order to make American individuals out of tradition-bound, communally-oriented peasants.[8] Smith openly laments the failure up to the 1940s to replace fatalist values and communal ties in the Japanese-American community with "autonomous individuals..., 'inner-directed' men and women, ready to venture 'out on their own,'" (425). Only the shock of literally uprooting these communities could break down the "Japanese psyche." So, Smith concludes, Japanese Americans benefited from the evacuation because they were now able to face life in the U.S. as real Americans, that is to say, as individuals. Such an interpretation obviously collides with the views of many in the Japanese-American community who believe that removal and internment were and remain a founding moment of their ethnic identity and of their conflicting relationship to U.S. society.[9]

But Smith goes even further. The relocation camps themselves, he tells us, would not have solved the problem completely if not for the atom bomb. The obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was necessary not only to end the war in the Pacific but to force the Japanese emperor to acknowledge to his subjects that he was only human, thus breaking the hitherto inexorable link between Japanese ethnicity and the Japanese state. So Smith, who began by asserting that Pearl Harbor unleashed a feeling of freedom among Japanese Americans, ends by saying that their real freedom could only begin after — and because of — Hiroshima (439-440). Thus, the internment and the

bomb, two events which some historians have linked to make the case that the war in the Pacific had a strong racist component, become in Smith's hands the preconditions for the heroic triumph of Western individualism.[10] And some people accuse left-wing multiculturalists of purveying "feel-good" history!

Smith himself had attacked self-congratulatory versions of history in previous books. He ended his long study of the Civil War by referring to the greed it unleashed, and he declared elsewhere that "[w]e had too long solaced ourselves with spurious and inflated history, obscuring or ignoring our cruelties and injustices."[11] Keeping these ideas in mind might have led Smith to a more accurate and usable book on the Japanese-American experience in World War II.

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NOTES

1 The most influential work has been Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps, U.S.A: Japanese Americans and World War II* (N.Y., 1972), but see also: Morton Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed* (Chicago, 1949); Jacobus ten Broek et al, *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution* (Berkeley, 1954); Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (N.Y., 1976); Peter Irons, *Justice at War* (N.Y., 1983); John Tateishi, *And Justice for All: An Oral History of the Japanese American Detention Camps* (N.Y., 1984); the multi-volume document collection *American Concentration Camps*, ed. by Daniels (N.Y., 1989); and Sandra Taylor, *Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz* (Berkeley, 1993).

2 See Leslie Hatamiya, *Righting a Wrong: Japanese Americans and the Passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988* (Stanford, 1988), and William Minoru Hohri, *Repairing America: An Account of the Movement for Japanese-American Redress* (Pullman, WA., 1988).

3 For a well-documented study which presents similar evidence on this point, but with very different implications, see Brian Masaru Hayashi, *'For the Sake of Our Japanese Brethren': Assimilation, Nationalism, and Protestantism Among the Japanese of Los Angeles, 1895-1942* (Stanford, CA., 1995).

4 See Richard Drinnon, *Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism* (Berkeley, 1987).

5 Ingrid Winther Scobie, *Center Stage: Helen Gahagan Douglas, A Life* (N.Y., 1992); Helen Gahagan Douglas, A Full Life (Garden City, N.Y., 1982).

6 See Yoshiko Uchida, *Desert Exile: The Uprooting of a Japanese American Family*

(Seattle, 1982) and Charles Kikuchi, *The Kikuchi Diary: Chronicle from an American Concentration Camp*, ed. by John Modell (Urbana, IL., 1973). Smith draws heavily but tendentiously from Kikuchi. For an overview of recent Japanese-American accounts, see Arthur Hansen, "Oral History and the Japanese American Evacuation," *Journal of American History* 82 (Sept. 1995), 625-639.

7 Alert readers might note parallels in this notion that Nisei cooperation with U.S. authorities manifested loyalty to Japanese ideals to Earl Warren's long-discredited 1942 claim that the fact that no sabotage by Japanese Americans had yet occurred was evidence that Japanese Americans were planning such sabotage.

8 Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (Boston, 1951). For a challenge to Handlin by the "new immigration history," see John Bodnar, *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America* (Bloomington, IN., 1985). For a survey of Japanese-American immigration from the "new immigration history" framework, see Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (Boston, 1989).

9 See Yasuko Takezawa, *Breaking the Silence: Redress and Japanese American Ethnicity* (Ithaca, 1995).

10 See John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (N.Y., 1986).

11 Page Smith, *Trial by Fire: A People's History of the Civil War and Reconstruction* (N.Y., 1982), 992-95; idem., *Redeeming the Time: A People's History of the 1920's and the New Deal* (N.Y., 1987), 1140.

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